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Chapter I: 
Introduction to the Eurozone Crisis: Where there’s 
smoke, there’s fire 
As smoke hung heavily over Athens and unforgiving winds blowing out of 
central Europe spread searing flames toward Greece’s ancient capital, resi-
dents fled the scorching embers and deadly heat, leaving behind homes and 
livelihoods. Escaping the late August 2009 wildfires, none could have known 
that the conflagration pursuing them was only the beginning of a Homeric 
ordeal that would dash the dreams of millions, ruin personal fortunes, topple 
governments, and threaten to destroy the aspirations of an entire continent. In 
the ashes of the pine trees, olive groves and burned foundations, the seeds of 
an economic and political crisis would soon germinate, with repercussions 
affecting financial markets across the globe. Athens would enflame again, 
although desperation and frustration, not tinder-dry woods, would fuel future 
fires. 
In the weeks following the wildfires, perceived failures in the Greek 
government’s response to them, coupled with years of apparent neglect of the 
firefighting service, and suspicions that the forest fires were the product of 
unscrupulous land developers using arson to avoid the bureaucracy involved 
in clearing protected forests, ignited new calls for the ousting of the sitting 
center-right New Democracy Party. The party, already stung by a string of 
earlier corruption scandals and holding only a one-seat majority in the Hel-
lenic Parliament, made a strategic blunder. In an attempt to gain greater par-
liamentary leverage, prime minister Kostas Karamanlis called a snap election 
in hopes of consolidating his party’s power over the main opposition Pan 
Hellenic Movement (PASOK) and several smaller parties. That early Sep-
tember decision proved disastrous: the voters punished New Democracy, 
giving it its lowest vote share in party history (up to that time). Unbeknownst 
to the electorate, however, the returns of the Greek legislative election of 
October 2009 would set in motion the events of what has since come to be 
known as the eurozone crisis. 
The newly elected center-left PASOK government, led by George Papan-
dreou, assumed office and began to sort through the ledger left by its prede-
cessor. The audit revealed a much larger deficit than expected. For years, 
previous Greek governments had hidden massive debts from the rest of the 
European Union (EU), apparently to obscure the fact that Greece had not met 
the necessary debt and deficit commitments that “eurozone” countries, are 
14 
required to meet.1 Countries failing to meet such commitments in the EU 
were not unusual. Other countries in the recent past, including the largest 
economies in the bloc, France and Germany, had also failed to meet these 
targets, especially the deficit target set at three percent of gross domestic 
product (GDP). More recently, the 2008 global financial crisis and the ensu-
ing government actions across the continent to stabilize markets had also left 
several other member states outside EU-mandated fiscal guidelines. Deficits 
were not unusual. What shocked markets was the scale of the revelation: 
Greece’s estimated government deficit for 2009 more than tripled, revised 
from a previous 3.7 percent of GDP to 12.5 percent shortly after the new 
government took office. By April 2010, new EU figures suggested the deficit 
was even larger – nearer to fourteen percent.2 The implications of this admis-
sion forced investors worldwide to reconsider their faith in the safety of sov-
ereign debt, a faith that had already been tested in rescuing the world finan-
cial system in the aftermath of the 2008 global market crash. Questioning the 
solvency of sovereign debt threatened to undermine the only source of 
seeming certainty in a still fledgling financial recovery. 
Such revisions in official statistics are rare; in Greece, however, such 
revisions were part of a repeated pattern of obfuscation. Since 2005, the EU 
had expressed reservations no fewer than five times regarding the biannual 
reporting of Greek debt and deficit figures. The EU’s own statistical agency, 
Eurostat, had first suggested Greece was guilty of misreporting these num-
bers in 2004. Following the most recent post-election revelations, on 10 
November 2009, the European Economic and Financial Affairs Council 
(ECOFIN) once more issued a statement imploring the Greek government to 
rectify the reporting issues and called for an investigation of the ongoing 
accounting problems in Greece.3 In its August 2010 follow-up report, the 
                                                          
1  The eurozone consists of eighteen countries. Greek deficit and debt had been hidden using 
several tactics for years, including using special financial accounting practices to present 
misleading government expenditure statistics. See http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/14/ 
business/global/14debt.html?pagewanted=1&hp (accessed 31 August 2015). 
2  These figures come from the European Commission, Report on Greek Government Deficit 
and Debt Statistics, Brussels, 8 January 2010 COM(2010) 1 Final. Eventually the deficit 
would be re-estimated to be 15.6 percent of GDP http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/ 
4187653/6404656/COM_2010_report_greek/c8523cfa-d3c1-4954-8ea1-64bb11e59b3a (ac-
cessed 31 August 2015). 
3  The ECOFIN statement declared the following: “The Council REGRETS the renewed 
problems in the Greek fiscal statistics. The Council CALLS ON the Greek government to 
urgently take measures to restore the confidence of the European Union in Greek statistical 
information and the related institutional setting. The Council INVITES the Commission to 
produce a report before the end of 2009. Moreover, the Council INVITES the Commission 
to propose the appropriate measures to be taken in this situation. In this context, the Council 
WELCOMES the commitment by the Government to address this issue swiftly and seri-
ously and CONSIDERS the measures announced recently, such as those aiming to make 
the National Statistical Service fully independent, to be steps in the right direction” p. 4 
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European Commission identified two primary causes of the repeated pattern 
of upward debt and deficit revisions: Greece’s accounting procedures; and 
poor governance influencing fiscal reporting. The latter problem was far 
more troubling than the former as it implied the reported state of Greek fi-
nances could be more dependent on electoral and political cycles than on the 
true state of affairs. While it was stated more diplomatically in official terms, 
Greece was charged with allowing official agencies to “cook the books” 
when politically expedient. A quiet suspicion all along, the new deficit revi-
sions in 2009 created a tipping point in financial markets. These problems 
would no longer be ignored or overlooked. What else had been discounted or 
misreported in other member states? Was sovereign debt really as safe as 
credit agencies had rated it? 
Just as fraud issues in the US housing crisis led to a loss of investor 
confidence in what was considered very safe assets, mortgages, and eventu-
ally led to the 2008 global financial crisis, Greek reporting of fraudulent 
numbers led to a loss of confidence in the ultimate safe investment, sovereign 
debt, that is debt backed by national governments, and eventually led to the 
eurozone crisis. Unlike in 2008, however, Europe would feel the effects of 
this crisis for years instead of months. Angela Merkel warned it would be a 
marathon.4 According to the EU’s Web site, “the inspiration for the € symbol 
itself came from the Greek epsilon () – a reference to the cradle of Euro-
pean civilization – and the first letter of the word Europe, crossed by two 
parallel lines to ‘certify’ the stability of the euro.”5 Ironically, Greece would 
come to ‘certify’ the instability of the euro. 
The European Union: A Model for the World? 
Part of the mystique of the euro is its symbolic power. The euro would allow 
the EU to displace the United States as the dominant economic superpower. 
At the turn of the millennium, both T.R. Reid, in his book The United States 
of Europe: The New Superpower and the End of American Supremacy and 
Mark Leonard in Why Europe will run the 21st Century argued that the Eu-
ropean model was superior to the American one, and would become the 
world’s new benign hegemon. The euro was the symbol of this new reign: 
                                                          
Council of the European Union, Council conclusions on EU Statistics, 2972nd Economic 
and Financial Affairs Brussels, 10 November 2009, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ 
uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/111007.pdf (accessed 3 August 2015). 
4  Euronews “Merkel warns of marathon to solve euro-crisis” 2 December 2011 
http://www.euronews.com/2011/12/02/merkel-warns-of-marathon-to-solve-euro-crisis/ (ac-
cessed 3 August 2015). 
5  http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/euro/cash/symbol/index_en.htm. 
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In pursuit of economic union, Europeans have thrown their marks, 
francs, lira, escudos, drachma, and so on into history’s trash can and re-
placed them all with the new common currency, the euro, a new currency 
that has more daily users than the US dollar. … Europeans want to see 
the euro replace the dollar as the world’s reserve currency…, [b]ut Eu-
rope’s new money is more than money. It is also a political statement – a 
daily message in every pocket that cooperation has replaced conflict 
across the continent.6 
As a symbol of the EU’s success, the euro’s image graces more than bills and 
coins; it has been the ubiquitous emblem of Europe idealized in many art 
forms, including a neo-classical statue in front of the European Parliament 
building in Brussels (see image 1-1). 
 
Image 1-1: A neo-classical statue of the euro displayed in front of the European Par-
liament building in Brussels. Photo by Stephanie Anderson. 
Despite hopes that the creation of the euro would allow the EU to rival the 
US as global hegemon, many observers have worried about the currency’s 
underlying administrative structure. Ultimately, the euro required an eco-
nomic ‘leap of faith’ that it would be managed prudently. Skeptics have long 
worried the euro was vulnerable to crises and economic mismanagement. As 
                                                          
6  T. R. Reid, The United States of Europe: The New Superpower and the End of American 
Supremacy (New York: The Penguin Press 2004,) 2. 
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early as 1997, Martin Feldstein, a Harvard economist, argued “there is no 
doubt that the real rationale for EMU is political and not economic. Indeed, 
the adverse economic effects of a single currency on unemployment and 
inflation would outweigh any gains from facilitating trade and the capital 
flows among the EMU members.”7 
Once trouble began, the structure of the currency union would not create 
the incentives necessary for union members to take corrective action to avoid 
ever worsening outcomes. In a 2005 HSBC report called “European Melt-
down?”, Robert Prior-Wandesforde and Gwyn Hacche warned: 
The eurozone’s current path is unsustainable. We believe the single cur-
rency has helped create significant economic strains which look set to 
become more and more extreme if nothing is done. In particular, it is 
probably only a matter of time before Germany and the Netherlands are 
dragged into deflation, while Italy seems destined to move in and out of 
recession for years to come.8 
Some even doubted the ability of the common currency to survive, being 
used by so many different countries, each with potentially different goals and 
objectives and likely most concerned with their own self-interests. In 2006, 
Frits Bolkestein, the former EU internal market commissioner, questioned the 
chances of survival for the euro in the long term as he thought leaders would 
put short term political interests ahead of the long term interests of the union. 
He argued that states “will be forced by political pressure to borrow more and 
increase their budget deficit, with consequences for interest rates and infla-
tion,” so “the real test for the euro is not now, but in ten years time.”9 Not 
incurring a deficit requires reducing spending, politically an unpopular 
decision that could cost an election. Deficits among countries would, how-
ever, threaten the currency union. This chain of events is exactly what hap-
pened and resulted in the European financial crisis. 
As long as the eurozone continued to show good growth, however, the 
early naysayers were ignored, that is until the eurozone crisis gave the cynics 
their day in the sun. Feldstein almost gleefully said ‘I told you so’ in his arti-
cle titled, “The Failure of the Euro: The Little Currency that Couldn’t”.10 
Rather than becoming a model for the world, Europe, in the months – and 
                                                          
7  Martin Feldstein, “EMU and International Conflict,” Foreign Affairs (1997): 60. 
8  Robert Prior-Wandesforde and Gwyn Hacche, “European meltdown? Europe fiddles as 
Rome burns” HSBC Global Research, July 2005, http://quantlabs.net/academy/download/ 
free_quant_instituitional_books_/%5BHSBC%5D%20European%20Meltdown%20-%20 
Europe%20Fiddles%20as%20Rome%20Burns.pdf (accessed 3 August 2015). 
9  Mark Beunderman, “Ex-commissioner questions survival of euro” EUObserver.com, 26 
January 2006. 
10  Martin Feldstein, “The Failure of the Euro: The Little Currency that Couldn’t” Foreign 
Affairs (January/February 2012): 91:1, 105-116. 
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now years – since the crisis began, has seemed in decline. In 2014, almost a 
full five years after the crisis began, European Council President Herman 
Van Rompuy went so far as to say the EU was in “a survival crisis!”11 
The crisis, apparently caused by one of the monetary union’s smallest 
member states, has had dramatic effects, not only on the economies of Eu-
rope, but also on human lives. While other countries, for example the United 
States, have been able to find the path to economic recovery relatively 
quickly after the financial crisis, the EU has unfortunately not. The Interna-
tional Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) published 
a report in 2013 stating that the humanitarian impact of the crisis had only 
begun to rear its ugly head. The report chastised the EU: “Whilst other conti-
nents successfully reduce poverty, Europe adds to it.”12 
This long-lasting economic crisis surrounding the euro has had inevitable 
political consequences too, ones that have undermined the very reason for its 
existence. As unemployment and even suicide rates increased across the most 
affected by the crisis, the extreme right, including neo-Nazi parties, the an-
tithesis of European integration, has increased in popularity and with it calls 
for a return to national currencies and a rollback of the European Union. In 
France, in May 2012, the National Front took eighteen percent in the presi-
dential elections, the best results the party has ever received. In the same 
month, Golden Dawn, an extreme nationalist party, which some have accused 
of being openly racist, won a seven percent share of votes in Greek legisla-
tive elections. In recent polling, the anti-immigrant Freedom Party is the third 
largest party in the Netherlands, as is the Danish People’s Party in Denmark. 
Austria’s Freedom Party has similarly been running second in opinion polls. 
Jobbik, currently polling second, is the fastest growing party in Hungary. Its 
leader, Gabor Vona, has accused the EU of colonizing its nation; its MPs 
removed the EU flag from the Representatives’ office building. 
The widespread suffering caused by economic conditions, coupled with 
political opportunism by parties hoping to gain from the general dissatisfac-
tion of the electorate, has generated a great deal of negative press and cast a 
pall on the idea of European integration. According to the Pew research cen-
ter, many Europeans are second-guessing whether EU membership is a “good 
thing” for their country.13 Eurobarometer, the EU polling organization, notes 
                                                          
11  Herman Van Rompuy, Speech by President Herman Van Rompuy at the Brussels Eco-
nomic Forum 2014 – 4th Annual Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa Lecture, Brussels, 10 June 
2014 EUCO 127/14, 5 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/ 
en/ec/143160.pdf (accessed 3 August 2015). 
12  The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), Think Differently: 
Humanitarian Impacts of the Economic Crisis in Europe, (Geneva: IFRC, 2013) 10, 
http://www.ifrc.org/PageFiles/134339/1260300-Economic%20crisis%20Report_EN_LR.pdf. 
13  Pew Research Center, “European Union: The Latest Casualty of the Eurozone Crisis” 
http://www.pewglobal.org/european-union-the-latest-casualty-of-the-euro-crisis/. 
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that a majority of Europeans are worried about the effects of the crisis on 
their personal finances, and are pessimistic about the future. Such feelings are 
reflected in numerous political cartoons where the EU is sometimes depicted 
as a sinking ship. 
Is the EU really sinking? Hope for the union is not completely lost. Truth 
be told, polling data and electoral results still indicate a majority of Europe-
ans, even within the eurozone, support the ideals of European integration, the 
EU, and the common currency. Despite the growth of fringe parties and peo-
ple’s worries, the European Union has still maintained support, even in the 
worst days of the crisis. For example, in October 2011, Eurobarometer re-
ported that a majority of Europeans, fifty-five percent, believed that coordi-
nated economic action within the EU would provide better protection in the 
current crisis. Moreover, the Europeans are willing to put their money where 
their mouth is: according to one poll, fifty percent considered it “desirable” 
for their countries to give financial help to other EU member states.14 Accord-
ing to polls in 2012, a majority of people in eurozone countries thought the 
euro was good for their country and two-thirds thought it good for the EU.15 
Europeans in the eurozone do not want to abandon the currency, at least not 
yet. In other words, in the very short period of ten years, the euro may have 
succeeded in its political goal of creating a sense of unity among Europeans, 
but the crisis has certainly tested that unity. Subsequently, support for the 
EU, the euro and other EU institutions has fallen, and in the worst affected 
countries such as Greece, it may be the case that a majority no longer sup-
ports these ideas.
Extreme right and populist parties very often increase their support dur-
ing times of uncertainty and crisis. The question is whether such political 
changes will result in an undoing of what has been over fifty years of inte-
grative effort. If EU presidents and prime ministers can demonstrate coordi-
nated leadership on the issue and return economic stability to Europe, the EU 
model could still prove itself. German chancellor Angela Merkel has declared 
that, in response to the eurocrisis, the EU is on the inevitable path of political 
union. Perhaps; however, if Europe’s leadership cannot find the political will 
and resources to make difficult decisions, the euro could still fail, and with it, 
the European ideal could become bankrupt as well. Understanding these 
issues is the purpose of this book. 
                                                          
14  http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/topics/eb76_europeans__and__the__crisis_analytical__ 
summary_en.pdf. 
15 http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_362_sum_en.pdf. 
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Understanding the Eurozone Crisis: Layout of Book 
The eurozone crisis is particularly difficult to follow because of the inter-
twining of economics and politics among the now nineteen countries sharing 
the euro in not-quite-confederal European Union, against the backdrop of the 
international financial system. The book focuses on three key questions: 
1. Why has the eurocrisis been so severe?; 
2. Why did Europeans choose the sets of policies they did in reaction to 
the crisis?; and 
3. Why not abandon the euro altogether? 
First, why has the eurozone crisis been so long and so severe? After the 2008 
global financial crisis began in the US, Europe and most of the developed 
world, fell into recession. In the US and Europe, the financial crisis-induced 
recessions officially ended in the second quarter of 2009, with economic 
contraction lasting six quarters in the US and five in the EU and eurozone. 
Afterward, stronger growth occurred in Europe relative to the United States, 
until the European financial crisis started in late 2009. 
The structure of the monetary system left the eurozone sharing a com-
mon currency, but not a common treasury, allowing excessive debts to build 
up within the currency union that eventually led to the crisis. Once the crisis 
began, the common currency that tied member states together also allowed 
the crisis to spread more easily to other countries. By the last quarter of 2011, 
European economies began to contract as the crisis worsened, and its conta-
gion spread to most of the economies on the continent. Europe would not 
emerge from recession until 2013. 
“Emerge” might be too strong a term. As of 2015, this lack of growth has 
produced high unemployment across most of the continent, leaving some 
countries with Great-Depression-like conditions. Youth unemployment has 
hovered around fifty percent in Greece and Spain, while general unemploy-
ment rates are double or more what they were before the crisis, with the worst 
affected countries experiencing unemployment rates for the entire population 
in excess of twenty percent. 
Why has this crisis lingered for so long? In part, the answer lies in the 
cause, a financial crisis, which, when one occurs, results in worse conditions 
than the usual recession. There is also a strong case to be made that the poli-
cies European leaders chose to counteract the crisis actually exacerbated it. 
Given the severity of the eurozone crisis, policymaking would have been 
difficult under any circumstance, requiring difficult political and economic 
choices. The structure of the EU, however, made effective policy-making 
more difficult, as it created incentives within countries to act in their own 
interests and not necessarily in those of the entire Union’s. 
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Why did the eurozone member state governments choose the policies 
they did? Economics has typically provided an orthodox toolkit for use dur-
ing crises: Keynesianism. Keynesianism prescribes increased government 
expenditure to offset the drops in private sector spending that occurs during 
recessions, plus an expansion of the money supply to create growth in the 
economy through greater lending. The financial crisis, however, left crisis 
countries unable to borrow to finance the deficits Keynesianism requires. 
Moreover, eurozone countries were initially unable to come to agreement 
regarding expansion of the money supply for fear it would touch off inflation 
in those countries not yet affected by economic contraction. As a result, the 
only policy choice left was “austerity”, i.e., cutting government spending in 
an effort to reduce deficits and balance the books. This policy choice, unfor-
tunately, led to even greater economic contraction as economies now saw 
more reduction in economic activity and worsening unemployment. 
Such outcomes appear to have worsened the crisis, or at best prolonged 
it, as well as resulting in the deterioration of political support for the Union. 
The following chapters explain these issues in more detail. 
Second, why did the European Union member states, whose economic 
policies, in the past, have been much more interventionist than those of the 
US, now reject these policies? Because many attributed the crisis to a case of 
poor Greek management rather than to structural problems within the euro-
zone. To many in Europe, the narrative of the European financial crisis began 
with Greece accumulating excessive debt and deficits prior to the crisis, 
making the government dependent on borrowing to maintain government 
operations, social entitlements, and to finance interest payments. When the 
crisis hit, lenders were no longer willing to support such a situation with 
more loans. The clear solution was to reduce the debt through government 
cutbacks; however, doing so required massive cuts to spending and entitle-
ments. Such cuts were both massively unpopular and insufficient to balance 
the books. Without borrowing, interest payments could not be met and a 
Greek national default loomed. Avoiding this would require Europe bailing 
out Greece, but who should pay? 
The question of “who should pay” led to issues of morality, sovereignty, 
and national pride: Should Germans and Finns pay for what many in these 
countries perceived were caused by a corrupt government of Greece? Would 
bailing out Greece only encourage such behavior in the future, undermining a 
long-term solution to the real problem – excessive debt? Understandably, 
countries in Europe, especially those in the richer north, did not want to pay 
for the mistakes of Greece, or, later, of other southern countries. Rather, some 
leaders and EU citizens felt these countries needed to learn the true costs of 
profligate spending and to reform in order to regain the confidence of credit 
markets. At the same time, the other member states had to save their own 
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financial systems, which were deeply intertwined with those of Greece and 
the rest of Europe. 
The result was limited bailouts in return for austerity in aided countries. 
Fearing default, the markets cut off access to credit leaving the governments 
of the affected economies high and dry. To qualify for bailouts, the govern-
ments had to adhere to austerity measures causing these economies to con-
tract, thereby reducing tax revenues and worsening deficits, instead of cor-
recting them. Instead of improving the crisis, Europe’s reaction actually led 
to a death spiral in many troubled economies. Was this result inevitable or 
would other policies have avoided such a situation? While this book argues in 
the affirmative, it also attempts to equip readers with the tools to draw their 
own conclusions. 
Finally, considering all the economic problems, why does the euro con-
tinue to exist? Why has the euro been able to withstand the stress? Why has it 
not broken? European Central Bank president Mario Draghi once likened the 
euro to the bumblebee: it should not have been able to fly.16 Why did it, and 
does it still? Did the very idea of the euro, that is this new symbol of Euro-
pean unity, contribute both to its ability to defy gravity and its tensile strength 
in withstanding all the economic pressures of the international financial mar-
kets? This book analyzes and evaluates the political power of the euro as a 
symbol to rally people and governments to withstand severe austerity 
measures. However, can this symbolic power sustain the euro indefinitely? 
The rise of anti-euro and anti-Europe parties across the continent as well the 
disunity and dissension among member states begs the question of whether 
the eurozone crisis will breed so much mistrust among the peoples that pop-
ular support for the European project will decline or possibly even evaporate 
completely. 
This book explores the crisis in detail. Chapter two provides an historical 
background and explains how the European Union itself functions. Next, it 
explains the economic, political, and symbolic importance of the euro as well 
as the evolution of economic and monetary union. 
Chapter three discusses the economic theory behind the single currency. 
It compares the requirements necessary for a perfect currency union to those 
existing in the European Union. 
Chapter four delves into the specific economic, political and cultural dif-
ferences that make up the eurozone member countries. By comparing the so-
called PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece & Spain) or GIPSI (Greece, 
Ireland, Portugal, Spain & Italy), both offensive acronyms, countries with 
each other and with the wealthier countries in the eurozone, the authors 
                                                          
16  Speech by Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank at the Global Investment 
Conference in London, 26 July 2012, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2012/ 
html/sp120726.en.html. 
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demonstrate that all countries bear some of the blame; the eurozone crisis is a 
product of an intricate economic minuet between the north and the south. 
This chapter also pays particular attention to Germany as the main actor in 
policy formation. 
In chapter five, the authors create a timeline of the crisis explaining how 
each event led to the next, from the discovery of Greece’s ‘cooked books’ to 
the European Central Bank’s decision to launch its “big bazooka”. 
Finally, in the conclusion, the authors provide counterfactuals: what 
would have happened economically and politically had the euro split up? 
Next, the authors assess the economic and political costs of the crisis. Inter-
estingly, the economic costs far outweigh the political; in some ways, the 
European Union may be stronger today politically than it was before the 
crisis. In the end, the authors conclude that, in light of the weak leadership 
seen during the crisis, there is an inverse relationship between comfort and 
cooperation.17 It is possible that only through the crucible of a crisis will the 
European project be able to achieve the integration that Europe has aspired to 
for over half a century. 
 
                                                          
17  The authors are indebted to Thomas R. Seitz for this observation. 
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Chapter II: 
European Integration: The Road to the EU and the 
Euro 
The Origins of European Integration 
The road to a common European currency began during the aftermath of World 
War II in a drive to integrate the continent. The idea of a united Europe became 
increasingly popular in the 1940s when resistance groups preached unity to 
combat the nationalism that had started two world wars. Jean Monnet, who 
would later be called the “father of Europe,” was a leading advocate of this 
school of thinking: 
There will be no peace in Europe if the States are reconstituted on the ba-
sis of national sovereignty, with all that that entails in terms of prestige 
politics and economic protectionism. … The countries of Europe are too 
small to guarantee their peoples the prosperity that modern conditions 
make possible and consequently necessary. They need larger markets. … 
Prosperity for the States of Europe and the social developments that must 
go with it will only be possible if they form a federation or a ‘European 
entity’ that makes them into a common economic unit…18 
In his address on 19 September 1946 at the University of Zurich, UK states-
man Winston Churchill agreed calling for the creation of a United States of 
Europe: 
We must build a kind of United States of Europe. In this way only will 
hundreds of millions of toilers be able to regain the simple joys and 
hopes, which make life worth living. The process is simple. All that is 
needed is the resolve of hundreds of millions of men and women to do 
right instead of wrong and to gain as their reward blessing instead of 
cursing… 
The structure of the United States of Europe, if well and truly built, will 
be such as to make the material strength of a single state less important. 
Small nations will count as much as large ones and gain their honour by 
their contribution to the common cause.19 
                                                          
18  Jean Monnet, Speech to the National Liberation Committee, 1943, http://www.cvce.eu/ 
content/publication/1997/10/13/b61a8924-57bf-4890-9e4b-73bf4d882549/publishable_en.pdf 
(accessed 28 July 2015). 
19  Winston Churchill, Speech to the Academic Youth in Zurich, University of Zurich, September 
9, 1946. 
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Such a construction sounds straightforward enough, but how does one gain 
“the resolve of hundreds of millions of men and women”? In the case of the 
United States, a multinational state of immigrants, identity is woven around a 
civil religion20 and a creed rather than the traditional glue of race or lan-
guage.21 To construct a ‘European’, that is to graft a new affiliation and 
loyalty atop the long-existing national ones, Monnet proposed: “Make men 
work together. Show them that beyond their differences and geographical 
boundaries there lies a common interest.”22 
As the first step, French statesmen Robert Schuman and Monnet collabo-
rated on a revolutionary proposal to pool Europe’s coal and steel resources 
under a European government: 
By pooling basic production and by instituting a new High Authority, 
whose decisions will bind France, Germany and other member countries, 
this proposal will lead to the realization of the first concrete foundation 
of a European federation indispensable to the preservation of peace.23 
The Treaty of Paris, signed on 18 April 1951 created the European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC) among France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux 
countries (Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg) and established the 
first supranational European governmental institution. Its purpose was to 
coordinate and consolidate the economic interests of member states to 
achieve war-time reconstruction quickly, raise living standards, and ensure 
European peace by pooling the coal and steel production capability of all six 
nations, which had historically been central to national munitions production. 
Governance of the ECSC was directed by several institutions, each a 
forerunner of similar institutions functioning today in the European Union. 
The executive body governing the ECSC, the High Authority, would eventu-
ally evolve into the European Commission. Its charge was to work in the 
interest of the community of nations as opposed to national interests. The 
ECSC also had a Common Assembly with consultative power to the High 
Authority, but no direct legislative power. Originally made up of seventy-
eight members appointed or elected by their constituent states, this body was 
the forerunner of the modern European Parliament. The Special Council of 
Ministers included representatives from the member states’ national govern-
                                                          
20  Jürgen Habermas, Ciaran Cronin, and Pablo De Greiff, The Inclusion of the Other: Studies 
in Political Theory (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1998), 113. 
21  Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism (New York: Verso Books, 2006), 47. 
22  Tim Lister, “Britain, Germany and France – Europe’s reluctant dance partners,” CNN.com, 
December 11, 2011, http://www.cnn.com/2011/12/09/world/europe/europe-triangular-
relationship. 
23  The Schuman Declaration, 9 May 1950 http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-information/ 
symbols/europe-day/schuman-declaration/index_en.htm (accessed 25 July 2015). 
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ments. This group evolved into the EU’s Council, also known as the Council 
of Ministers. The High Authority required the consent of the Special Council 
in all areas of executive action except coal and steel, where the Council of 
Ministers only advised the High Authority. In this way, national interests 
were represented in non-coal and steel decisions as Council rules requiring 
unanimity in decision-making allowed members to veto actions not in their 
country’s interest. Other institutions governing the ECSC included the Court 
of Justice, which adjudicated disputes and ensured ECSC laws were ob-
served, as well as the Consultative Community. The Court continues today as 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The Consultative Community, an advi-
sory group to the High Authority representing coal and steel consumers and 
dealers, workers (unions), and employers, was a precursor to today’s Eco-
nomic and Social Committee of the EU. 
Nationalist versus Federalist Tensions: The Evolution of the 
European Union (1957-2009) 
One year after the signing of the Treaty of Rome, in 1958, nationalist senti-
ments in the European Economic Community (EEC) began to grow, particu-
larly in France, with the election of Charles De Gaulle as President of the 
newborn Fifth Republic. De Gaulle disapproved of France’s status in the 
EEC as one among six rather than as leader. He believed the fragile govern-
ments of the previous Fourth Republic had negotiated the Treaty of Rome 
from a position of weakness. De Gaulle eschewed supranational integration 
efforts, instead envisioning “l’Europe des patries” or a “Europe of states”, 
with France as its de facto head. In 1960, when Denmark, Norway, Ireland 
and the United Kingdom applied for membership, France, fearing its foreign 
policy interests could be undermined by this wider expansion, particularly the 
addition of the United Kingdom, vetoed British admission to the EEC, re-
sulting in the suspension of the remaining countries’ membership processes 
and a victory for France’s nationalist interests. 
The conflict between nationalist and federalist efforts came to a head in 
1965, when French concerns regarding its sovereignty over agricultural pol-
icy resulted in “the empty chair” crisis. As a protest over the use of majority 
voting in the Council, which had undermined the principle of national vetoes, 
the French withdrew representation from the Council, effectively halting 
proceedings. The Luxembourg Compromise of 1966 resulted, which insti-
tuted the practice of vetoes in matters of national interest. This practice con-
tinues to this day and has, thus, limited the formation of a strong, federal, 
European governance system. 
De Gaulle’s opposition to the supranational authority of EEC institutions 
also resulted in the first informal European leaders’ summits in 1961 as an 
attempt to offset the growing power of the EEC’s supranational authority. 
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Although these early meetings did not initially create a permanent nationalist 
counterweight to federal EC power, they eventually resulted in the creation of 
a new European institution in 1975 – the European Council. This body, now 
the preeminent decision-making body, is made up of member state chief 
executives, and takes decisions by consensus, i.e., all members retain a veto, 
except where the treaties provide otherwise.24 
Although the United Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland were formally ad-
mitted to the EEC in 1973 after De Gaulle’s death, the European project had 
lost much of its momentum and entered a period called “Eurosclerosis”. 
Despite the establishment of a common market in 1958, interstate trade 
remained stymied by a host of non-tariff barriers and customs regulations. 
Federalists demonstrated to remove customs and border controls altogether. 
To revive the European integration process, the 1986 Single European Act 
(SEA), the first major revision of the original Treaties of Rome, sought “to 
improve the economic and social situation by extending common policies and 
pursuing new objectives” and “to ensure a smoother functioning of the 
Communities.” 
A common currency seemed the natural accompaniment to the newly 
completed single market. The Delors Report (1989) established the stages 
and processes by which monetary union should occur, and in 1992, the Maas-
tricht treaty set the ball in motion. It also changed the EU’s governing struc-
ture to one based on ‘three pillars:’ the European Community pillar; the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy pillar; and the Justice and Home 
Affairs pillar. Although the first pillar served largely as an extension of ex-
isting institutional structures, the latter two pillars were established to keep 
these areas purely intergovernmental, that is, firmly in the grasp of the mem-
ber states and out of the hands of the EU institutions. Forty years after 
Churchill’s speech in Zurich, the political and economic integration of Eu-
rope was well underway, yet the balancing of nationalist and supranational 
interests continued to define the Union’s governance. 
In 2009, the Lisbon treaty, a less ambitious version of the failed Constitu-
tional treaty of 2005, replaced the rotating member state presidency with a per-
manent president of the European Council in order to provide continuity of 
leadership. In addition, it augmented the power of the High Representative for 
Foreign and Security Policy by making him/her a Vice President of the Euro-
pean Commission, changed the system of qualified majority voting in the 
Council, and boosted the power of the European Parliament by forcing the 
European Council to nominate a Commission president in line with EP election 
results and by increasing its legislative mandate. It also removed the pillar 
system. The euro was named the official currency of the EU, and the European 
                                                          
24  Treaty on European Union, article 15(4). 
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Central Bank became an official EU institution. However, these changes had 
little impact on the governance of the eurozone crisis. 
 
Image 2-1: Demonstration for a common currency outside the Berlaymont, 12 May 
1978, © EC P-001974/04-07, http://ec.europa.eu/avservices/photo/photoDetails.cfm? 
sitelang=en&mgid=64#2 (accessed 31 July 2015). 
How the EU Works 
The nationalist versus federalist tensions visible in the governing structures 
of the EU make it difficult to label. It is not a federation, like the United 
States, where each of the states has signed a constitution and agreed to submit 
to the federal authority. In general, the member states run the show in the EU. 
There is no federal government with the power to tax and spend. The lion’s 
share of financing comes from member state contributions as a percentage of 
their Gross National Income (GNI). In other words, Brussels is dependent on 
the member states for money; the EU’s independent sources of income, from 
customs duties on imports and through VAT, only covers roughly a third of 
expenditure. The member states also retain their powers over foreign, secu-
rity, and defense policy; were these policies to shift to Brussels, the member 
states would have to agree explicitly in a treaty. The power to amend the 
treaties resides exclusively among the member states. Nevertheless, there are 
supranational or federal elements to the European Union. All member states 
are bound by the European Court of Justice, as well as by Commission regu-
lations and directives. The member states have surrendered all competence in 
certain areas to the European Commission, for example, in commercial and 
fisheries policies. 
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This odd set of governing structures with supranational (where there is an 
authority higher than the state governing state behavior) and intergovern-
mental qualities (where decisions are made by consensus among the states) 
has led to the label of sui generis – basically, a species unto itself. Neither 
fish nor fowl, the EU is in a class of its own. 
Yet, this designation is unsatisfying. Being neither here nor there, nu-
merous academics, politicians, and European citizens want the EU to become 
a real federation. However, federalism is also known as the ‘F-word’, and 
many, especially on the right side of the political spectrum, desire to move 
away from federalism, placing authority back in the national capitals. Such 
tension is visible throughout the history of the EU as each treaty bringing 
“ever closer union” is actually a compromise among the states where, super-
ficially, it appears that the Union is inching towards federation, yet the mem-
ber states preserve key competences. For example, the official name of the 
Maastricht treaty, which changed the name of the European Community to 
the European Union, was the Treaty on European Union, rather than the 
Treaty of European Union. In other words, it did not create a union, but only 
discussed it. The euro is a perfect example of such a compromise with the 
introduction of a common currency and a central bank, but without the corre-
sponding banking union or fiscal union and where national capitals retain 
crucial powers. 
Intergovernmental decision-making has defined Europe’s reaction to the 
eurozone crisis. Some governments have been unwilling to consider EU poli-
cies that might undermine their strength domestically or cost them an elec-
tion, thus constraining a strong EU-wide response to the crisis. Specifically, 
any policy that might imply an intergovernmental transfer of wealth to other 
nations has been especially difficult to agree upon, thereby undermining aid 
to the most troubled countries in the crisis, or the creation of new institutions 
that could strengthen the Union. Simply put, the structure of the EU system 
implies that domestic politics in individual states can have important impli-
cations on EU-wide decision-making. 
The EU’s Governance Structure 
Promising “ever closer union”, the founding 1957 Treaty of Rome created a 
governing structure akin to a presidential-parliamentary system25 with a 
                                                          
25  In the presidential-parliamentary or semi-presidential system, the cabinet, or in this case, 
the College of Commissioners, can be dismissed by either the European Commission presi-
dent or by the European Parliament in a vote of no confidence. Although the European Par-
liament may dismiss the College of Commissioners as a whole, the Parliament may neither 
appoint a new one nor remove individual Commissioners. The Commission President may 
remove individual Commissioners. 
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separate, bicameral legislative branch made up of a Council, composed of 
member state representatives, and a parliament to represent the people, an 
executive branch headed by the Commission to implement legislation, and a 
judicial branch in the form of the European Court of Justice. Although sepa-
rate, the powers of the different institutions were far from equal; the Council 
dominated. Until 1979, the parliament was indirectly elected with almost no 
powers. The power of legislative initiative lay solely in the Commission, and, 
yet, the member states in the European Council set the agenda for Europe. 
Each member state nominated a justice to sit on the Court. No decisions 
could be made without member state approval. 
 
Figure 2-1: A chart of EU governance. Solid arrows in the diagram identify who is re-
sponsible for appointing/electing the members of each body. Broken arrows denote 
legislative action. 
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As a rule of thumb, “The Commission proposes, the Council disposes.” In 
other words, the Commission has the exclusive right of initiative: only the 
Commission can propose legislation because the Commission represents 
Community interests rather than national interests. Nevertheless, individual 
member states can suggest legislation for the Commission to propose. The 
Commission is made up of the College of Commissioners, one from each 
member state, who, although member state appointees, promise to work in 
the Union’s interest only. In general, the Commission is composed of former 
or defeated politicians, for example, José Manuel Barroso, European Com-
mission president during the eurozone crisis, was a former prime minister of 
Portugal; Joaquín Almunia Amann, Commissioner for Competition, was the 
defeated socialist party candidate for prime minister of Spain. 
The Council of the European Union, often referred to simply as “the 
Council” or by its old name, “the Council of Ministers”, represents the gov-
ernments of the member states (MS). The Council meets in different configu-
rations of ministers. For example, the General Affairs Council (GAC) is 
composed of MS European Affairs ministers; the Economic and Finance 
Committee (EcoFin) is made up of economic and finance ministers from all 
member states. Each representative acts solely in the national interest. “The 
Council disposes” means that, typically, the member states have the final say 
over any proposed legislation. 
Depending on the competence involved, for example, customs union or secu-
rity policy, the EU has different procedures in place to guide legislative deci-
sions. Despite being the only directly elected institution, the European Par-
liament was customarily shut out of the legislative process until the 1990’s. 
Legislative decisions often by-passed the EP entirely, or only gave them a 
ceremonial nod. Under consultation (formerly assent) procedure, the Council 
‘consults’ with Parliament, but is under no obligation to incorporate its sug-
gestions. Such was the disdain for the Parliament that the EP took the Coun-
cil to the European Court of Justice – and won – demanding that the Council 
at least restrain from enacting a decision before the EP could render an opin-
ion. Consent procedure gives the EP the power of an up-or-down vote with-
out the ability to amend. Today, the European Parliament has increased clout 
as added competences have been shifted to what was called “co-decision”, 
now the ordinary legislative procedure. Under this procedure, the European 
Parliament is given equal power to the Council. With regards to the eurozone 
crisis, the European Parliament has played a marginal role. Article 133 of the 
Lisbon Treaty states, 
Without prejudice to the powers of the European Central Bank, the Eu-
ropean Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordi-
nary legislative procedure, shall lay down the measures necessary for the 
use of the euro as the single currency. Such measures shall be adopted 
after consultation of the European Central Bank. 
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Nevertheless, questions regarding breach of excessive deficit or external 
monetary agreements remain exclusively in the Council’s hands. 
The Euro as a Symbol: Creating the Currency of a(n) EUtopia 
The integration process may be losing steam. Decisions regarding the Euro-
pean Union are mainly addressed by national parliaments, i.e., the educated 
elites, with whom the idea of Europe has been highly popular.26 However, 
among the people, more than seventy-five percent of Europeans polled could 
not say how many member states there were.27 Such ignorance can be taken 
as an indication of apathy. When treaty ratification has been put to a popular 
vote, the results have been rather underwhelming. The Danes voted no in the 
first referendum on Maastricht. The French voted yes only by the narrowest 
of margins.28 The Irish rejected both the Treaty of Nice and the Treaty of 
Lisbon. Sweden, the UK, and Denmark have refused to join the single cur-
rency. The European Parliament elections of June 2004 reflected this public 
dissatisfaction with and skepticism towards the EU with a turnout of just 45.3 
percent; at the time, the lowest turnout in the history of the assembly. Moreo-
ver, in the new ten EU members, whose populace overwhelmingly voted to 
join, only twenty-six percent voted. To quote Parliament spokesman David 
Harley, it was a “disappointing and pathetically low turnout.”29 In 2009 and 
2014, turnout decreased further to 43 percent and 42.54 percent respec-
tively.30 Significantly, the Euro-skeptic and right-wing nationalist parties 
achieved their best results to date across the continent.31 Altogether, this 
public skepticism represents a significant ‘speed bump’ on the road to Euro-
pean integration. 
In the words of Raymond Aron, a sympathetic critic of European unity 
efforts, 
the name Europe distinguished a continent or a civilisation, not an eco-
nomic or political unit…. The European idea is empty; it has neither the 
transcendence of Messianic ideologies nor the immanence of concrete 
                                                          
26  Standard Eurobarometer 57 (2002), 12-15. 
27  Andrew Rettman, “Most Europeans don’t know their union has 25 states,” EUObserver.com, 
11 October 2006. 
28  The Maastricht treaty passed in France 50.5 percent “yes” and 49.5 percent “no”. 
29  Paul Taylor, “Europe’s Voters Turn Backs on EU, Governments,” Reuters, 14 June 2004. 
30  “Results of the 2014 European Elections,” European Parliament, http://www.results-elec-
tions2014.eu/en/turnout.html (accessed 3 August 2015). 
31  William Horsley, “Euro-skeptics storm the citadel,” BBC News, 14 June 2004. See also 
Economist, “The Eurosceptic Union,” 31 May 2014, http://www.economist.com/news/ 
europe/21603034-impact-rise-anti-establishment-parties-europe-and-abroad-eurosceptic-
union?zid=309&ah=80dcf288b8561b012f603b9fd9577f0e (accessed 3 August 2015). 
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patriotism. It was created by intellectuals, and that fact accounts at once 
for its genuine appeal to the mind and its feeble echo in the heart.32 
Benedict Anderson argued, “in themselves, market-zones, ‘natural’-geo-
graphic or politico-administrative, do not create attachments. Who will will-
ingly die for the Comecon or the EEC?”33 Jacques Delors recognized the 
problem when he warned that “you can’t fall in love with a single market.” 
Economic advantages of integration do not sway public opinion. Rather, 
according to Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, identity does: “Citizens do 
indeed take into account the economic consequences of European integration, 
but conceptions of group membership appear to be more powerful.”34 
Therefore, to encourage a feeling of togetherness and ‘Europeaness’, the 
EU has sought to create both a narrative and symbols, that is, a story around 
which the citizens could identify: 
To put it in a nutshell, the identity narrative channels political emotions 
so that they can fuel efforts to modify a balance of power; it transforms 
the perceptions of the past and of the present; it changes the organiza-
tion of human groups and creates new ones; it alters cultures by empha-
sizing certain traits and skewing their meanings and logic. The identity 
narrative brings forth a new interpretation of the world in order to 
modify it.35 
This identity narrative is clearly spelled out on the EU’s Web page: 
The EU was created in the aftermath of the Second World War. The first 
steps were to foster economic cooperation: the idea being that countries 
who trade with one another become economically interdependent and so 
more likely to avoid conflict. The result was the European Economic 
Community (EEC), created in 1958, and initially increasing economic 
cooperation between six countries: Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands. … The EU has delivered half a cen-
tury of peace, stability and prosperity, helped raise living standards, and 
launched a single European currency, the euro.36 
                                                          
32  Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Economic and Social Forces, 1950–1957 
(London: Stevens & Sons 1958), 28-29. 
33  Anderson, Imagined Communities, 53. 
34  Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, “Does Identity or Economic Rationality Drive Public 
Opinion on European Integration?,” Political Science and Politics 37:03 (2004): 415. 
35  DenisConstant Martin “The Choices of Identity” Social Identities 1:1 (1995): 7. For more 
on the importance and role of narrative in identity building, see Paul Ricoeur Oneself as 
Another (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995). 
36  The European Union, “How the EU Works,” http://europa.eu/about-eu/index_en.htm 
(accessed 3 May 2015). 
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Through the hardship of war, the Europeans have learned how to create a(n) 
EUtopia.37 This is the basic narrative of the European Union, the story told 
and retold to remind its citizens what they have in common and what they 
have accomplished through cooperation.  
As a constant reminder of this group identity, the EU has adopted certain 
symbols. For example, the EU has a flag with a blue background with twelve 
yellow stars and a ‘national’ anthem (Beethoven’s Ode to Joy). Peter van 
Ham remarked, “The EU’s striking logo – a blue flag with a circle of 12 stars 
– is already omnipresent. The application of ‘euro’ to everything from trains 
and soccer championships to a unit of currency will make it one of the most 
frequently used names across the continent and one of the world’s most pop-
ular brands.”38 
Michael Billig explained, in his book Banal Nationalism, that the mun-
dane day-to-day identity of ‘national’ symbols such as flags, anthems, 
money, EU passports, etc., is what causes the people to recognize themselves 
as a particular group out of habit.39 According to the EU Website, the euro is 
the ultimate symbol of European integration: “The euro – used every day by 
some 338.6 million Europeans – is the most tangible proof of cooperation 
between EU countries.”40 
The Symbolism of the Euro’s Design 
In 1993, the European Parliament sponsored a competition to get people 
excited about the introduction of the euro. It asked individuals to choose 
among ten different designs for the new common currency, the most amusing 
of which was a coin that said in Dutch, “money only stinks when it’s in an-
other man’s pocket.” Explaining the rationale, Egon Klepsch, EP president 
wrote “I am convinced that this competition to produce a design for the ECU 
and this consultation of the citizens can play an important role in spreading 
information and knowledge about the European Economic and Monetary 
Union … We must make it clear that there is no alternative to the European 
Community, the sole guarantor of peace and security in Europe.”41 In 2008, 
                                                          
37  Borrowed from Kalypso Nicolaidis and Robert Howse, “’This is my EUtopia …’: Narrative 
as Power,” Journal of Common Market Studies 40:4 (2002): 767. 
38  Peter Van Ham, “The Rise of the Brand State,” Foreign Affairs (2001): 5-6. 
39  Michael Billig, Banal Nationalism (London: Sage, 1995), 8. 
40  “Money and the EU,” European Union, http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-information/ 
money/index_en.htm (accessed 3 May 2015). 
41  Letter from Egon A. Klepsch, European Parliament president on the poster for the Graphic 
ECU Competition, European Parliament, 1993. 
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the European Commission sponsored a similar competition to commemorate 
the tenth anniversary of the euro.42 
 
Image 2-2: Euro notes 
In the end, none of the proposed designs from the 1993 competition were 
chosen. Instead, the euro was designed with depictions of nondescript 
bridges, tunnels and arches that could be found in any EU member state with 
Roman ruins. The goal was to put something common and familiar on the 
currency that would symbolize the linking together of Europe: 
On the front of both series of euro banknotes, windows and doorways are 
shown. They symbolise the European spirit of openness and cooperation. 
The bridges on the back symbolise communication between the people of 
Europe and between Europe and the rest of the world.43 
In doing so, the euro became both the figurative and literal currency of the 
Union. In the pockets of all Europeans, the euro was the concrete symbol of 
peace and prosperity on the continent. 
  
                                                          
42  “Design the New Euro,” European Commission, formerly at http://ec.europa.eu/news/ 
economy/080208_1_en.htm. While this Web site no longer works, on 14 March 2008, the 
winner of the competition was announced: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/ 
articles/euro/article12315_en.htm (accessed 31 July 2015). 
43  “Banknotes,” European Central Bank, http://www.ecb.europa.eu/euro/banknotes/html/ 
index.en.html (accessed 31 July 2015). 
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To further cement the euro in the hearts of the people, in the 1990’s, Eu-
ropean Parliament President Enrique Barn Crespo supported the creation of 
a new comic book hero for Europe: Captain Euro (see image 2-3). Working 
against his archenemy, Dr. D. Vider, he protects Europe from division within. 
In 2002, one year after the ‘birth’ of the euro, the Commission commissioned 
an artist, Constatin, to commemorate the anniversary. The image is of twelve 
star parents greeting their toddler (see image 2-4). 
The euro has become a symbol for the people to rally around. In front of 
the European Parliament stands a neo-classical statue of the euro. In front of 
the European Central Bank is another, more modern and cartoonish depiction 
of the euro symbol (see image 2-5). In 2002, the New Year heralded the ad-
vent of the euro; people gave the introductory packages of coins as gifts (see 
image 2-6), and huge state-sponsored celebrations filled the streets and the 
airways. In contrast, the United States would likely come under a great deal 
of criticism if it placed such statues and art depicting the dollar sign in front 
of the US Capitol or the US Federal Reserve buildings around the country. 
Rationale for the Euro: An Economic House of Cards? 
In the United States, fifty states have close to completely free trade and share 
the same currency. Upon casual inspection, the economic fundamentals are 
broadly similar across the EU and US. Each has an approximately compara-
ble population and gross domestic product (GDP).44 Both include only devel-
oped economies. Socially, European ancestry in the United States is still 
obvious in its laws, institutions, and cultures. There are, however, important 
differences. Fundamentally, a united Europe is still an unfinished project. In 
economic matters affecting the entire eurozone or the whole EU, it is still a 
confederation, one that approaches difficult decisions slowly based on con-
sensus of the member nations.45 The emergence of “Merkozy”, that is Angela 
Merkel, chancellor of Germany, and Nicholas Sarkozy, the president of 
France as the primary decision-makers during the eurozone crisis from 2009 
until 2012, is in itself indicative of the vast difference in governance between 
the two unions. Europe’s governance, dominated by these two leaders pre-
                                                          
44  In 2012, the eurozone had a population of 331 million people, while the United States had a 
population of 312 million. US GDP at current prices in 2012 was $15.1 trillion and euro-
zone GDP across countries at current prices converted to US dollars was $12.2 trillion, IMF 
April 2013 World Economic Outlook Database, www.imf.org. 
45  The description of a confederation is meant narrowly here, and is focused on the decision-
making apparatus of major policy initiatives. The EU should not be generalized as a con-
federation in all issues. The EU has elements and institutions that reflect everything from 
intergovernmentalism (where national governments are the primary actors in the process of 
decision-making) to federalism, depending on the policy area. 
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siding over the eurozone’s two largest economies, would be comparable to 
the governors of New York and California dominating the political debate 
rather than the president of the United States. In the US, strong federal gov-
ernance has ensured this does not occur. In Europe, however, regional inter-
ests dominate as healthier and wealthier economies have the greatest power 
in dictating policy. How did this system of economic governance evolve? 
Evolution of Monetary Union 
Efforts to achieve closer economic integration began in the late 1960s. At 
The Hague Summit of 1969, the European Council delegated Pierre Werner, 
then Prime Minister of Luxembourg, the task of reporting on how the Euro-
pean Community might avoid exchange rate volatility among its member 
states. The result was the 1970 Werner Plan, which recommended a common 
currency or irrevocably fixed exchange rates among member currencies to 
occur over a period of ten years in three stages. The first stage would lay the 
groundwork for the transfer of economic policy across the EC from national 
governments to a single centralized, community-wide body. In effect, the 
report called for greater political integration to achieve economic goals. In 
light of the 1966 Luxembourg compromise, establishing the dominance of 
national governments over European policy making, the plan was not 
adopted. 
In 1972, after the breakdown of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate 
system, concerns mounted in the European Community regarding exchange 
rate volatility and the negative impacts such risk implied for closer economic 
integration and trade in the EC. The Six co-opted an idea from the Werner 
Plan establishing a cooperative semi-pegged exchange rate system, referred 
to as “the snake in the tunnel”, in which currencies would be allowed to 
fluctuate by only +/- 2.25 percent between countries. However, the arrange-
ment failed to reduce exchange rate fluctuations. In his 1975 Report on Euro-
pean Union, Belgian Prime Minister Leo Tindemans criticized the lack of 
progress in this area and stated categorically that that “unless it [progresses] 
European Union will be meaningless.”46 
In 1979, the EC made another attempt based on a new reference currency 
referred to as the European Currency Unit or ECU, which, in turn, was based 
on the values of the participating countries’ currencies in the newly created 
European Monetary System (EMS). Again, exchange rates of individual 
countries were pegged within a range of +/- 2.25 percent of the ECU value, 
                                                          
46  Report on European Union in Bulletin of the European Communities, 1976, supplement 1, 
11-35, http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1997/10/13/284c9784-9bd2-472b-b704-ba4 
bb1f3122d/publishable_en.pdf (accessed 31 July 2015). 
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with a wider band of +/- 6 percent allowed for the Italian lira. The EMS also 
proved volatile. Over time, because of the German Bundesbank’s (the Ger-
man central bank) strict anti-inflation policies, the Deutsche Mark became the 
central currency within this system and other currencies had to follow the 
Bundesbank’s lead to maintain their exchange rates. 
By the late 1980s, member countries were primarily using national inter-
est rates to maintain their EMS exchange rate targets. Differences in eco-
nomic conditions and policy priorities across member states led to a crisis in 
the system in September 1992 as speculators recognized several countries 
would not be able to maintain their exchange rates given domestic economic 
conditions. What is referred to as a “time inconsistency” problem occurred: 
that is, countries that had committed to a fixed exchange rate regime earlier 
now found it optimal to renege on that commitment.47 On “Black Wednes-
day,” 16 September 1992, under intense pressure from currency speculators 
in international exchange markets, Britain was forced to withdraw from the 
EMS. The conflict between dreadfully weak domestic economic conditions 
and the high interest rates (over ten percent) necessary to maintain exchange 
rate targets proved unworkable. The following day, Italy, unable to maintain 
exchange rate targets, also withdrew from the EMS. When the French franc 
came under speculative pressure the following year, EMS target ranges were 
widened to fifteen percent to accommodate it. While in principle, the EMS 
still functioned, in practice, the system had completely broken down and no 
longer provided the exchange rate stability it was meant to create. The hope 
was that the eventual introduction of the single currency would eliminate 
such crises in the future. 
In 1988, European Commission President Jacques Delors pushed for an 
economic and monetary union to accompany the plans for a single market. 
Although the gears were already set in motion by the time of the June 1988 
European Council with fundamental French and German consent, the fall of 
the Berlin Wall in the next year and the dissolution of the Eastern Bloc has-
                                                          
47  This problem of commitment to a fixed exchange rate is referred to as a “time incon-
sistency” problem. Initially, a country sees it as optimal to adopt a specific exchange rate; 
however, doing so then limits the monetary policy options in that country as interest rates 
must be held at levels that support the target exchange rate. If the country’s domestic econ-
omy later falls into a recession, for example, it then faces a conflict between maintaining 
higher interest rates to protect the exchange rate or lowering them to assist domestic recov-
ery, which is inconsistent with the commitment to maintain the fixed exchange rate. Since 
internal politics usually trump a government’s priorities, currency speculators will also rec-
ognize that higher interest rate policies needed to maintain exchange rates will eventually 
be abandoned. They then begin to sell these currencies in anticipation, adding further pres-
sure for an exchange rate devaluation, which makes the conflict the government faces more 
intense and usually hastens the abandonment of the country’s exchange rate policy. This is 
what happened in Europe, in 1992 and 1993, with George Soros being the most famous of 
the currency speculators involved. 
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tened EMU. To allay fears of a ‘German Europe’, Kohl promised to pursue 
unification in the framework of the European Union, thereby assuring a 
‘European Germany’. Germany would give up the Deutsche Mark (DM) for 
the common European currency. 
EMU occurred in three stages. Stage I, beginning on 1 July 1990, elimi-
nated many exchange rate controls and restrictions on capital movement 
while working on the criteria necessary for the transition to irrevocably fixed 
exchange rates. Stage II, beginning on 1 January 1994, created the European 
Monetary Institute (EMI), predecessor to the European Central Bank. 
The strength of the Deutsche Mark forced other member states to follow 
German economic monetary policy if they were to maintain their exchange 
rates. Effectively, German economic policy had become European policy, 
much to the dissatisfaction of several other European Community member 
states. Some saw the single currency as a way to minimize Germany’s exces-
sive influence. Adopting such a system would commit countries to exchange 
rate parity and allow Europe-wide monetary policy to be determined for all of 
Europe, avoiding the problems the EMS experienced. Following the outline 
recommended in the 1989 Delors Report, the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 de-
fined the new European Union and conditions under which a new single 
currency would be adopted: the euro. 
The euro first came into existence in 1999 as a virtual currency, used only 
as a unit of account among the original eleven participating EU countries. In 
2001, Greece received approval to become part of the euro at the start of the 
following year, joining France, Germany, Luxembourg, Spain, Italy, Portugal, 
Belgium, the Netherlands, Finland, Ireland and Austria, now often referred to 
collectively as the eurozone or “Eurogroup”. At the beginning of 2002, the euro 
replaced national currencies in participating countries to great fanfare. The 
euro’s introduction as the single currency of the monetary union fueled 
optimism that it would replace the US dollar as the world reserve currency. The 
following decade never lived up to such hopes; nevertheless, the euro has 
emerged as the only major alternative to the dollar in international finance. 
To coordinate economic policies more closely, the Eurogroup of finance 
ministers meet on a regular basis, typically a day before EU-wide meetings of 
the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN).48 Since the euro-
crisis began, it has also been common for Eurogroup chief executives to 
convene “euro-summits” to decide crisis policy in a manner similar to the 
European Council. Again, these meetings have been unofficial, but have 
served to ensure policy coordination across eurozone countries. 
                                                          
48  The Council of Ministers is often referred to as Ecofin when finance ministers meet to 
decide economic and financial issues. 
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Figure 2-2: The Process of European economic integration over time. Efforts to stabi-
lize currency exchange rates among member countries in the European Community 
began in the 1970s and led directly to the creation of the euro in 1999. More and more 
countries have joined the eurozone for a total of 19 as of 2015. 
The implementation of the euro as a common currency was a critical political 
achievement, one that had been decades in the making. Ideally, the creation 
of the eurozone would ensure significant economic benefits for those coun-
tries participating. In some quarters, specifically Germany and northern 
Europe, it was thought the euro would mitigate the threat of inflation through 
the enshrining of a sound continent-wide monetary policy. Other countries 
saw the creation of the euro as a spur to growth, easing trade and creating 
better access to credit markets, particularly those countries in the south. In 
general, the euro was expected to create the conditions for “economic con-
vergence,” the condition in which all member economies’ standards of living 
converge to a common outcome, bringing greater prosperity to the entire 
union. This promise has since led to additional countries joining the currency, 
including Slovenia in 2007, Cyprus and Malta in 2008, Slovakia in 2009, 
Estonia in 2011, Latvia in 2014, and Lithuania in 2015. 
Conclusions 
Despite the hopes of the original visionaries, a “United States of Europe” has 
not yet emerged. Instead the EU, and the eurozone in particular, represent 
hybrid governmental institutions that are far more economically than politi-
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cally integrated. The eurozone is a supranational economic government. 
However, politically, the institution could be considered to behave more 
often like a confederation, with intergovernmental relationships defining its 
political direction. Without political consensus on a stronger federal union, 
discussions on a common fiscal or banking union have been sidestepped 
throughout the evolution of the current eurozone. 
As a result, one can draw the following conclusions about the European 
Union: 
1) The governing structure is skewed towards the Council; Brussels is 
hostage to member state capitals in all areas except those few where 
it has exclusive competence: customs union; competition rules; 
common fisheries policy; common commercial policy; the conclu-
sion of certain international agreements; and monetary policy for eu-
rozone countries; 
2) Member states are reluctant to give up more power to Brussels. 
3) The EU appears to be more federal than it truly is; and 
4) Many question whether Brussels has been given too much or not 
enough power from the member states. 
The above issues are all in play in the eurozone crisis. Despite the fact that 
monetary policy is decided by the ECB, it is the member states that domi-
nated during the crisis. 
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Chapter III: 
The Flawed Economic and Political Architecture of the 
Eurozone 
As noted in the previous chapter, the structure of the EU is the consequence 
of attempting to accommodate two different visions of European integration 
over decades of negotiation. One vision, personified in the ideas of Jean 
Monnet and Robert Schuman, would prefer to see Europe evolve into a fed-
eration wherein European integration would create a “United States of Eu-
rope” with full political and economic integration. An opposing nationalist 
view, personified by leaders such as Charles De Gaulle, envisioned that inte-
gration would create a “Europe of States” (“L’Europe des patries”), resulting 
in a confederation of sovereign states. Over time, these visions have alter-
nated in their ascendency as the driving influence in the process of European 
integration, resulting in the governance system now in place. 
Jean Monnet reportedly predicted, “The fusion [of economic functions] 
would compel nations to fuse their sovereignty into that of a single European 
State.”49 This federalist vision gained traction with the 1989 Delors Report 
that provided a blueprint for adoption of a single currency. Hans Tietmeyer, 
President of the Deutsche Bundesbank from 1993 to 1999, recognized the 
implications of such a move writing in 1991, “A European currency will lead 
to member nations transferring their sovereignty over financial and wage 
policy as well as monetary affairs. It is an illusion to think that states can hold 
on to their autonomy over taxation policies.”50 
However, a federation was not forthcoming. The implementation of the 
euro created an economic union designed to fit the political structures of the 
EU, and not vice versa. Whereas many currency unions occur in the context 
of a common economic union, the euro-system had to fit the intergovern-
mental nature of the European Union and be adopted without a strong politi-
cal, fiscal, or banking union. These structural omissions have fueled many 
criticisms and much skepticism towards monetary union, especially in Ger-
many. In 1992, sixty-two German economists signed a document warning 
against the implementation of the common currency. The adoption of the 
euro and Maastricht Treaty were challenged in the country’s constitutional 
                                                          
49  This quotation was reportedly penned by Jean Monnet in a memo on April 3, 1952 as found 
in Thierry Baudet, The Significance of Borders: Why Representative Government and the 
Rule of Law Require Nation States (Boston, MA: Brill Publishing, 2012), 148. 
50  Peter Shore, “Fighting Against Federalism,” in Implications of the Euro: A Critical 
Perspective from the Left, edited by Philip Whyman, Mark Baimbridge, and Brian Burkitt, 
(Bodmin, Great Britain: MPG Books Ltd, 2006) 148. 
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court in 1997.51 In addition, many US economists, in both the Federal Re-
serve and academia, voiced skepticism regarding the euro’s potential suc-
cess.52 
This chapter explains why the economic structure of the eurozone may 
have been doomed to experience an eventual crisis, why attempts to address 
the economic shortcomings of the currency union’s structure have prolonged 
its economic cost, and why a political solution is not possible in light of 
Rodrik’s trilemma of globalization. 
Why Have a Common Currency at All? 
Consider the benefits of a common currency among several countries. In a 
world with only one currency, countries would never again have to worry 
about the uncertainties that render international trade and investment unsure 
today. A common currency removes exchange rate risk, the uncertainty that 
investors and traders, not to mention foreign travelers, often experience as 
they conduct economic transactions in foreign currencies. Eliminating differ-
ent currencies eliminates the need for exchange rates and having to first 
exchange one currency for another in order to buy foreign goods or services, 
making it easier to trade. Second, a common currency makes price differ-
ences between foreign goods, relative to domestic ones, transparent, thereby 
facilitating competition and better functioning of the free market. 
After World War II, Bretton Woods, an agreement meant to help aid 
post-war recovery in the developed world, named after the town in New 
Hampshire where the conference took place, created a set of fixed exchange 
rates among nations, as well as two of the most important international finan-
cial institutions we have today: the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, more commonly 
called the World Bank. The conventional wisdom of the time was that to 
avoid the problems the international financial system experienced between 
the wars, a system of fixed exchange rates was needed.53 The Bretton Woods 
                                                          
51  “Leitsatz,” Entscheidungen, http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/ 
rs19980331_2bvr187797.html (accessed 31 July 2015). 
52  For a detailed history of these criticisms, see: Lars Jonung and Eoin Drae, “The Euro: It 
can’t Happen. It’s a Bad Idea. It won’t Last: US Economists on the EMU 1989-2002,” Eu-
ropean Economy Economic Papers 395 European Commission, December 2009, 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication16345_en.pdf (accessed 31 
July 2015). 
53  In the post-war period, an understanding developed that the Treaty of Versailles, and, in 
particular, reparations payments required of Germany, created significant political and eco-
nomic instability in the post-World War I period. The debt Germany owed following the 
war led to the printing of German currency and the hyper-inflation that the country 
experienced in the 1920s. These economic troubles then contributed to Hitler’s rise to 
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system, as the post-war organization of exchange rates was called, would rely 
on regulated sets of market economies within states and strict controls on the 
values of currencies between states. This system would remove the potential 
for speculative financial flows between countries that had disrupted national 
economies and international relations between the wars, and ensure that fi-
nancial flows instead funded the reconstruction of war-torn economies. Such 
a liberal economic system in which economies relied on competitive forces, 
with an integrated international economic system relying on competitive 
trade and investment, would deepen international economic ties, thereby 
increasing the likelihood of peace. The motive to use economic ties to pro-
mote peace was also a driving force in the movement for greater European 
integration. 
A system of fixed exchange rates provided considerable benefits during 
the process of European integration. Having a fixed exchange rate system 
ensured that trade patterns between countries were determined by their abili-
ties to produce goods more cheaply. As a result, countries specialized in what 
they could produce at relatively lowest cost, and then traded for goods that 
other countries produced more economically. Compared to a common cur-
rency, a system of fixed exchange rates only incurs the additional costs of 
currency exchange. All the other benefits of a common currency remain; the 
prices of goods and assets between countries do not fluctuate in unpredictable 
ways as they had before the wars, thereby facilitating trade. Put simply, a 
common currency fixes all participating countries’ exchange rates at parity 
(1:1). 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, the Bretton Woods Agree-
ment broke down, and countries resorted to allowing their exchange rates to 
“float”, i.e., to be determined in international exchange markets. The result 
was much greater uncertainty in international trade, which threatened to limit 
greater European integration from occurring. To avoid this problem and to 
allow deeper economic integration among European Community member 
states, Europe attempted to restore fixed exchange rates in two ways. First, in 
the 1970s, the EC used the “snake in the tunnel” mechanism wherein ex-
change rates (the snake) were allowed to only fluctuate within a narrow band 
of values (the tunnel) relative to the US dollar, which had been the reference 
currency during the Bretton Woods period. As noted in the last chapter, this 
                                                          
power. Simultaneously, during the 1920s, a significant increase in the flow of speculative 
financial capital across countries led to additional international financial instability. Finally, 
in the 1930s, increasingly isolationist trade policies and the formation of trade blocs meant 
to reduce imports, coupled with competitive exchange rate devaluations – “beggar thy 
neighbour” policies meant to increase exports – led to a breakdown of the international 
financial system. In 1945, the understanding was that many of these problems could have 
been avoided had countries coordinated their exchange rates in the interwar period and that 
failure to do so had led in part to the political tensions that caused World War II. 
48 
attempt failed by the end of that decade. A second attempt, in the 1980’s, 
called the European Monetary System (EMS) fixed exchange rates within a 
range around a basket of their own currencies (called the European Currency 
Unit), but failed in the nineties. 
Why did Europe’s fixed exchange rates fail? Very simply, the reason was 
national interests. While a country can potentially benefit from greater trade 
when the costs of trading are reduced, for example, by fixing exchange rates 
to reduce uncertainty in the costs of goods and services traded, they are costly 
in the sense that they eliminate a country’s ability to use monetary policy. A 
country controlling its own currency can change its interest rates and ex-
change rate to manage its economy. In the early 1990s, maintaining the fixed 
exchange rates among European countries became very difficult as economic 
conditions began to diverge among member states. Germany, absorbing the 
costs of reunification, experienced a relatively weaker economy than other 
European states, some of which had experienced significant housing booms 
in the late 1980s. Despite its own weak conditions, Germany decided to set 
relatively higher interest rates by reducing its money supply within its econ-
omy to counteract the inflationary effects of its reunification expenditures. 
These higher interest rates drove its exchange rate higher relative to other 
European currencies as international investors attempted to take advantage of 
the higher interest rates paid on German assets. Under the EMS, Britain and 
Italy, along with many of the other countries in Europe, were forced to fol-
low, hiking interest rates to protect their exchange rates with Germany. 
The problem, however, is that higher interest rates within a country re-
duce economic activity and can lead to recessions as the costs of borrowing 
to finance consumption and investment increases. Less expenditure due to the 
higher costs of borrowing first leads to reduced employment, then greater 
decreases in borrowing and lending as business conditions weaken, and 
finally, further job losses and recession. As exchange rate conditions became 
strained, weak domestic economic conditions caused by the end of the hous-
ing boom in Britain and Italy, recessionary conditions elsewhere in the world 
depressing trade, and the high interest rates necessary to maintain their ex-
change rate with Germany resulted in currency speculators expecting many 
European countries, particularly Britain, eventually to abandon their high 
interest rate policies due to the poor economic conditions these were creating 
in each country. The reasoning was simple: they deduced that Britain, in 
particular, and other countries such as Italy, would not sacrifice their own 
economies to maintain a commitment to European economic integration and 
the fixed exchange rates the European Monetary System required. The politi-
cal costs of doing so within each country were simply too high. 
Acting on this expectation, they began selling the currencies of the 
countries they believed would have to break away from the EMS, resulting in 
further declines in these countries’ exchange rates. These countries were 
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forced to raise interest rates to offset the decline in their exchange rate, wors-
ening domestic economic conditions and tipping their own economies into 
worse recessions. Finally, the speculators’ expectations were self-fulfilling, 
and domestic pressures led to Britain and other EMS countries succumbing to 
conditions and abandoning the EMS on Black Wednesday, 16 September 
1992. The lesson learned was simple: When the cost of maintaining them 
becomes too high, countries will abandon their commitment to fixed ex-
change rates. Domestic interests will prevail over international commitments 
under such circumstances. Such currency speculation in part led to the aban-
donment of the Bretton Woods system. After several failures at fixing ex-
change rates among European countries, Europe chose a common currency as 
the solution. 
A common currency creates commitment and adherence by allowing no 
alternative. While leaving a currency union is possible, such a departure 
would incur considerable risk and uncertainty that could result in greater 
costs than those borne by staying. If a country were to leave a common cur-
rency, what currency would be used instead, and how much would it be 
worth? Further, a common currency is also symbolic, and committing to one 
creates a difficult process to reverse not only economically, but also politi-
cally. Additionally, creating a common currency requires the creation of a 
single central bank setting monetary policy over the entire currency area, 
thereby taking the interest rate decisions out of the hands of individual gov-
ernments. Therefore, “leaving” is much more difficult to do than it is under 
fixed exchange rates where “leaving” only requires a change in monetary 
policy. In this way, the decision to commit Europe to a common currency 
area was meant to achieve what the fixed exchange rate systems could not: a 
long-lasting system in which exchange rate uncertainty would be eliminated 
between countries. The cost of doing so, however, would be eliminating a 
degree of state sovereignty. A single currency requires that a “one-size-fits-
all” monetary policy across the currency area be used regardless of differ-
ences in individual countries’ preferences, or perhaps in spite of them. 
The Structure of Europe’s Monetary Union – An Optimal Currency 
Area? 
Economists have studied the idea of common currency areas, specifically, 
when they will work and what causes them to break down. A common cur-
rency area that has no tendency to break down and does not lead to countries 
leaving the common currency or set of fixed exchange rates is called an “op-
timal currency area.” Such an area describes one in which conditions ensure 
the benefits of leaving the currency union are outweighed by the benefits of 
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staying.54 Canadian economist Robert Mundell, winner of the Nobel Memo-
rial Prize in Economics in 1999, first developed the theory of an optimal 
currency area in 1961. 
Table 3-1: Optimal Currency Area Characteristics of the Eurozone 
Optimal Currency Area Criteria Eurozone Area Conditions 
Economic criteria 
Degree of trade openness and integration High 
Product diversification High 
Labour mobility  Low 
Wage flexibility Low 
Level of debt Varies from low to high 
Fiscal transfers possible Officially limited 
Social criteria 
Homogeneous policy preferences  Regional/limited 
High degree of solidarity with other nations Regional/limited 
The adoption of a common currency, however, like the adoption of fixed ex-
change rates, comes at a cost: the loss of the country’s ability to utilize inde-
pendent monetary policy to manage its economy or to adjust to a country-
specific economic shock, such as a natural disaster or economic crisis within 
the country. In the absence of a currency union, if a negative or “recession-
ary” economic shock were to occur, a country could lower its exchange rate 
by lowering its interest rate. Increasing the money supply, or “expansionary 
monetary policy” to stimulate growth through lower interest rates by encour-
aging greater investment, simultaneously causes depreciation in the country’s 
exchange rate, stimulating trade with the rest of the world. If, when a cur-
rency union is in place, other options exist to adjust to the shock or stimulate 
the economy and reduce the costs of the shock, then the member state is less 
likely to leave. The characteristics and conditions that might allow such op-
tions are described in table 3-155, as are eurozone conditions with respect to 
these qualities. 
The optimal currency area literature suggests that common currency ar-
eas will be better served if they include the economic and social criteria 
shown. With respect to economic criteria, trade openness and product diversi-
                                                          
54  Economists call such a situation “incentive compatible” in that the commitment to enter a 
currency union is compatible with incentives to stay. 
55  The sources for the table are Zuzana Gáková and Lewis Dijkstra, “Labour mobility between 
the regions of the EU-27 and a comparison with the USA” European Union Regional Policy, 
02/2008 http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/focus/2008_02_labour.pdf (ac-
cessed 31 August 2015), Richard and Charles Wyplosz. The Economics of the European In-
tegration (New York: McGraw Hill, 2009) and www.OECD.org. 
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fication allow economies to better integrate and benefit from a common cur-
rency area, increasing the benefits of such a union. Labour mobility and wage 
flexibility are necessary to allow the union to adjust more quickly to severe 
country-specific shocks. The final two conditions – lower levels of debt and 
the ability to create fiscal transfers across member states – increase the num-
ber of options a country has to react to such a shock, in light of the loss of an 
independent monetary policy. 
With regard to the social criteria, a high degree of solidarity or “common 
identity” among the union’s populations could ease the political tensions a 
common currency generates. Specifically, if populations have similar values 
and policy preferences, it is less likely that the “one-size-fits-all” monetary 
policy will be considered disadvantageous to one country over another, and, 
thus, will lead to fewer economic or political conflicts over which monetary 
policy should be implemented in the union. 
In Europe, as the table notes, both qualities are somewhat regional. The 
eurozone spans both northern and southern European countries with signifi-
cant cultural and historical differences. These differences, not to mention 
differences over economic policy preferences, have played a role in the Eu-
ropean financial crisis. Furthermore, the crisis has exacerbated these differ-
ences, potentially increasing the perceived cost of the monetary union within 
the member states most affected, especially those in the south, particularly 
Greece. In the current crisis, bailouts to southern periphery countries have 
been widely unpopular in the other countries that have financed them, poten-
tially undermining support for the currency union overall. Significantly, the 
idea of eurobonds, that is, bonds that allow the joint liability for debt to 
support countries cut off from credit markets, has also been soundly rejected, 
especially by northern countries, most vocally Germany, while supported by 
the most negatively affected states.56 
Successful monetary unions have historically had three common charac-
teristics that have allowed them to succeed. Each requires states to give up a 
degree of sovereignty over monetary and fiscal policy for the good of the 
currency: 1) economic integration and the ability to manage and react to 
external and internal shocks (a political union); 2) a common fiscal frame-
work allowing collective transfers and if necessary, collective debt (fiscal 
union); and 3) a strong central bank able to oversee the banking sector and 
                                                          
56  Differences in preferences also led to the failure of the EMS system. In Germany, political 
and public preferences typically prioritize concerns about inflation above those regarding 
unemployment and economic activity levels. In the 1990s, Germany’s decision to focus on 
inflation despite the economic cost of such actions led to their monetary policy decision to 
increase interest rates and impose contractionary monetary policy. In Britain and other 
countries that eventually had to leave the EMS after failing to maintain their exchange rates 
due to the domestic cost, these decisions reflected a political and public preference to pro-
tect employment and economic activity over inflation. 
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act as a lender of last resort in the common currency (a banking union). The 
European monetary union, however, was critically lacking in several of these 
features when it was launched. The first two conditions are consistent with 
the conditions necessary to form an “optimal currency area.” The lack of a 
political and fiscal union can be blamed in part for both the conditions that 
led to the European financial crisis and leaders’ inability to act once it began. 
The third characteristic, the presence of a banking union – a strong central 
bank that can act as a union-wide lender of last resort – has proven invaluable 
in financial crises for over a century. The design of the European monetary 
union’s economic architecture has contributed to the severity of the eurozone 
crisis, and has hindered its recovery. Much of the effort to address the crisis 
has therefore focused on trying to establish these missing elements, specifi-
cally, fiscal and banking unions. 
With the loss of monetary policy, governments can only use expansion-
ary fiscal policy to address macroeconomic shocks: i.e., expansion of gov-
ernment expenditures; lower taxes to stimulate growth; or both. Outside aid 
or changes in union-wide monetary policy could be possible, but only if such 
changes were acceptable to all other member states. Further, it would be 
advantageous if such policies were coordinated, timely and effective. Without 
political union to streamline decision-making, such changes would most 
likely be disjointed, slow, and, therefore, less effective. As noted in the last 
chapter, EU-wide decision making requires unanimity over serious policy 
matters, and individual member state interests constrain the options available. 
Policy made at the union level will likely be slow in coming and weaker than 
needed for the most affected countries. In the European financial crisis, pol-
icy responses by the EU and eurozone collectively have often been charac-
terized as “too little, too late”. 
For countries in a currency union, using expansionary fiscal policy to 
counter a recessionary shock may require governments to borrow as tax reve-
nues could decline. Such borrowing may be checked if a country lacks a 
significant stock of savings in the country, or cannot borrow at reasonable 
rates from international financial markets. The credit may come from other 
member states in the union in the form of transfers, or from international 
lenders and financial markets. Such rates require that a country maintains a 
sustainable debt load, facilitated by a strong “fiscal union”. A fiscal union 
refers to a set of rules that ensures all countries follow similar policies to 
ensure their access to credit, if necessary, is maintained. In the EU, the 
structure of the fiscal union backing the euro was described in the Maastricht 
Treaty. 
With the implementation of the euro in 1999, fiscal policies regulating 
government expenditures and taxation by country were left effectively inde-
pendent, but limited. The “Maastricht Criteria” stipulated critical fiscal re-
53 
quirements that all countries using the euro had to meet before they could 
officially adopt the euro, specifically: 
1)  Limiting annual government deficit levels to no more than 3% of 
GDP; 
2)  Limiting their ratio of national debt to GDP to no more than 60%; 
and 
3)  Maintaining an annual average inflation rate no greater than 1.5% 
more than the average rate of the three lowest inflation states in the 
eurozone.57 
The debt and deficit limits were meant to ensure debt brakes existed within 
the currency union so that individual countries would be able to access inter-
national credit markets at affordable interest rates should a severe economic 
shock occur. The third was to ensure that no country embarked on inflation-
ary policies that caused it to become uncompetitive; otherwise, if the price of 
one member state’s goods increased with respect to the others’, it would 
create an incentive for the state to leave the union to devalue its exchange 
rate. Overall, these conditions aimed to control the costs of joining the com-
mon currency and to encourage countries to remain in the union by preserv-
ing the ability to use fiscal policy if faced with a severe economic shock. 
To limit members’ liability vis-à-vis other members, the Treaty prohib-
ited bailouts of one country by another. Such a ban removed domestic incen-
tives to maintain high levels of public expenditure and accumulate higher 
debts with the thought of passing those debts onto the union as a whole, an 
incentive referred to as moral hazard. Transfers between countries, if one 
country found it could not access credit, were also prohibited, as was the use 
of joint-liability, that is, having other countries back a troubled country’s debt 
to allow it access to international credit. The structure of the fiscal union 
implied by the Maastricht Treaty was clear: countries that faced shocks were 
expected to remedy the situation only by utilizing their own resources and 
access to credit. 
The criteria were to be enforced by rules described in the European Sta-
bility and Growth Pact (SGP), adopted at the original urging of Germany, to 
encourage members to adopt the ‘golden rule’ or balanced budgets. Other-
wise, moral hazard might lead to countries pursuing otherwise imprudent 
fiscal policies leading to higher debts and deficits, without thought to the 
destabilizing effects on the currency union. As a result, the SGP specified 
sanctions for the failure to meet the Maastricht conditions, including fines 
and even the suspension of EU expenditures within the country. 
                                                          
57  The three states considered cannot be ones in economic distress or experiencing abnormal 
economic conditions, for example a severe recession. 
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Consider why the Maastricht conditions might be necessary to avoid a 
country exiting the common currency and triggering the potential for the 
currency to unravel as previous European fixed exchange rate mechanisms 
had. In the face of a severe economic shock affecting one country, but not the 
entire union, a country without the ability to borrow from international credit 
markets to finance expansionary fiscal policy would have no choice but to 
suffer through the recessionary effects of the negative shock to its economy.58 
Eventually, the lack of demand in the economy will drive down prices and 
wages as unemployment mounts, allowing it to expand its exports within the 
currency union. The eventual recovery through lower wages and prices is 
referred to as “internal devaluation”, as it has the same effect that lowering 
the exchange rate would have had if the country had been able to pursue such 
a policy. The process of recovery, however, can be long and drawn out, and 
the costs of such outcomes fall directly on the people of the country, making 
the effects very politically costly to sitting governments. 
 
Figure 3-1: OECD strictness of overall employment protection index. The high index 
scores of EU countries relative to the United States indicate how difficult it is to use 
labour market adjustment to adapt to economic conditions. In a currency area, internal 
devaluation becomes very difficult for countries to achieve. Source: OECD. 
This costly process will be even more prolonged if wage flexibility is low in 
a nation, due to, for example, excessive labour protections that limit wage ad-
                                                          
58  If a severe shock affected the entire union, expansionary monetary policy could be used to 
devalue the currency and relieve conditions across the union. 
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justment. In Europe, such protections are relatively high compared to other 
developed economies, such as the United States, as shown in figure 3-1, and 
were especially high in 2008 at the beginning of the European financial crisis. 
One means of reducing the potential political costs of such a shock is la-
bour migration, as displaced workers look for employment elsewhere. This 
migration can occur inside and outside the country and, while not optimal for 
workers, can reduce the cost that a state experiences in adjusting to such a 
severe economic shock. For example, in the United States, unemployed 
workers in Oklahoma famously migrated to California during the Great De-
pression, allowing internal economic adjustment among US states affected 
differently during the period.59 Similarly, economic migrants are common-
place among countries around the world, and their existence is part of global 
adjustment to country-specific shocks. As such, migration can ease unem-
ployment within a state by rebalancing the demand and supply of available 
labour as well as providing an option for the unemployed. 
Nevertheless, the labour mobility option – having people move to other 
regions or countries with better economic conditions – may well be limited 
by cultural and linguistic factors or immigration restrictions between coun-
tries. Such restrictions may include outright laws against such movement or, 
as in the case of Europe, differences in social programs, language, or culture 
that create disincentives to move, or that make such relocation difficult. For 
example, a Greek worker might have trouble finding a job in Finland because 
the languages are so different. Despite the promise of freedom of movement 
of workers in the 1957 Treaty of Rome, language and cultural differences 
across countries have limited this goal in practice. The situation is so prob-
lematic that the European Commission declared 2006 the “European Year of 
Workers’ Mobility” to find ways to overcome obstacles to free movement of 
people.60 Compared to US labour mobility, the levels found in the eurozone 
have been estimated to be two and a half times lower.61 Wage inflexibility, 
coupled with limited labour mobility, implies adjustment to a country-spe-
cific shock would be slow and costly without other policy interventions. 
Clearly, labour migration and internal devaluation impose the costs of ad-
justment to a macroeconomic shock on the people within the country, and if 
adjustment requires either to occur, political pressure may build to rethink 
currency membership. 
                                                          
59  John Steinbeck’s famous novel The Grapes of Wrath depicts this migration. 
60  http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/internal_market/living_and_working_in_the_ 
internal_market/c11333_en.htm (accessed 31 July 2015). 
61  See Economist “Europe’s debt crisis: At a bursting point?” 27 January 2012, retrieved 8 June 
2013 from http://www.economist.com/blogs/charlemagne/2012/01/europes-debt-crisis, and 
Zuzana Gakova and Lewis Kijkstra, “Labour mobility between the regions of the EU-27 and a 
comparison with the USA” European Population Conference, Vienna, Austria, 1-4 September 
2010, http://epc2010.princeton.edu/abstracts/100976 (accessed 31 July 2015). 
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One means to offset a negative economic shock is the use of fiscal pol-
icy. However, to do so requires adequate “fiscal space”, defined as lower 
levels of debt, which allows countries better access to the financing necessary 
to implement expansionary fiscal policy. The Maastricht criteria were meant 
to ensure such conditions; however, once the common currency was adopted, 
political incentives led to some countries to ignore or weaken them. 
Almost immediately after the euro replaced national currencies, some 
countries violated the Maastricht and SGP rules. As image 3 illustrates, debt–
GDP levels across the original twelve eurozone countries have varied signifi-
cantly, but, in general, have grown over time. This growth occurred even 
before the world financial crisis of 2008 and the eurozone crisis in 2009, and 
has continued since. With respect to violations of treaty requirements, first 
Portugal was found to be in violation in 2002, and then Greece in 2005, but 
sanctions were not imposed. In 2002 and 2003, France and Germany, the two 
largest countries in the eurozone accounting for fifty percent of eurozone 
output, had both exceeded the three percent deficit rule. In 2003, France and 
Germany also exceeded the sixty percent debt–GDP rule, which they have 
broken every year since. Germany’s failure to achieve Maastricht targets was 
primarily due to the costs of reunification with former East Germany. France 
had missed the targets after a severe economic slowdown in the early 2000s. 
In each case, the Commission began sanction proceedings as directed under 
SGP, but both countries successfully lobbied against any punitive action 
being taken against them. More importantly, they also lobbied for a reinter-
pretation of the SGP rules,62 which was to have significant influence on the 
future course of events in the eurozone. 
At the European Council meeting of 22-23 March 2005, the member 
states agreed to German–French proposals that would change rules defined in 
the SGP regarding violations of the accord. Their proposals allowed the in-
clusion of special circumstances under which the Maastricht convergence 
requirements need not be strictly met; specifically, if debt–GDP requirements 
were met, deficit rules could be loosened. By implication, the structural defi-
cit limits (the deficit adjusted for the business cycle) could now also be 
loosened when economies slowed, allowing counter-cyclical fiscal expendi-
tures to expand when necessary. Furthermore, deficit limits would also be 
waived if deemed necessary by the severity of an economic downturn, or if 
expenditures were undertaken to enhance future productivity, and “all other 
relevant factors.” These ideas had merit from an economic perspective. They 
allowed for large-scale public infrastructure investment, like that occurring in 
former East Germany. Relaxing the Maastricht limits also safeguarded 
against increased austerity measures exactly when the opposite type of fiscal 
                                                          
62  See European Council Presidency Conclusions, Brussels, 22-23 March 2005, http://www. 
consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/84335.pdf (accessed 31 July 2015). 
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policy might be called for in the event of an economic slowdown. Ironically, 
the Germany of the mid-2000’s, with the help of France, undermined the 
strict rules the Germany of the 1990’s had adopted to protect the eurozone. 
Unfortunately, the loosening of Maastricht and SGP requirements made 
any type of fiscal controls nearly impossible, should a government wish to 
avoid them for economic or political reasons. As a result, the member states 
had wider variations in fiscal stance than beforehand. As shown by the rise in 
debt–GDP across countries in image 3, the French–German effort to avoid 
sanctions set a standard and practice that was to continue. Deficits and debt 
limits began to be missed repeatedly by several countries in the eurozone, 
each time justified on the wider grounds now available to governments to 
waive Maastricht limits.63 The net result of the rising debt-GDP levels was to 
reduce the potential fiscal space, i.e., the ability countries had to borrow on 
international financial markets. Such a move was also potentially destabiliz-
ing to the currency union, as it increased the possibility countries could face a 
debt crisis if borrowing as a means of servicing debt obligations became 
difficult. 
Overall, from an economic perspective, the implementation of the euro 
as a single currency was potentially flawed and prone to instability. While 
trade integration and diversification suggested that the benefits of a currency 
union could be significant and that country-specific shocks should not occur 
often, much of the eurozone lacked the ability to deal with such shocks. 
Therefore, if they were to occur, the economic and political costs could be 
large. Since the treaty structure of the eurozone intentionally limits transfers 
among union members, countercyclical aid to offset the costs of such events 
would not be available from the rest of the eurozone. In these circumstances, 
if countries found they could not finance a fiscal expansion to offset the 
shock, country-specific shocks would inflict greater costs on affected coun-
tries, potentially resulting in countries reconsidering currency membership. 
                                                          
63  After the currency union was created in Europe, some countries, specifically Greece, 
exceeded Maastricht debt and deficit limits by reporting misleading economic statistics, 
thereby causing a severe understatement of their actual debt and deficit levels. Still others 
began or continued to miss these targets claiming excesses were due to special economic 
circumstances such as changes in the business cycle. Often, however, excessive deficits and 
resulting increases in debt levels were due to domestic political pressures to maintain politi-
cally popular spending. Sanctions in all cases were neither levied nor seriously considered 
once the SGP rules were changed in March 2005. Political expediency forced the Maas-
tricht limits to be ignored after the precedent set by Germany and France. 
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Figure 3-2: Debt-GDP levels for the original twelve eurozone countries. Since the 
inception of the euro, some countries have had relatively higher debt-GDP ratios, 
indicating that access to financial markets could potentially become problematic. 
Several also saw debt loads rise as a proportion of national income after the euro was 
implemented, despite the Maastricht criteria meant to limit such debt growth. By 2007 
and the beginning of the eurozone crisis, a majority of countries had debt-GDP ratios 
greater than the 60 percent specified in the Maastricht Treaty (dashed line). Source: 
Eurostat. 
This, in fact, is what happened during the European financial crisis. The 2008 
US financial crisis and its repercussions around the world led to increased 
debt and deficit levels in European countries to stabilize the recessionary 
effects in their economies. The accounting irregularities uncovered after the 
Greek elections in 2009 led to that country losing access to international 
borrowing, except at exorbitant interest rates that reflected doubt that Greece 
could support its recently discovered debt obligations. Unable to borrow to 
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meet its debt obligations, a default on its sovereign debt loomed, which 
would likely require an exit from the currency union. A bailout eventually 
arrived from other eurozone and EU states, but it turned out to be too small, 
and the costs it imposed on Greece too high, to resolve the crisis. 
The uncertainty created subsequently affected Ireland and Portugal, both 
of which found access to international credit markets similarly restricted and 
only at excessive interest rates. They quickly found their domestic resources 
too small to overcome a potential default and the possibility of leaving the 
union. This process threatened to create, like tipping dominoes, a chain reac-
tion across the continent that would eventually result in the failure of the 
common currency. 
In general, the structure of the fiscal union backing Europe’s common 
currency was not necessarily optimal and could be potentially destabilized by 
regional or country-specific shocks, both due to the original design and the 
evolution of the rules following the euro’s adoption. Furthermore, differences 
in social attitudes across nations also likely undermined its stability. Lack of 
labour market flexibility would aggravate the costs of any shock as well. 
Since the crisis, redefining the fiscal union has focused on structural adjust-
ment – that is, removing impediments to the labour market adjusting, as well 
as rule changes to ensure countries would, in the future, maintain greater 
fiscal space. In 2012, the SGP rules were strengthened through the imple-
mentation of “the fiscal compact” to allow greater scrutiny by the EU over 
states’ debts and deficits, and stronger economic sanctions if these were 
deemed excessive. Rules were also adopted recognizing that some transfers 
might be necessary between states in special circumstances. In 2010, the 
creation of bailout actions and facilities to aid Greece, then Ireland and Por-
tugal and any future countries in trouble, increased the ability to allow trans-
fers in the currency area among countries. These changes have strengthened 
the fiscal union beyond that originally implemented in the eurozone. 
Such changes, however, required consensus among EU and eurozone 
states and were generally implemented too late to avoid undermining faith in 
the survival of the euro. This uncertainty and the prolonged period required 
to make policy has also worsened the recessionary effects of the crisis across 
the union. In addition to a flawed, fiscal union, the central banking architec-
ture of the monetary union also made the financial sectors of each country 
more prone to destabilizing shocks. 
The EU’s Monetary System: The Eurosystem 
Currency union requires the creation of a single central bank responsible for 
monetary policy. In a two-stage process begun in 1994, the European Monetary 
Institute (EMI) took over the administration of the European Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (ERM) and oversaw the coordination and convergence of member 
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state monetary policies in preparation for the adoption of the euro. In May 
1998, the original eleven members of the euro met the convergence conditions 
defined by the Maastricht Treaty necessary to form the currency union, and, in 
June 1998, the second stage of the process began with the adoption of the ECB 
and the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), which consists of the 
central banks of all EU members and the ECB, replacing the EMI.64 
The “Eurosystem” forms the central banking architecture of the eurozone 
and refers to a subset of the ESCB banks consisting of the ECB and the na-
tional central banks of the eurozone countries as shown in figure 3-3. The 
ECB is overseen by a president, vice-president, and four directors who make 
up the Executive Board, with appointments staggered and lasting eight years. 
Appointments to the ECB’s Executive Board are recommended by the EU 
Council of Ministers and approved by heads of state or EU member govern-
ments. During the European financial crisis, two presidents have governed 
the ECB, Jean-Claude Trichet of France until 31 October 2011, and Mario 
Draghi of Italy from 1 November 2011 to the present. The Executive Board 
and the governors of each of the nineteen eurozone national central banks 
meet as the Governing Council, making all monetary policy decisions in the 
currency area by majority vote every two weeks. Monetary policy, once de-
termined, is implemented by the ECB, which issues instructions to the na-
tional central banks of the eurozone, who carry it out. 
 
Figure 3-3: Structure of the ESCB. 
A central bank has three inter-related functions: 1) ensuring the stability of 
the financial system; 2) acting as a lender of last resort to ensure that banks 
and states have access to credit when necessary; and 3) controlling monetary 
policy, the availability of money in the economic system for transactions and 
private lending. To maintain stability in a currency, the bank’s conduct 
should be independent and free from outside political influence. 
                                                          
64  Luxembourg had to create a central bank, as it had previously been part of a currency union 
with Belgium. 
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For example, in the United States, the Federal Reserve or “Fed” serves as 
the politically independent entity performing all three of these tasks. It de-
termines US monetary policy to achieve two – sometimes conflicting – man-
dates: to maintain employment by sustaining conditions for growth and to 
maintain price stability. By controlling monetary policy and, indirectly, the 
levels of interest and underlying credit conditions across all fifty states, the 
Fed attempts to achieve both of these goals, but it can often face tradeoffs. 
The Fed can loosen policy and create better conditions for growth in some 
areas while causing inflation in others. As part of monetary policy, it can also 
intervene in bond markets and take other actions to soothe conditions if they 
become turbulent. The Fed can also act as a lender of last resort by loaning 
directly to banks if they are cut off from credit. The Fed can also use this 
lender of last resort function to provide credit to the Federal government 
through bond market purchases. The ability of the Federal Reserve to use 
each of these actions proved vital during the financial crisis of 2008 and its 
aftermath. While controversial, many economists and other observers credit 
the swift and effective use of these instruments with helping to quell the US 
crisis by early 2009. 
By comparison, the sole purpose of the Eurosystem is to ensure price 
stability through the ECB as defined in the treaty articles. As a result, the 
Eurosystem’s greatest concern with respect to monetary policy has been 
inflation. In practice, price stability has been interpreted to mean an inflation 
rate across the eurozone of less than two percent. The ECB even put out a 
video with the catchphrase “how low can you go?” with the euro symbol 
dancing the limbo. Unlike the Federal Reserve, the ECB is mandated only to 
maintain price stability; therefore, its ability to use monetary policy to stim-
ulate growth is very limited. If one country or region faces recession, it will 
likely not see monetary policy relief if such action threatens inflationary 
conditions in other countries. During the eurozone crisis, credit relief to all 
states in the form of expansionary monetary policy, causing lower interest 
rates, could have reduced the economic damage to the afflicted, mostly 
southern, countries by providing additional support to employment and 
output conditions. Monetary policy, however, did not loosen during this pe-
riod, but, in fact, tightened in mid-2011 as concern escalated regarding poten-
tial inflationary conditions in stronger northern states. 
Like the German banking system where strong bank independence is pre-
ferred and upon which much of the Eurosystem design was based, separation 
of regulatory authority from the actual central bank is assumed to enhance the 
central bank’s political independence. Bank regulations are therefore not 
under ECB supervision, but instead remain the responsibility of the individ-
ual member states. National authorities are also responsible for the stability 
of banks within their jurisdictions, including deposit insurance, which, across 
the EU, must insure the first 100,000 euro in bank deposits from loss in the 
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event of bank failure. If a national banking crisis arose, the national treasury, 
and by extension the taxpayers of that country only, are responsible for any 
costs incurred to support the banking system. 
 
Image 3-1: From the European Commission video “Low inflation with a limbo-dancing 
euro!” (2010) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FxiPqsUE0hc (accessed 31 July 
2015). 
Within the EU framework, the ECB cannot act as a lender of last resort. Spe-
cifically, common interpretation of treaty rules prohibits the ECB from acting 
directly as a lender of last resort to sovereign states as such actions would 
violate the EU’s “no-bailout” policy.65 Furthermore, by being unable to pur-
chase national debt directly, the ECB largely refrained from entering into 
global financial markets to maintain lower sovereign debt rates of member 
countries at the start of the eurozone crisis, and since has done so only under 
very specific conditions. The intent of the policy was to eliminate moral 
hazard and to create a debt brake for states; otherwise, states might not per-
ceive that they faced the discipline of private markets to control their fiscal 
decisions. Within countries, national central banks may engage in emergency 
lending as a lender of last resort only to institutions within their jurisdiction. 
Nevertheless, such actions must be coordinated with the ECB and other cen-
tral banks to ensure such actions do not undermine overall monetary policy. 
Private institutions, however, can use funds to purchase national debt in bond 
                                                          
65  Controversially, the ECB did begin more significant interventions in sovereign debt mar-
kets in August 2011, but only a year and a half after the bailout of Greece and almost two 
years after the start of the crisis. Notably, Germany’s representative to the Governing 
Council argued vociferously that such support was illegal. 
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markets; thus, an indirect channel exists to finance government debt in the 
banking system. 
Since national central banks police their own banking systems, in the 
event of a banking failure, each has different practices and procedures gov-
erning bank resolution or shut down. During the eurozone crisis, remarkably 
few banks have closed despite its seriousness. Instead, bank rescues have 
occurred, typically protecting bank creditors at taxpayers’ expense. The lack 
of a common set of procedures means that regulators in some countries may 
be unwilling to impose losses on creditors and “resolve” illiquid institutions. 
Such reticence could occur if a regulator feared a credit market backlash at 
other institutions in their country, potentially worsening a banking crisis in 
their country, or for fear of political repercussions. This self-restraint poten-
tially creates weaker banks in some countries versus others and an increased 
chance that a country-specific banking crisis could occur, destabilizing the 
monetary union, as eventually occurred, in Ireland, Portugal, Spain and 
Cyprus. The solution is a common set of regulatory rules and procedures 
across the eurozone or a so-called “banking union” to generate more certainty 
and avoid the propping up of illiquid banks, thereby stabilizing the system. 
Banking Instability and Sovereign Risk in the Eurosystem 
Monetary unions are most successful when they are least likely to experience 
country-specific shocks, whether on the goods producing side of the econ-
omy or in financial markets. After the Greek revelations regarding their pub-
lic debt in 2009, however, markets quickly came to the realization that finan-
cial markets in the eurozone were, in fact, quite susceptible to financial crisis, 
in large part because of the currency union’s structure. While eurozone 
members adopted a common currency, the evolution of rules governing fiscal 
discipline had not created a convergence in fiscal discipline. The Eurosystem 
and its distribution of responsibilities created a seriously destabilizing Achil-
les heel: the problem posed by national banking systems. 
In a nutshell, national banking systems generated country-specific liabil-
ities that created sovereign debt crises. In Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain, and 
Cyprus, real-estate bubbles led to highly leveraged banks, much as it did in 
the United States in the mid-2000s. Furthermore, across Europe, exposure to 
now-questionable Greek debt, in addition to the price decline in world secu-
rities after the 2008 US financial crisis and ensuing global recession, created 
more bank weakness. Ireland, for example, was forced to take a national 
bailout in 2010 after the costs of a banking system rescue were so high that 
international finance markets effectively cut off credit to the nation. The 
sudden increase in sovereign debt caused by the combined effects of a reces-
sion and bank rescues increased public debt from 24.8 percent in 2007 to 
over 108 percent by 2011 as shown in figure 3-2. World financial markets 
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reacted to the sudden risk in Ireland’s apparent ability to service its debt 
sustainably, by more than doubling sovereign interest rates to levels ap-
proaching nine percent in 2010. The result was an unsustainable debt level, 
leaving Ireland with what appeared only two inevitable choices: it could 
leave the euro and default on its sovereign debt; or request outside aid – a 
“bailout.” Ireland chose the latter, requesting a bailout in November 2010. 
Portugal, with similar experiences, also requested a bailout early the follow-
ing year. 
The relationship of bank failures to sovereign debt has sometimes been 
referred to as the “Doom Loop.” Within the EU framework, the Eurosystem 
can act as a lender of last resort, but only to banks. If a financial institution 
finds credit is unavailable as might occur in a financial crisis, the national 
central bank can provide temporary emergency assistance in return for collat-
eral, as a stopgap measure, until private credit for the bank is reestablished, or 
it is shut down. The collateral eligible to be used for such actions includes 
that country’s sovereign bonds. In the event such a bailout is deemed neces-
sary, the treasury of the country involved assumes the costs of the bailout, 
financing them through sovereign debt. The doom loop occurs as a conse-
quence of the following chain of events: 
1. Bank asset values fall as a consequence of a financial shock, for 
example, the effect the financial crisis of 2008 had on real-estate 
market loans. 
2. Banks, then, experience illiquidity – the inability to borrow – as mar-
kets become concerned about their solvency and cut-off credit. A 
bank crisis, or “run”, occurs as depositors rush to withdraw their 
funds, fearing that if the bank fails, they could suffer a loss of some, 
or all, of their balances. 
3. National governments step in to stabilize their financial systems by 
providing liquidity (loans) to banks. If the bank system requires a 
large bailout, countries must increase their debt, often substantially. 
4. Concerns regarding the country’s sovereign debt sustainability and 
solvency in reaction to bailout costs drive sovereign bond interest 
rates up. 
5. Banks, as large holders of domestic bonds, see their asset values fall 
further as bond prices are inversely related to interest rates, returning 
the loop to step 1. Self-fulfilling bank illiquidity and sovereign debt 
crises emerge as the negative feedback loop worsens until either na-
tional default or an external bailout of the country occurs. 
This process allows a state in the eurozone potentially to be forced into crisis 
by the weakness of its banking system. In other jurisdictions, such as the 
United States, a federal banking union guarantees that the failure of a local 
bank cannot result in the insolvency of the individual state where the bank is 
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located. For example, New York State cannot be bankrupted by its own 
banks because its lender of last resort is not the New York State government, 
but the Federal Reserve, which serves all fifty states and, crucially, has the 
ability to ‘print’ money.66 Considering that the Federal Reserve can ‘print’ 
money, such bailouts do not require loans. As part of a larger banking union 
in 2008, failing banks in New York and across the United States were bailed 
out by the federal system, and the banking crisis did not trigger a series of 
state debt crises.67 Member states in the European monetary union cannot 
print euros; that ability lies with the ECB. Instead, member states must bor-
row, and, therefore, the structure of the European banking system can lead to 
destabilizing shocks and a cut-off of credit to member countries if, in bailing 
out their banks, financial markets begin to worry about the country’s ability 
to cover its debts. The result is a crisis in which the costs rapidly escalate into 
conditions where the country could default, leading to its departure from the 
currency union. 
To avoid this problem, an improved banking union could be structured in 
two ways. First, the ECB, which has control of money printing and, there-
fore, borrows in the currency it creates, could be the lender of last resort. 
Second, should a bank get into trouble and threaten default, bank runs – the 
condition in which customers, fearing a bank failure, rush to withdraw their 
money and cause the bank to fail68 – could be avoided if bank deposits were 
insured in such a way that customers never worried about losing their depos-
its. Under the pre-crisis rules of the Eurosystem, each country had to insure 
its banking system, up to €100,000 per bank depositor, and pay out any such 
insurance in a banking crisis if the bank involved failed. This requirement, 
however, could force the country to borrow to meet such obligations, with 
unintended consequences. Such borrowing, in turn, could cause concern in 
international financial markets and result in credit being cut off except at 
unaffordable interest rates. Under these circumstances, depositors, fearing the 
insurance on their deposits might not be honored, might then rush to with-
draw funds, thereby undermining the stabilizing effect the insurance is sup-
posed to have. A larger insurance pool across all the member states in the 
monetary union could avoid this situation, minimizing bank runs and break-
ing the doom loop. The prohibition on joint-liability, however, has also been 
interpreted as prohibiting such a system. 
                                                          
66  Technically in the United States the Federal Reserve prints money by creating reserve 
deposits for the banks it lends to. It does not actually print money and deliver it to banks. 
67  The Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) provided a form of Federal bailout in the 
United States in October 2008. With authorization to use as much as $700 billion, funds 
were provided to recapitalize the banking system. 
68  This type of event is depicted in the film It’s a Wonderful Life (1946), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lbwjS9iJ2Sw. 
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In a unilateral action, the European Central Bank stemmed the crisis by 
promising to “do whatever it takes”: offering unlimited credit to troubled 
economies. In effect, the central bank took over the powers of a lender of last 
resort, something that was controversial across the union, but was effective in 
stopping the spread of the crisis and preserving the euro, which appeared to 
be facing an imminent breakdown. Since the announcement in 2012, this 
policy, while unused, has increased the power of the bank and installed a 
missing element: a central bank with the power to lend as needed to ensure 
necessary liquidity. 
Since 2014, the Eurosystem has been reformed to create a better banking 
union. The ECB has been put in charge of regulating most large banks across 
the union under a common set of rules. Furthermore, plans are now underway 
to increase the value of the insurance pool backing depositor insurance in 
each country, although a single multi-national pool has yet to be created. 
While new rules have been implemented, agreement across the eurozone and 
EU countries to create a single deposit insurance pool has been difficult to 
reach, primarily due to resistance from Germany on the grounds that it vio-
lates the joint-liability rule of the Maastricht Treaty. 
Why Is There No Political Solution for Economic Integration? 
The implementation of the euro, combined with a set of national sovereign 
governments, was at best only an intermediate step toward the greater politi-
cal integration of Europe. Stabilizing the currency union would require 
further changes in EU governance and, more generally, a change in the bal-
ance regarding state versus supranational sovereignty, tipping the scales to-
ward a more federal system. For example, bailout mechanisms put in place 
during the European financial crisis have required repudiation of the Maas-
tricht ban on national transfers between countries. Efforts to strengthen the 
stability and growth pact weakened in the mid-2000s have also reduced the 
flexibility of individual nations to determine their own fiscal policies. Simi-
larly, to strengthen the banking union, national discretion over bank closures 
has been reduced as the European Central Bank has taken over the responsi-
bility of regulation and resolution for major banks in the monetary union. 
These steps, however, have not gone far enough. Creating a deposit in-
surance pool, with the requisite repeal of the Maastricht ban on joint credit 
liability, will cost the member states more sovereignty. Germany, especially, 
has resisted such moves. Additionally, if more binding limits on fiscal policy 
are to be achieved, member states will have to cede national sovereignty to 
the interests of the greater union, but, at this time, countries such as France, 
Greece, Italy, and other countries oppose such changes. Given the political 
dissatisfactions that have developed within parts of the European electorate 
during the European financial crisis, especially in reaction to such crisis poli-
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cymaking and to changes in the structure of the union’s economic system, 
Europe’s own governance system may need to evolve. The EU’s major po-
litical institutions should consider allowing greater electoral participation to 
address the alienation large portions of the population apparently feel in be-
ing unable to affect directly union-wide decision-making. Currently, some 
policy decisions are driven, not by the will of the entire continent, but, in-
stead, by a majority within the largest economies in the European Union, 
specifically Germany and France. 
After the implementation of the euro, political and economic theorists 
eventually realized that the European process of integration had fallen into a 
trap. The euro’s creation attempted to maintain sovereignty and the cost of 
doing so was currency area economic instability. The fundamental problem 
facing Europe’s integration was that to design a system that could achieve 
deep economic integration, while simultaneously protecting national sover-
eignty, and maintaining direct political democracy over the supranational 
governance of Europe, invokes a sociopolitical impossibility, first described 
by Dani Rodrik as the “international trilemma of globalization.” 
Rodrik’s Trilemma 
Dani Rodrik first penned his trilemma to describe the political and economic 
challenge of globalization.69 His insight recognized that deeper global 
integration cannot be achieved while preserving national sovereignty in 
policymaking and involving democratic politics that allow domestic prefer-
ences to determine overall governmental policy. Diagrammatically, the 
trilemma is shown in figure 3-4. 
Rodrik noted that deeper international economic integration, allowing 
free flow of trade and capital, would require a tradeoff. Countries that wished 
to be open and to compete for international trade and capital could not inter-
fere with economic transactions. For this reason, greater economic integration 
among countries would reduce the political space from which policies could 
be drawn, decreasing the role of democracy in the formation of economic 
policy. 
In describing the trilemma, Rodrik noted that a compromise is necessary. 
Deep economic integration cannot occur simultaneously with sovereign state 
policy-making and democratic politics. At best, only two of these goals can 
be achieved. For example, in the early stages of European integration, the 
Bretton Woods compromise could not result in truly deep economic integra-
tion. The reason was that the fixed exchange rate system of Bretton Woods 
                                                          
69  Dani Rodrik, “How far will international economic integration go?” The Journal of Eco-
nomic Perspectives (2000): 177-186. 
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was maintained by direct interference with economic markets. Countries 
often resorted to financial capital flow limits and strict bank regulation in 
order to maintain their exchange rates and domestic economic policies. Such 
activities allowed countries to preserve some independence in their economic 
policies while keeping domestic input as decision-makers were accountable 
to their own electorates. 
 
Figure 3-4: Rodrik’s international trilemma applied to Europe. Source: Rodrik, p. 181, 
with authors’ notations regarding the euro. 
Worldwide, Rodrik noted, states remained in control of economic policy con-
sistent with the preferences of their electorates and routinely used capital 
controls and trade restrictions throughout the postwar period until the early 
1970s when the Bretton Woods Agreement finally broke down. This break-
down led to a movement toward greater globalization and a suspension of 
those institutions that had allowed countries to maintain sovereign economic 
policies. The world economy began to move toward deeper economic inte-
gration. Specifically, individual countries’ capital flow rules and the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) were both used to limit trade flows 
consistent with national democratic preferences, while maintaining exchange 
rates. The existence of these limits, however, ensured deeper economic inte-
gration across countries did not transpire. 
The GATT was superseded by the World Trade Organization, which has 
worked to limit trade and capital controls, leading towards international trade 
liberalization and a narrowing of political options, which Rodrik defined as 
the Golden Straitjacket. This term reflects Rodrik’s observation that main-
taining states with fully independent policies determined by domestic politi-
cal preferences cannot occur if deep economic integration allowing the free 
flow of capital and goods is desired. Deep economic integration requires that 
governments not interfere with the free markets. Therefore, open economies 
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have little ability to impose control over economic outcomes regardless of 
electoral preferences. Should electoral preferences prefer protections or other 
interferences with deeper economic integration, for example, to preserve 
economic sectors or avoid outside trade competition, the result would require 
some withdrawal from deeper economic integration. 
Worldwide, greater competition among states requires that policies be-
come harmonized to international norms regardless of domestic preferences, 
if deep economic integration were to be achieved. Using monetary policy to 
affect the terms of trade can allow a country to protect sectors of the econ-
omy or worker wages, but participating in a common currency area removes 
this option. In such a case, labour protections or other independent policies 
cannot be maintained if they adversely affect competition and differ from 
those of trade partners: the more similar political preferences, the more stable 
the currency union. 
In Europe, greater efforts toward closer integration in the 1970s moved 
the continent slowly toward the straitjacket outcome as those efforts nar-
rowed the potential set of national economic policy choices countries had. 
The breakdown of the ERM and fixed exchange rate regimes exemplified the 
political tradeoff member states faced when they imposed conditions on their 
economies necessary to support integration. This conflict led to Britain’s 
withdrawal from the ERM in the early 1990s. Faced with an electorate that 
demanded policies that were not consistent with those necessary to support 
its fixed exchange rate, the government withdrew from the ERM. The im-
plementation of the euro, with its lack of an exit method, does not offer states 
an easy exit option. When policy preferences of a national electorate diverge 
from the policies necessary to maintain currency union membership, the 
social frustration can generate political instability. 
With respect to the euro, adopting it necessitated giving up national 
monetary policy and transferring this power to the European Central Bank, 
while limiting fiscal policy to the convergence criteria defined in the Maas-
tricht Treaty. Governments moved toward becoming technocratic entities in 
these areas, administering economic and social policies consistent with 
maintenance of the common currency regardless of public opinion. The costs 
of adhering to ‘Golden Straitjacket’ policies were high because governments 
have been unable to find the political will to reduce labour market and wage 
rigidities within their borders. In Rodrik’s trilemma, the need to balance the 
requirements of deep integration across countries as implied by the euro, 
combined with the governance structure adopted for the EU, leaves no room 
for contrary social preferences expressed in democratic politics to be incorpo-
rated. Elected member state governments are locked into those policies nec-
essary to maintain the currency irrespective of electoral preferences. As noted 
in the last chapter, reducing the instability in the current common currency 
arrangement in Europe will require additional reduction in sovereign discre-
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tion over more economic policy, thereby further alienating electorates from 
control over economic policy unless changes are made to its system of demo-
cratic governance. 
If opinion polling and election outcomes are any indicator, the adoption 
of the euro created a technocratic role for national governments in imple-
menting economic policy that may now have undermined people’s trust in 
Europe-wide institutions and their willingness to move toward the political 
integration necessary to politically stabilize the currency union.70 A populist 
backlash has resulted in unstable political environments across the eurozone, 
especially in Greece and Italy, where anti-European parties, whose platforms 
include leaving the euro, have often received the most votes in recent national 
elections. This political backlash has been in part fed and made worse by the 
perception among citizens that their votes have no impact on the policies 
their countries have taken, and is an “on the ground” example of the type of 
alienation Rodrik described that could occur in his straitjacket outcome. Reli-
ance on technocratic solutions imposed by recent bailouts during the euro-
zone crisis (described in more detail in later chapters), and the imposition of 
technocratic governments in Italy and Spain, and EU-mandated austerity 
plans across the eurozone during the euro crisis have only worsened people’s 
perceived alienation from the European political process. Such alienation 
threatens to compound the political instability currently present in the euro-
zone and, ironically, threatens to undermine support for greater economic and 
political integration across Europe at exactly the time when needed most. 
Alternatively, Rodrik suggested deep global economic integration and 
democratic politics could occur simultaneously, evolving into a kind of 
“global federalism,” but this would necessitate the eclipse of the state as the 
primary economic policy maker. In Europe, this outcome might be referred to 
as European federalism, a situation in which deeper economic and political 
integration would take place simultaneously. Such an economic and political 
union could be achieved by the creation of supranational European govern-
ance, electorally accountable directly to the people of Europe. States would 
                                                          
70  See Eurobarometer polling regarding support for European-wide institutions including the 
ECB. From spring of 2008 through spring 2012 support for the ECB had dropped by 47 
percent across the eurozone, support for the EU dropped by 46 percent, and support 
dropped for the European Parliament, the European Commission and the euro by 34 per-
cent, 32 percent, and 7 percent, respectively. See Flash Eurobarometer 335, July 2012, and 
Felix Roth, Lars Jonung, and Felicitas Nowak-Lehmann, Public support for the single Eu-
ropean currency, the Euro, 1990 to 2011. Does the financial crisis matter? Working Paper 
2012: 20 July 2012 http://www.researchgate. net/profile/Lars_Jonung2/publication/ 
239807580_Public_Support_for_the_Single_European_Currency_the_Euro_1990_to_2011
._Does_the_Financial_Crisis_Matter/links/0f31753366da33b8e8000000.pdf (accessed 31 
July 2015). Despite these significant declines in support, consistent with economic 
downturns, support for the European project as a whole remained. For more discussion of 
opinion polls during the crisis, see chapter 4. 
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then only administer their territories within this framework with some differ-
ences in taxation and regulation possible among jurisdictions as long as they 
did not interfere with economic activity. 
Conclusions: The Effects of Europe’s Governmental, Economic, 
and Sociopolitical Flaws 
The effects of the three architectural design flaws present in the eurozone: 
governmental, economic, and sociopolitical flaws, undercut the three charac-
teristics successful monetary unions usually have, that is, the ability to man-
age and react to external and internal shocks; a common fiscal framework 
allowing collective transfers and, if necessary, collective debt; and a strong 
central bank able to act as a lender of last resort in the common currency. The 
inability of Europe to achieve a greater political union resulted in a currency 
union that has become technocratic in nature and seemingly removed from 
the people, especially since the crisis began. 
The structure of the EU’s currency union was the logical outcome of the 
decades-long process of European integration. As such, the design of the 
currency union was made to fit within the philosophical and organizational 
constraints of a European governance system that was, itself, a compromise 
between nationalist and federalist visions of ‘Europe’. With regard to the 
theory of Optimal Currency Areas, the EU’s common currency was not opti-
mally designed. Efforts to preserve national sovereignty resulted in a less 
stable monetary union. 
As noted at the beginning of the chapter, some of the currency union’s 
designers hoped that changes over time would lead to deeper fiscal and 
banking integration as well as deeper political integration. Ironically, not only 
did these reforms not occur, but the relatively fragile fiscal union in the form 
of the Stability and Growth Pact was also weakened. Stronger fiscal and 
banking governance could have avoided or, at least mitigated, the eurozone 
crisis. A stronger banking union with greater powers could have avoided the 
bank failures that triggered the country-specific shocks that destabilized the 
monetary union. A stronger fiscal union might have avoided the cut-off of 
credit, the fear of default, and the possible exit from the currency union 
debtor countries faced. 
To avoid the chaotic exits of countries from the common currency during 
the eurozone crisis, the rest of the eurozone, the EU, and the IMF, had to 
finance a series of bailouts, something never intended in the original design 
of the monetary union. The terms of these bailouts have been very protective 
of the financing countries’ contributions as creditors, and required recipient 
countries to institute very painful, dramatic, and politically unpopular re-
forms. The public backlash to these reforms, in turn, has highlighted the final 
architectural flaw in the eurozone: the lack of a political union. 
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Together, the economic design of monetary union and the Eurosystem, 
combined with the lack of a federal system to coordinate broad, effective, and 
timely continent-wide economic policies have contributed to conditions in 
the union that helped precipitate and then worsen the crisis, as well as cripple 
the EU’s policy response. By adopting the euro and giving up their sovereign 
currencies, eurozone members adopted a common currency without a sover-
eign. The European monetary union’s ability to solve the current crisis was 
then hamstrung by its economic and monetary architecture and lack of a 
federal system to move toward solutions that were in the best interest of the 
currency area as a whole. Without the waiving of long-standing policy 
stances regarding joint fiscal actions and the role of the ECB, finding policy 
solutions that reduced pressures in markets proved very difficult, and policy 
reaction took too long, undermining market confidence in policy-makers’ 
ability to address the situation. 
Only when the ECB acted independently and unilaterally, offering its re-
sources as a lender of last resort, was the crisis brought under control in 2012. 
As an independent entity, the ECB does not need the support of governmen-
tal institutions to act. Still, recognizing that such actions would create politi-
cal dissension among the currency union member governments, such actions 
were not taken until almost three years after the crisis began. Once taken 
though, these actions then created time for the European Union and the euro-
zone to address internal political conflicts and structural changes necessary in 
the banking and fiscal union. They also demonstrated how necessary it is to 
have a centralized governance system capable of acting in the union’s interest 
regardless of any individual country preferences. In the longer term, the Eu-
ropean Union will not only have to address the shortcomings in its currency 
union architecture, but also the democratic deficit present in the system by 
adopting a wider federal governance system, one that creates a system of 
decision-making in the common interest of the entire union and without def-
erence to the preferences of particular countries. 
In order to save the euro, “more Europe” appears necessary. In a very im-
portant speech in July 2012, when the European Central Bank pledged to “do 
whatever it takes” to preserve the euro, Mario Draghi, the president of the 
ECB compared European monetary union to a bumblebee.71 He remarked 
that, like the bee, the monetary union should not have been able to fly; yet, it 
did for almost a decade before the shortcomings in its design caught up with 
it. To continue flying, Europe will have to ensure it has a stronger fiscal and 
banking union than in the euro’s original design. Such changes will require 
more supranational governance, not less. In other words, states will have to 
cede additional sovereignty to support the long-term stability of monetary 
                                                          
71  Mario Draghi, speech to the Global Investment Conference, London, 26 July 2012, 
http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120726.en.html (accessed 31 July 2015).
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union. In adopting a more supranational approach with common fiscal and 
banking policies, the eurozone will also have to become more democratic and 
less technocratic, allowing European governance to be more responsive to the 
will of the people. 
As is often the case with unstable structures, unexpected tremors can lead 
to their imminent collapse without immediate remedial work to repair them. 
The financial crisis of 2008 provided such a tremor, and the damage resulting 
was the European financial crisis that began in Greece in 2009. Since then, 
the eurozone has struggled to repair the foundations of economic and political 
integration the post-war generations of Europe built, but this reconstruction 
will have to occur while the structure is occupied, with predictable political 
distress, anxiety, conflict and costs. 
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Chapter IV: 
Of ‘PIIGS’ and ‘GIPSIs’: Pre-Crisis Structural 
Imbalances 
To join the European Union, all member states must be democracies with 
functioning free market systems, adopt the acquis communautaire, that is, all 
the EU legislation to date, and be on the European continent. Aside from 
these commonalities, the countries all have different political systems, politi-
cal cultures, and economic structures. As established in the previous chapter, 
for a currency union to function properly, the participants must be similar 
enough in competitiveness and productivity, and yet, the EU member states 
are not. Much of the explanation of the eurozone crisis and its popular narra-
tive are based on these differences. 
In the popular narrative of the eurozone crisis, i.e., the story surrounding 
the event, the rich, hard-working north had to bail out the lazy, corrupt south 
in order to save the euro. The Greeks bristle at the charge. How true is it? Of 
all the countries, Greece, with its relative poverty, poor governance and 
compliance, as well as corruption, has long been viewed as “Europe’s Basket 
Case”72. This reputation may have blinded politicians and pundits to what 
was really going on in the eurozone crisis. Jean Pisani-Ferry, in his book The 
Euro crisis and its aftermath, argued that, had the financial crisis begun in 
Ireland, with its good reputation for compliance and governance, politicians 
might have seen it for what it was: economic imbalances and faulty banking 
regulations. Instead, the original narrative focused on falsified data, corrup-
tion, and poor governance. 
This chapter examines structural imbalances that led to the crisis. In fact, 
both the north and south are to blame, if ‘blame’ is the correct word. Eco-
nomic pressures led to a cycle of the ‘north’ lending to the ‘south’ so these 
countries could buy ‘northern’ products. Through a series of case studies, this 
chapter establishes how the political and economic differences among the 
member states set the stage for the eurozone crisis. 
                                                          
72  Joanna Kakissis, “Europe’s Basket Case” Foreign Policy, 24 June 2013. However, Greece 
was so labeled long before the Eurozone crisis. In a speech by Lucas Papademos of the 
Bank of Greece, “Greece and the Euro” to the Ninth Frankfurt European Banking Congress, 
19 November 1999, he stated “the Greek economy had been described by a leading finan-
cial newspaper as the basket case of western Europe.” http://www.bankofgreece.gr/ 
Pages/en/Bank/News/Speeches/DispItem.aspx?Item_ID=242&List_ID=b2e9402e-db05-
4166-9f09-e1b26a1c6f1b (accessed 3 August 2015). 
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The Ant and the Grasshopper?: A Narrative of the Eurozone 
Crisis 
The common narrative of the eurozone crisis has often laid blame at the feet 
of the so-called PIIGS countries, Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, and Spain. 
In the 1990’s, PIGS referred to countries with a great deal of debt or to the 
southern countries of Schengen: Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain, but not 
Ireland. However, before the 2004 expansion, Spain, Portugal, Ireland and 
Greece were known as “the poor four”, that is the weakest economies of the 
EU. During the eurozone crisis, PIGS was changed to PIIGS to include both 
Ireland and Italy.73 
The term PIIGS was deemed offensive with negative impacts on the nar-
rative of the eurozone crisis. Samuel Brazys and Niamh Hardiman went so far 
as to argue that the use of the term PIIGS as a heuristic affected the behaviour 
of market actors and consequently Irish bond yields.74 Carlos X. Alexandre 
took credit for coining a “new, and logical, acronym – GIPSI – that actually 
reflects the credit risk by order of magnitude (from high to low).”75 Although 
GIPSI sounds very close to Gypsy, a slur against the Roma people, from 
which the verb “to gyp”76 is derived, GIPSI has become the accepted acro-
nym for these countries. Nevertheless, the use of either term has very nega-
tive connotations and characterizes the countries as either weak, spendthrift, 
or corrupt. We, the authors, chose to refer to Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece, 
and Ireland as SPIGI as suggested by Erik Bleich.77 
Although they have been among the weakest economies of the EU, the 
SPIGI countries have little in common. Italy, one of the founding members 
and one of the largest EU members, is usually ranked among the world’s top 
ten economies. Spain, Portugal and Greece saw the EU as a way to stabilize 
their regimes after dictatorships, as well as gaining other advantages; Ireland 
joined, in part, to get out from under the shadow of its former colonial over-
lord, Great Britain. 
                                                          
73  See “Europe’s PIGS country by country” BBC News, 11 February 2010 http://news.bbc. 
co.uk/2/hi/8510603.stm (accessed 3 August 2015). 
74  Samuel Brazys, and Niamh Hardiman. “From ‘Tiger’ to ‘PIIGS’: Ireland and the use of 
heuristics in comparative political economy,” European Journal of Political Research 54.1 
(2015): 23-42. 
75  Carlos X. Alexandre, “2011: Year of the European GIPSI?” http://seekingalpha.com/article/ 
236784-2011-the-year-of-the-european-gipsi (accessed 3 August 2015). 
76  Merriam-Webster defines gyp as a fraud or a swindle, http://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/gyp (accessed 15 August 2015). 
77  Erik Bleich, “Say Goodbye to PIGS and GIPSIs” Opinion: Al Jazeera, 3 December 2012, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/12/201212392653337846.html (accessed 3 
August 2015). 
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In general, the narrative follows the storyline of the Greek slave Aesop’s 
fable, “The Ant and the Grasshopper”. As the morality tale goes, the grass-
hopper plays all summer while the ant toils to store food for winter. In the 
end, the grasshopper has nothing, while the ant is safe during the cold 
months. In the eurozone crisis storyline, the Germans are the hard-working 
ants whereas the Greeks are the Mediterranean grasshoppers who squandered 
their opportunity for saving. In the fable, the grasshopper only recognized the 
error of his ways when he was cold and hungry. By the same token, the 
question of “moral hazard” frequently makes its way into the eurozone crisis 
lexicon: if the hard working northerners give their hard-earned cash to the 
lazy, corrupt southerners, won’t the cycle continue? Won’t the lessons have 
been lost? Will the lazy south have any incentive to fix their corrupt govern-
ments and their business-unfriendly environments? Won’t the ants in the 
north be subsidizing the grasshoppers’ devil-may-care lifestyle? 
In June 2013, Greek prime minister George Papandreou admitted his 
mistakes in handling the eurozone crisis, and said that the people, who had 
unduly suffered, were “in the main, not to blame for the crisis.” He did blame 
Brussels and its “orthodoxy of austerity”: 
Small Greece, he argued, had been made the scapegoat for a larger po-
litical and economic failure. As Mr. Papandreou mockingly put it, Eu-
rope chose to point the finger at “those profligate, idle, ouzo-swilling, 
Zorba-dancing Greeks.” Instead of addressing the harder, underlying is-
sues, the impulse was to say: “They are the problem! Punish them!”78 
So convinced are some by this tale that the New York Times printed an op-ed 
piece by Todd Buchholz, which argued that the Germans were so hard 
working, they had lost part of their very soul and envied the Greeks theirs: 
No, Germany’s real motivation to help Greece is not cash; it’s culture. 
Germans struggle with a national envy. For over 200 years, they have 
been searching for a missing part of their soul: passion. They find it in 
the south and covet the loosey-goosey, sun-filled days of their free-
wheeling Mediterranean neighbors.79 
Such analysis, based on stereotypes, add little to an understanding of the 
eurozone crisis. ‘National envy’ aside, the Greeks work the most hours and 
the Germans the least. After the introduction of the euro, the SPIGI countries 
                                                          
78  Chrystia Freeland, “Economic worries and the global elite,” Reuters, 13 June 2013 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/13/column-freeland-idUSL2N0EP1B420130613 
(accessed 15 August 2015). 
79  Todd Buchholz, “Germany’s Mediterranean Envy,” The New York Times, 25 September 
2011 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/26/opinion/germanys-love-for-greece.html (ac-
cessed 15 August 2015).  
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far outpaced the north in terms of economic growth. France and Germany 
were the first to break the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) in 2003. Struc-
tural imbalances in the eurozone explain these seemingly contradictory reali-
ties. 
Nevertheless, the characterization of the SPIGI countries as ‘grasshop-
pers’ does explain some of the tension between the ‘north’ and the ‘south’. 
The issue of moral hazard continually rears its ugly head: the profligate 
Mediterraneans must learn a lesson from the crisis lest the cycle be repeated. 
The Germans especially, informed by Lutheranism, as well as their history 
with inflation, the rise of Hitler, and rebirth via the Wirtschaftwunder, or 
economic miracle, believe they have a universal solution for economic 
growth: the application of Ordoliberalism or austerity measures. 
The ‘Ants’: Why Does German Policy Often Seem at Odds with 
Much of Europe’s? 
The press, particularly the English-speaking press, has frequently labelled 
Germany as obstinate in its opposition to many of the proposals meant to 
stabilize the crisis. For example, Germany officially resisted the European 
Central Bank’s intervention in Spanish and Italian bond markets in late sum-
mer of 2011.80 The country also opposed the consideration of Euro-bond 
proposals to create joint liability across states in the currency union as a 
means to support the sovereign bond markets of troubled countries. German 
representatives to the ECB have also opposed allowing the bank to act as a 
lender of last resort.81 Some German politicians and academics have vehe-
mently opposed crisis bailout programs and the EU mechanisms created to 
back them, going so far as to take them to the Constitutional Court in in 
Karlsruhe in an effort to avoid German participation. Germany has also 
strenuously advocated tough austerity measures for bailed-out countries in 
spite of the fact that these policies threatened to worsen their recessionary 
conditions. These austerity demands have resulted in a political backlash that 
has caused some to question sovereign democracy in the EU. 
                                                          
80  The European Central Bank’s intervention in Spanish and Italian bond markets in August 
2011 was strongly resisted by German delegates to the ECB, and led to Jürgen Stark re-
signing in protest from its Executive Board as a signal of German opposition to the policy. 
This action and open antagonism of ECB efforts occurred in spite of strong support else-
where in Europe.  
81  Although in 2012, the German government appeared tacitly to support Mario Draghi’s 
declaration to do “whatever it takes” to save the euro, a policy that was eventually unveiled 
as the ECB’s Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) Program in August 2012 and one 
credited with stabilizing sovereign bond markets, the euro exchange rate, and finally ending 
the European Financial crisis, many German politicians attacked the program and also 
challenged its legality in court. 
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Why has Germany been so often at odds with significant portions of the 
eurozone over so many crisis policies? In ECB matters, Germany has regu-
larly appeared to stand alone as the most vehement opponent to expansionary 
monetary policy. In other cases, particularly in meetings of the European 
Council, Germany has frequently been cast as the leader of a group of north-
ern European countries including Finland, The Netherlands, Austria, Slo-
vakia, and the Baltic states, which have advocated stricter policies for trou-
bled countries. German politicians have habitually been the most vocal in 
Europe regarding the need for other member states to impose greater austerity 
on their national budgets and the necessity to introduce greater wage and 
labour reforms across EU economies. Elsewhere in Europe, the German 
viewpoint has been far less popular. While Germany was able to use its eco-
nomic might to ensure its concerns were considered in EU policymaking 
throughout the first years of the crisis, as recessionary conditions have wors-
ened across the continent, German policy stances have come under greater 
scrutiny. Some have even called the backlash to German economic orthodoxy 
a “revolt”.82 Reasons for this divide range from cultural differences to na-
tional interests to economic ideology. 
Cultural Differences 
Cultural dissimilarities between Germany (and northern European countries) 
and those of western and southern Europe stem from historical religious and 
cultural differences and recent economic experience in the twentieth century. 
A common theme in the press regarding distinctions between the north and 
the south has been the influence of religious history among these countries. 
Popular German opposition to allowing greater aid and latitude to crisis 
countries regarding fiscal austerity has often been attributed to the influence 
of Lutheranism, focusing on the acceptability of suffering and the importance 
of frugality as moral lessons during the eurozone crisis. Angela Merkel, her-
self the daughter of a Lutheran pastor, has used the example of the thrifty 
Swabian housewife83 as an illustration of German thinking regarding good 
fiscal management. German narratives regarding their own willingness to 
accept self-sacrifice and discipline, the importance of saving, eschewing the 
use of credit, and the expectation of self-reliance as a means of dealing with 
                                                          
82  See, for example, New York Times, “Germany’s insistence on Austerity meets with Revolt 
in the Eurozone,” 8 October 2014, p. B4. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/08/business/ 
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http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21595503-views-economics-euro-and-much-else-
draw-cultural-archetype-hail-swabian, (accessed 3 August 2015).  
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problems all play into popular explanations of German opposition to pro-
grams aimed at easing crisis conditions in debt markets and stimulating eco-
nomic growth in troubled countries. This so-called Protestant work ethic has 
been contrasted to supposed Roman Catholic attitudes as a possible explana-
tion of why the crisis has afflicted mainly Catholic countries.84 
The hyperinflation Germany experienced during the Weimar Republic in 
the 1920’s that led to the rise of the Third Reich has often been held up as a 
reason why Germans oppose expansionary monetary policy. In addition, 
inflation has a negative effect on savings. As a result, Germans regard infla-
tion as a much more serious problem than a general lack of economic 
growth.85 While cultural differences may play a role in national populations’ 
viewpoints regarding the crisis, some have argued that such reasoning is too 
simplistic and relies on unreasonable and negative national stereotypes. In-
stead, a far simpler argument can be made: self-interest. 
National Self-Interest 
An obvious reason for German opposition to softer bailout policies could be 
attributed to national self-interest. As the primary creditor country in the 
eurozone, Germany has the most to fear from a troubled country’s default as 
it would absorb the greatest proportion of losses should such an event occur. 
Moreover, permitting the ECB to support sovereign debt purchases and act as 
a lender of last resort could reduce the urgency and necessity of reform. Eas-
ier monetary policy and actions that decrease the pressure on a country both 
to reduce its debt and reform its economy could be seen as creating moral 
hazard by diminishing the cost of imprudent behaviour that may have led to 
the crisis in the first place. In addition, such a policy could make a country 
more likely to renege on its financial commitments. Any creditor could be 
forgiven for preferring policies that make a country more likely to focus on 
debt reduction and less likely to default. Germany would also see such inter-
ests as in the best interest of the eurozone too, as reduced debt and greater 
competitiveness would also make the currency union more stable in the long 
run. 
Furthermore, expansion of the money supply, like that necessary to sup-
port expanded bond purchases by the bank, is usually presumed to be infla-
tionary. Above normal inflation would also undermine the value of the loans 
                                                          
84  CNN, “Catholic vs. Protestant: European Debt Crisis,” 9 December 2011, http://ireport.cnn. 
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85  See for example Nicholas Kulish, “German Fears about Inflation Stall Bold Steps in Debt 
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indebted countries owe to Germany and the rest of the union. Since interest 
rates are fixed on bailout debt, any increase in inflation rates reduces the 
expected return on the loans made to help bailed out countries, while de-
creasing their real cost to borrowing countries. The latter effect could again 
be seen as causing moral hazard by reducing the cost of the financial crisis on 
those countries thought to have been its cause from a German perspective. 
Economic Ideology 
Academics also point to economic ideology for Germany’s stance during the 
crisis. In an effort to avoid the economic errors that led to World War II, 
since 1946, ordoliberalism, or Ordnungspolitik, developed in the 1930s at the 
Freiberg School, has heavily influenced post-war German economic policy 
This line of thought is an offshoot of classical liberalism that focuses on free 
markets and minimal governmental influence or interference in the economy. 
Ordnungspolitik defines several principles to be adhered to in a well-func-
tioning free market economy. Specifically, it argues that: (i) politics should 
avoid any activity that distorts prices in the economy and, thereby, distorts 
free market outcomes; (ii) monetary policy should focus only on price stabil-
ity; (iii) the government should ensure markets are as competitive as possible 
by controlling restraints of trade or monopolies; (iv) property rights be re-
spected and that individuals be free to conduct any contracts as long as they 
do not undermine competition; (v) individual liability be maintained (agents 
are held accountable for economic decisions) in markets as an incentive to 
ensure moral hazard does not lead to irresponsible behavior; and (vi) policy 
should be steady to avoid economic uncertainty.86 
The general idea of these principles and the ideas of ordoliberalism is 
that the government should support the economy and only regulate anti-com-
petitive practices. The role of government is not to affect market outcomes, 
but to support the market and to ensure competitiveness. To the degree that 
macroeconomic management is necessary, it should be accomplished through 
redistribution policies and not activist fiscal policies. Ordnungspolitik op-
poses the Keynesian policies that shaped much of the rest of the western 
world after World War II in which fiscal and monetary policy is used to man-
age macroeconomic outcomes. The government should also minimize its 
impact on the economy through the maintenance of a balanced budget, with 
expenditures limited to those necessary to provide public goods and services 
such as education, security, and defence. 
                                                          
86  See Tim Stuchtey, “Miracles are Possible – or a Classic German Approach to the Current 
Crisis,” American Institute for Contemporary German Studies (AICGS) Transatlantic Per-
spectives, June 2009.  
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As these principles have dominated German economic policy making 
since World War II, all German economists will, at some time, have been 
exposed to these ideas. Given that the German government, the Bundesbank 
and German institutions heavily recruit from their own universities, and the 
fact that there are relatively few scholars espousing alternative viewpoints 
such as Keynesianism in German academia, ordoliberalism has become the 
prevailing economic orthodoxy in Germany.87 German orthodox economics 
simply does not recognize Keynesian economics as a viable alternative. Cor-
respondingly, it focuses on long-term solutions and undervalues policies 
intended to stimulate affected economies in the short term. The Keynesian 
perspective, with its concern for the demand side of the economy, is far more 
prevalent in the rest of Europe. As a result, other countries’ economists 
instead call for economic stimulus to reduce unemployment in the short term 
and to ease credit market conditions to encourage greater economic activity.88 
The ‘Grasshoppers’: Why Have They Fared So Much Worse in the 
Eurozone? 
In many ways, the SPIGI countries look like stronger economies than the 
north’s. The south works more than the north, many of the SPIGI countries 
have extremely favourable business environments as well as effective gov-
ernments, and, while corruption is certainly a problem in countries such as 
Italy and Greece, the problem is more nuanced than one might think. Moreo-
ver, the SPIGI countries outpaced the north in growth from 1999 until the 
housing crisis hit in 2006 and 2007. Ireland’s growth was extremely high 
with very low debt to GDP ratios; as an outlier, it artificially raises the SPIGI 
growth rates. However, taking an average of Greece, Spain, Italy, and Portu-
gal’s growth rate from the same period, the south’s growth still outpaced the 
north’s, Germany, Finland, Austria, and The Netherlands (see figure 4-1). 
On the other hand, a closer look at the statistics reveals that structural 
imbalances in the eurozone set the stage for the crisis. In the end, the growth 
the SPIGI countries exhibited was not real growth, but the product of housing 
bubbles inflated by the easier credit available to them as members of the 
eurozone. Moreover, the corruption and less effective governments in 
Greece, Italy and Spain weakened their response to the crisis. 
                                                          
87  See Sebastian Dullien and Ulrike Guerot, “The Long Shadow of Ordoliberalism: Ger-
many’s Approach to the Euro-Crisis,” European Council on Foreign Relations Policy Brief 
(ECFR) 49, February 2012 http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR49_GERMANY_BRIEF.pdf 
(accessed 3 August 2015). 
88  Ibid. 
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Figure 4-1: Real GDP growth rates in the eurozone were relatively high over the first 
nine years of the euro’s introduction (1999-2007) with the original twelve eurozone 
countries (EU-12) averaging better growth than the United States. Performance, how-
ever, varied by region with northern economies (Germany/Finland/Austria/Netherlands) 
lagging behind the rest of the eurozone until 2006 when Germany began to overcome 
the malaise caused by reunification. In 2008, SPIGI (Spain, Portugal, Ireland, Greece 
and Italy) and southern (Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal) countries experienced con-
traction similar to the United States, while northern countries still experienced some 
growth, causing the EU-12 overall to average a positive although near-zero growth rate. 
In 2009, most European countries experienced recessions, but, following that year, 
northern countries, the EU-12 as a whole, and the United States returned to positive 
growth rates. In contrast, SPIGI) and southern countries continued to experience con-
traction five years after the US financial crisis began in 2008. Source data: Eurostat. 
The following section documents the differences in key economic areas: 
hours worked; corruption; effectiveness of governments; EU compliance; 
business-friendly environments; the degree to which the member state has 
benefited from integration; and attitudes towards credit. The statistics do not 
support the black-and-white grasshopper/ant stereotypes. In only three areas 
are there significant versus-the-rest differences. These are hours worked, the 
degree to which EU integration has benefited them, and attitudes toward 
credit. These three factors hold the answer in a nutshell: people in poorer 
countries work longer hours, making them more vulnerable to austerity 
measures, and Mediterranean and Anglo-Saxon cultures take a more permis-
sive approach towards credit, making them more likely to have taken ad-
vantage of the credit offered by membership in the eurozone. 
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Hours orked: Laziness or Poor Productivity? 
One of the most pervasive stereotypes of the SPIGI countries is that their 
inhabitants are lazy. Whether it is the Spanish with their siestas or the Guin-
ness-swilling Irish, these people have supposedly reaped what they have 
sown. According to OECD statistics, in general, the SPIGI countries work 
more hours per year than the north. Greeks work the most; Germans work the 
least. Since the poorer countries work longer hours than their richer counter-
parts, the cause of the eurozone crisis cannot be attributed to laziness. In any 
case, ‘laziness’ is a red herring: Why do the poorer countries’ inhabitants 
work more hours, and yet are poorer? The answer lies in productivity; in 
other words, the north’s workers can produce more in fewer hours. Differ-
ences in productivity were a significant cause of the structural imbalances 
that caused the crisis, and will be addressed later in this chapter. 
 
Figure 4-2: Hours worked per capita per year among the twelve eurozone countries.89 
The Role of Corruption and Effective Governance 
Another likely reason why the people in poorer countries work harder is 
because their governments are more likely to be corrupt or ineffective. In 
general, corruption varies a great deal in Europe from Denmark, which 
Transparency International ranks as the least corrupt government on earth, to 
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Greece, which ranks as the most corrupt in Europe, although with a rating of 
80 out of 177 countries, it still ranks in the top half of the world. Ireland is 
very clean, while Portugal and Cyprus are in the same league as Austria. 
Italy, Spain and Greece are the most corrupt, which partially explains the 
ineffectiveness of these governments as well as their poor EU compliance 
records. In other words, corruption is a contributing factor, although not the 
deciding one. 
All the governments in the European Union and the eurozone are “effec-
tive”. The World Bank charts the people’s perception of “the quality of pub-
lic and civil services and their degree of independence from political pres-
sures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibil-
ity of the government’s commitment to such policies.”90 All EU countries fall 
into the top two categories. The Irish, Cypriots and Portuguese rank their 
governments highly. Spain, Italy and Greece have less support, and yet still 
fall in the good governance grouping. Interestingly, these are the same three 
countries that are marked the most corrupt of the original euro-twelve on the 
previous chart. In addition, since the World Bank uses people’s perceptions 
of the governments for their index, it is possible that the people will score 
more highly governments that do not impose reforms or that continue with 
popular profligate spending. That said, effective governance is most likely 
only a contributing factor and not a deciding one in the eurozone crisis. 
EU Compliance: Did ‘Good’ Europeans Fare Better than ‘Bad’ 
Europeans? 
Are the SPIGI countries less likely to implement EU directives, i.e., do what 
the EU says? Is that why the eurozone crisis affected them more than others? 
Tanja Börzel established in her 2000 research into environmental compliance 
that there was “no southern problem”.91 Her more recent research on the 
subject confirms her previous assessment. A 2012 chart of all infringement 
proceedings against the first fifteen member states for non-compliance ranks 
Italy, France, Greece, Belgium and Germany as the worst, Portugal, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Spain and the UK as being in the middle, and The Netherlands, 
Austria, Denmark, Sweden and Finland as being the best. Granted, these 
numbers are skewed by the amount of time a country has been a member: the 
longer in the EU, the more likely not to have complied. Nevertheless, the 
numbers demonstrate that the issue is not a question of wealth or support for 
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the EU; France, Belgium and Germany are among the worst and Portugal, 
Ireland, and Spain are in the middle. Italy and Greece have some of the worst 
compliance records, most likely due to less effective governments, and yet 
they sandwich France, which was ranked as both one of the least corrupt and 
most effective governments. In addition, both France and Germany were 
among the first to violate the original Growth and Stability Pact in the early 
2000’s and to advocate for laxer regulations, which arguably contributed to 
the eurozone crisis a few years later. 
 
Figure 4-3: Sum of infringement proceedings by member state as of 2012.92 
Business Friendliness: Did Red Tape Hurt or Help? 
Are the SPIGI countries less open to business with too much red tape? Did 
overregulation weaken SPIGI economies and exacerbate their exposure to the 
eurozone crisis? The answer is no; there is no pattern in this area that would 
explain why the SPIGI countries felt the brunt of the crisis. Forbes magazine 
ranks countries on their favourable business environment based on eleven 
different factors including: property rights; innovation; taxes; technology; 
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corruption; freedom (personal, trade and monetary); red tape; investor pro-
tection; and stock market performance. Two of the SPIGI countries make the 
top twenty-five: Ireland ranks number one; Portugal is twenty, just below 
France. Among other countries in this list of 145: Finland is number six; 
Germany is twenty-four; Cyprus is twenty-seven; Spain is thirty-three; Italy 
is thirty-seven just above South Korea, and Greece is forty-six. Again, there 
is no stark difference between the SPIGI countries and the north.93 Neverthe-
less, Greece is one of the worst countries in the EU for red tape. It is notori-
ous for its rigid labour markets where it is almost impossible to fire workers. 
On the other hand, business friendliness may really be a measure of a lack of 
regulation, which might make some countries, such as Ireland, fertile soil for 
housing bubbles and bank failures. Countries, such as Germany, can afford to 
be less business friendly and to regulate to a higher degree because corpora-
tions will still flock to the thriving German economy. 
A Culture of Credit 
Where the SPIGI countries differ significantly from other member states is in 
their view of credit. The Economist deemed credit human kind’s greatest 
invention, but also argued it was a two-edged sword: 
At its core, finance does just two simple things. It can act as an economic 
time machine, helping savers transport today’s surplus income into the 
future, or giving borrowers access to future earnings now. It can also act 
as a safety net, insuring against floods, fires or illness. By providing 
these two kinds of service, a well-tuned financial system smooths away 
life’s sharpest ups and downs, making an uncertain world more predicta-
ble. In addition, as investors seek out people and companies with the best 
ideas, finance acts as an engine of growth. 
Yet finance can also terrorise. When bubbles burst and markets crash, 
plans paved years into the future can be destroyed.94 
                                                          
93  Kurt Badenhausen, “Map: The Best and Worst Countries for Business,” Forbes Magazine 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kurtbadenhausn/2013/12/04/map-the-best-and-worst-
countries-for-business/ (accessed 3 August 2015). 
94  The Economist, “The Slumps that Shaped Modern Finance” Digital Highlights, 10 April 2014, 
http://www.economist.com/news/essays/21600451-finance-not-merely-prone-crises-it-shaped-
them-five-historical-crises-show-how-aspects-today-s-fina (accessed 3 August 2015). 
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Figure 4-4: Mediterranean countries and Anglo-Saxon countries have a much more fa-
vourable view of credit than other EU members. 
This Eurobarometer poll from 2001 shows that the English-speaking and 
Southern countries see buying on credit as useful whereas Nordic and Ger-
manic countries have a strong cultural aversion to it. Adyen, an Internet 
payments company, estimates that fewer than thirty percent of Germans have 
credit cards. The Netherlands also has very low credit card penetration.95 This 
cultural split explains part of the mistrust and miscommunication that has 
characterized the political side of the crisis. 
A second interesting split, albeit not as stark as the credit divide, is in 
how much a member state has benefited economically from European inte-
                                                          
95  “Overview Supported Payment Methods,” Adyen http://www.adyen.com/wp-content/ 
uploads/2011/03/overview-payment-methods.pdf (accessed 3 August 2015). 
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gration. In 2014, the Bertelsmann Stiftung did an assessment of how the 
single European market affected each member state over the twenty-year 
period from 1992-2012. In calculating the cumulative gains of GDP per cap-
ital, the following table shows that, in general, the creditor countries are in 
the top half of those who gained the most, and the SPIGI countries are in the 
bottom half. Interestingly, Greece is the only loser in the group. That said, all 
the countries did benefit absolutely from integration, and even Greece, when 
one compares the GDP per capita using 2014 rather than 2012 figures (see 
table 4-1).96 
This chart reflects the structural imbalances that allowed some countries 
to benefit more from integration than others, in large part because of the euro. 
Economic benefits (costs) of integration include the internal market in Eu-
rope and the external impacts for trade outside of Europe. Since the D-Mark 
would have traded on the open market at a value higher than the euro, Ger-
many received an economic boost from integration and monetary union since 
its goods were cheaper when traded in euros. In other words, if a Canadian 
were to buy a Braun coffee maker, it would be cheaper for him or her to buy 
when priced in euros than it would have been in D-Marks because the euro 
reflected a basket or average of European currencies and not just the most 
expensive one – the D-Mark. For Greece, the effects were the opposite; the 
euro is higher than the Greek drachma would have been if traded on the open 
market. Therefore from Greece’s perspective, European integration inflicted 
a sort of double-whammy: not only was it less competitive in the internal 
market, on the external market, its goods were more expensive than they 
would have been if the drachma had floated.97 
                                                          
96  Thieß Petersen, Michael Böhmer, and Johannes Weisser, “20 years of the European single 
market: growth effects of EU Integration,” Policy Brief 2014/02 Bertelsmann Stiftung, 1. 
97  The value of integration was not just limited to the impacts caused by the adoption of a 
common currency. As can be seen, countries that were members of the EU and its common 
market system, but that did not adopt the euro, were also affected (note Sweden, the United 
Kingdom and Denmark). The degree to which they were affected depended on many fac-
tors, including their degree of labour market openness, and cultural, geographic and eco-
nomic factors. Trade imbalances within the set of countries adopting the common currency 
are evident, however, and these particularly impacted SPIGI countries, reducing the bene-
fits to Italy, Spain, Portugal and most of all Greece where integration appears to have re-
duced economic outcomes, particularly after the European financial crisis began. The im-
pact to Ireland was worsened by having adopted the common currency after the financial 
crisis occurred, but prior to this time this country saw significant benefits from integration 
that were in part reversed after events after 2008. 
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Table 4-1: Comparison of gross domestic product per capital in 2012 with and without 
increased European integration. In general, the SPIGI countries benefited less from 
integration than the north. Source: Prognos AG/Bertelsmann Stiftung. 
Difference
inPercent
Differencein
euros
Germany  2.3% 680 
Denmark 2% 720 
Belgium 1.6% 470 
Austria 1.4% 450 
Finland 1.2% 360 
United Kingdom 1% 310 
Ireland 0.9% 330 
Italy 0.9% 200 
France 0.8% 230 
Spain 0.7% 150 
Netherlands 0.6% 190 
Portugal 0.4% 60 
Sweden 0.4% 140 
Greece -1.3% -190 
While all the factors discussed contributed to the crisis, the main cause was 
structural imbalances among eurozone countries. In fact, the eurozone crisis 
began as an intricate minuet between the north and the south; countries with 
higher worker productivity will produce goods at lower cost that require 
markets in order to be sold. These productivity imbalances can create eco-
nomic pressures for trade deficits, and, when combined with different atti-
tudes towards credit, allowed the SPIGI countries to buy BMW cars based on 
the rapidly increasing values of their homes. One analogy describes the rela-
tionship as one between a bartender and a regular customer with a tab. The 
bartender keeps selling beer to the customer who keeps putting the cost on 
his tab. The bartender should stop selling beer on credit, and the customer 
should stop drinking. However, the bartender makes money off of each 
transaction, and the customer enjoys spending the money. In the end, if the 
customer cannot afford to pay his bill, the bartender will lose out, so he keeps 
extending the credit. The relationship is symbiotic. 
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Flight of the Bumblebee: Pre-crisis Structural Imbalances and 
Their Influence in the Eurozone 
According to currency union theory, the eurozone was not supposed to be 
able to fly; nonetheless, like a bumblebee, it did. From 2001 to 2007, the 
original twelve countries of the eurozone experienced average annual real 
GDP growth rates of over 2.7 percent with the average EU rate outpacing that 
of the US, and the southern countries (Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal) 
outpacing the northern economies (Germany, Finland, Austria, and The 
Netherlands). The house looked sound, but it lacked the structure needed to 
withstand an ill wind. The world financial crisis of 2008 and 2009 that burst 
the US housing bubble also burst similar bubbles throughout much of Eu-
rope. What had appeared to be a successful integration of eurozone econo-
mies had actually masked structural imbalances that now challenged the 
eurozone’s recovery. 
The structural imbalances meant that the financial crisis had different 
impacts in different regions. Northern countries, particularly Germany, Aus-
tria, Finland and The Netherlands, which had lagged behind southern and 
eurozone economies as a whole in the euro’s first five years, now accounted 
for the majority of eurozone growth post 2009. In contrast, the southern 
periphery, Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy, plus Ireland, all fell into what 
might be called a depression. As of 2014, levels of unemployment in SPIGI 
countries ranged from nearly twelve percent to over twenty-seven percent,98 
with unemployment rates for youth under twenty-five years of age ranging 
from twenty-three percent to over fifty-three percent.99 The following section 
details the economic imbalances in labour productivity and trade, and how 
the single currency aggravated them leading to housing bubbles, high interest 
rates, credit crunches, unemployment and severe recessions. 
Structural Imbalances: Trade Imbalances, Productivity Levels and their 
Influence on the Credit Crisis 
Like a ship in difficulty far from shore, any repairs to the eurozone will have 
to be made while the ship sails on. The primary challenge to overhauling the 
eurozone is two-fold. First, the original twelve euro countries always varied 
immensely with regard to competitiveness. Second, the most affected coun-
tries do not have the internal resources necessary to address current economic 
                                                          
98  “Unemployment Rate in Member States of the European Union in May 2014,” Statista: The 
Statistics Portal, http://www.statista.com/statistics/268830/unemployment-rate-in-eu-
countries/ (accessed 3 August 2015). 
99  “Unemployment Rate by Sex and Age Groups,” Eurostat, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/en/ 
web/products-datasets/-/UNE_RT_M (accessed 3 August 2015).  
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conditions; therefore, they need the aid of other eurozone countries if they are 
to remain in the currency union. 
The creation of the eurozone exacerbated competitiveness differences by 
increasing access to credit markets. In a tongue-in-cheek sort of way, the 
south was able to use the north’s low interest credit card. Southern states saw 
interest rates fall to levels nearly equal to those enjoyed by the traditionally 
low-interest economies such as Germany (see figure 4-7). Taking advantage 
of these newly opened capital markets, both the private and public sector 
increased borrowing. This activity fuelled growth in government and private 
consumption, thereby inflating and creating bubbles in real estate and prop-
erty prices that, while increasing GDP growth, masked the weaker economies 
underlying them and the worsening structural imbalances. 
With rapidly growing economies, the eurozone was a success. Southern 
countries faced no pressure to make the politically difficult decisions required 
to restrict public spending or restructure their economies in order to maintain or 
improve their internal competitiveness. As a consequence, productivity relative 
to northern European trade partners continued to fall, and costs rose in these 
nations relative to those of their northern neighbours. Northern economies 
faced the opposite conditions. While accession to the euro had had little impact 
on their credit conditions, with trade barriers and exchange costs eliminated, 
and historically higher wages, internal competitiveness within the eurozone 
demanded these countries focus on productivity gains. Thus, the north was 
forced to concentrate on competitiveness with the adoption of the euro, while 
the south, with its expansion of credit, did not face the same conditions. 
The first problem of competitiveness was generally ignored as it was as-
sumed that the eurozone itself would facilitate convergence. In theory, 
greater trade integration would spur convergence, as countries that were less 
competitive would run a trade deficit, requiring a financial flow into the 
country as investment. This increase in capital would lead to greater growth 
in the long run and ultimately convergence among economies. However, such 
convergence did not occur in the eurozone. 
Instead, the trade integration resulted in “twin deficits”. Countries that do 
not enjoy similar productivities or capacities for the production of goods and 
services will eventually begin to fall into greater and greater debt and deficit as 
trade flows continue to favour countries with lower production costs, making 
them more competitive in comparison. Since a country’s income cannot be 
greater than its total expenditure without incurring debt, a trade deficit implies 
that a country must spend more than it earns, thus trade deficits must be fi-
nanced by increasing debt burdens. The result is “twin deficits” – a situation 
where a trade deficit exists and is expanding, causing increases in government 
deficits due to rising public expenditures, thereby requiring additional borrow-
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ing since the economy is already spending more than it generates in income.100 
In sum, deficits mounted on the trade and budget side in southern countries due 
to competitiveness issues and expanding public sectors. 
Under normal circumstances, when a country finds itself uncompetitive 
with others in a trade environment, floating exchange rates would adjust to 
rebalance trade. United under a single currency, however, such adjustment 
between member countries cannot occur. Alternatively, in a complete fiscal 
and monetary union such as in the United States, the federal system can dic-
tate fiscal and transfer policies to alleviate problems across disparate regions 
in the country. Again, the eurozone has no significant or similar transfer 
facilities. While the EU created a monetary union, it failed to complete what 
some architects might have originally envisioned in a fully integrated Europe 
– a single federal system that would coordinate EU economic and social 
outcomes. As a result, trade imbalances caused by relative productivity shifts 
can neither be addressed through currency devaluation, due to the adoption of 
a common currency, nor internally through transfers. 
As figure 4-5 demonstrates, labour productivity was always much lower 
in the south compared to northern periphery countries, particularly in Ger-
many, Austria, The Netherlands, and Finland. Further, while labour produc-
tivity as a measure of national productivity grew across the union following 
the euro’s adoption, productivity increased more in northern countries. Com-
bined with the fact that before 2008, wages grew faster in the south relative to 
the north, the north’s cost advantage with respect to labour grew over time, 
leaving southern countries with an increasing cost disadvantage. 
Simultaneously, trade deficits widened in southern countries, while in 
northern countries, greater trade surpluses emerged (figure 4-6). Across the 
twelve original countries in the eurozone (EU-12), the collective trade balances 
with the rest of the world did not change significantly. Thus, the data suggest 
changes in internal trade flows caused the change in regional deficits and sur-
pluses. In other words, once the south had euros to spend, more Spaniards and 
Portuguese started buying Philips products from The Netherlands and Bosch 
                                                          
100  This concept becomes clearer when expressed mathematically: The Y=C+I+G+X-IM 
where X-IM is the trade surplus (X>IM) or deficit (IM>X) referred to as NX. This can be 
rearranged using T for total taxes or government revenue as  
Y-T-C +T-G = I +NX  
Where I = investment  
Y –T- C as total private savings S  
T-G as the budget deficit or surplus  
NX = X-IM  
This can be rewritten as  
S + T-G = I + NX  
If T-G < 0 (budget deficit) then often NX<0 since Investment is positive (one cannot take 
away the factories, only add them!) and as the budget deficit rises, the trade deficit in-
creases. 
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appliances from Germany. The resulting reductions in trade deficits in the 
south as import consumption fell were mirrored by reductions in northern trade 
surpluses, while the overall EU-12 balance was relatively unaffected.101 
 
Figure 4-5: From the initiation of the eurozone, there have been large differences be-
tween labour productivities in northern and southern periphery states. While productivity 
growth occurred throughout the decade in all regions, the gap between southern coun-
tries and the rest of the eurozone has only widened over the period. This has resulted in 
cost advantages affecting trade patterns in the eurozone, particularly between northern 
and southern countries as the north’s cost advantages increased. The SPIGI result shows 
the difference between labour productivities in Ireland and other troubled countries. 
Ireland’s labour productivity is the highest in the eurozone and has continued to grow 
throughout the crisis, in contrast to other troubled states. Data Source: OECD. 
Although often grouped with southern countries, Ireland is structurally quite 
different. As shown in figure 4-5, Irish levels of productivity were greater than 
the rest of the southern countries’ as indicated by the difference between aver-
age southern country productivity levels and that of the south combined with 
Ireland (SPIGI productivity levels). In fact, Irish productivity has only been 
exceeded by Luxembourg’s since the euro was created, and exceeds that of all 
                                                          
101  These results are more rigourously verified in papers such as Nils Holinski, Clemens JM Kool, 
and Joan Muysken, “Persistent macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area: Causes and 
consequences.” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review 94.January/February 2012 (2012), 
https://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/12/01/1-20Holinski.pdf (accessed 3 August 
2015). 
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northern periphery countries. Furthermore, when one averages Irish annual 
productivity levels with the south’s, the ratio of north to SPIGI country average 
productivity falls over time, indicating that growth in labour productivity in 
Ireland was greater than in the southern periphery, or northern states. Higher 
inflation rates, prior to 2008, were offset by these productivity gains. 
 
Figure 4-6: Trade balances (exports less imports as a percentage of GDP) were per-
sistently negative for southern countries (Portugal, Italy, Greece, Spain) during the 
2000s and deficits increased as credit conditions became easier after 2004. Similarly, 
northern states experienced growing trade surpluses throughout the period leading up 
to the crisis. Growth in surpluses appears to mirror deficits in southern states both in 
the periods leading up to 2008 and afterward during the eurozone crisis. Aggregate 
trade balance across the twelve original euro countries remained stable and slightly 
positive throughout the period, suggesting that the change in trade balances appears to 
have been the result of internal trade flows occurring after the adoption of the euro. 
Data Source: Eurostat. 
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Relative productivities diverged, with differences in costs between north and 
south rising throughout the decade. In general, Germany and, to a lesser ex-
tent, other northern European states, were the primary beneficiaries. Sus-
tained purchasing under these conditions for southern economies remained 
possible only through expanded credit markets and, in part, these were fi-
nanced by the mounting trade surpluses accruing to northern countries in the 
form of foreign investment.102 Northern economies improved and grew due to 
the internal trade advantages productivity growth provided. To make matters 
better, with a single currency, exchange rates could not appreciate to make 
the northern goods more expensive, as would normally happen in the world 
market. Southern economies, although weakened by eroding trade competi-
tiveness caused by the same forces, did not experience slowing growth as 
shown in figure 4-1, due to favourable cyclical conditions caused by real 
estate and consumption bubbles. Their economies remained buoyed by the 
credit flowing in from northern trading partners and the international “sav-
ings glut” that, in part, drove property bubbles in North America and the rest 
of the world during the mid-2000s. Differences in property prices relative to 
the rest of the eurozone and northern countries, in particular, are apparent 
from the inception of the euro until 2007 (see figure 4-8). 
                                                          
102  In simple economics, the sum of total expenditure across household consumption of domestic 
goods (C), investment (I), government expenditures of all types (G) and on the trade balance 
(exports (X) sold to other countries less imports purchased from other countries (M) or (X-M) 
must equal national income (Y). As Y=C+I+G+X-M is an identity that states’ total 
expenditure cannot be greater than total income, it must always be true. Redefining Y-C-G as 
national savings, (S), that is total savings by households and government, this relationship can 
be expressed as S = I + (X-M). When a trade deficit occurs, (X-M) < 0, expenditures on 
imports exceed exports sold abroad. Rearranging the previous equation, a trade deficit will 
imply that investment (I) exceeds new savings available to finance it (S) by the same amount 
(S – I = (X-M)). In this case, a trade deficit will require that borrowing to finance domestic 
investment must occur from other countries in an amount equal to the trade deficit as domestic 
savings will not be able to finance this level of investment expenditure. This borrowing is 
referred to as Net Foreign Investment or NFI = -(X-M) and refers to the positive flow of credit 
from other nations to satisfy the shortfall of domestic savings and investment in the presence 
of a trade deficit. Note also as G, government spending rises, total savings S falls since S = Y-
C-G, thus more must be borrowed from abroad to finance a given level of investment if public 
expenditures increase. This “twin deficits” hypothesis describes the fact that, typically, 
countries with expanding government expenditure deficits will also incur larger trade deficits. 
This was apparent in Europe, particularly in southern countries as shown in figure 4-6. 
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Figure 4-8: From 2003-2007, real estate price appreciation throughout the eurozone and 
in SPIGI countries were two to three times higher than in northern trade surplus coun-
tries such as Germany, Finland, Austria and The Netherlands. These trends reflected 
Europe-wide conditions. Source data: OECD, Eurostat and GlobalPropertyGuide.com. 
In hindsight, growth rates in the south did appear to suggest economic 
convergence, but these figures were illusory. What was not clearly under-
stood and partially hidden by the apparent growth in the southern economies 
was the importance of leverage and debt on the economic statistics observed. 
Persistent trade deficits between the relatively less wealthy southern countries 
and their wealthier northern partners could have been viewed as an unhealthy 
divergent force: weaker countries’ trade sectors were falling victim to the 
more competitive north. In fact, the opposite view emerged. 
Convergence and trade deficits were not regarded as mutually exclusive. 
The resulting net foreign investment flows from surplus countries to their 
southern neighbours, caused by persistent trade deficits, could and would 
result in increased productivity-enhancing investment. The accumulating debt 
faced by southern countries in the presence of trade deficits need not have 
detracted from debt sustainability if returns to such investments were higher 
than the cost of debt service. In other words, in southern “catch-up” coun-
tries, new investment could be expected to yield greater returns in those 
countries than in countries with higher productivity. 
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Figure 4-9: Trade imbalances in the period prior to 2008 should have financed net 
foreign investment flows in southern and SPIGI countries. It appears this did occur as 
investment slowed in Germany, Finland, Austria and the Netherlands relative to 
southern states during this period. Given the productivity data, which showed produc-
tivity improved for northern states relative to southern ones during the same time, the 
data is consistent with investment flows financing non-productivity increasing activi-
ties such as real estate construction, which would be reinforced by the price data 
shown in figure 4-8. Source Data: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database. 
The evidence, however, does not support this optimistic conclusion. While 
investment increased in southern and SPIGI countries relative to northern 
ones (see figure 4-9), the data suggest productivity improvements were not 
sufficient for such convergence to occur. High investment growth in southern 
countries, propelled in part by their credit, appears not to have been allocated 
to productivity-enhancing activities, but instead to debt-financed real estate 
bubbles, where investment occurred in the form of new construction. The 
SPIGI economies have not yet recovered from the burst bubbles. 
Trade imbalances not only financed real estate investment, they also 
fuelled both government and private debt. Reductions in gross national sav-
ing, as shown in figure 4-10, indicate how both private and public saving 
declined in southern and SPIGI countries, especially during the real estate 
boom that occurred between 2004 and 2008. Saving has been consistently 
lower in southern and SPIGI countries relative to the rest of the union. This 
debt pattern and the presence of larger public sectors are shown by the higher 
debt/GDP ratios in these countries (figure 4-11). Stronger growth in the mid-
100 
dle part of the decade allowed southern countries to expand the public sector 
without great impact on the debt/GDP ratio. 
Once the financial crisis of 2008 occurred, property bubbles collapsed 
and rapid and severe recessions followed, as private and public debt levels in 
the SPIGI countries became unsustainable. Private and public debt levels are 
shown as they evolved from 2001 to 2011 for the original twelve countries of 
the eurozone and Cyprus in figure 4-12. From 2001 to 2007, real estate and 
consumption booms were financed by additional private debt accumulation. 
By 2011, serious recessions and banking crises caused public debt to balloon 
as debt/GDP ratios grew much more quickly than in the rest of the eurozone. 
Simultaneously, the overhang of accumulated private debt has created 
significant uncertainty in the eurozone. Countries that saw private debt levels 
climb, most often due to real estate booms, were now far more susceptible to 
banking crises, as the quality of loans underlying those private debts rapidly 
diminished due the sudden crash in real estate prices after 2007. Moreover, 
the abrupt reduction in debt accumulation that had fuelled the economic 
booms in much of Europe, especially SPIGI countries, created a contraction 
in economic activity, further destabilizing banking systems while increasing 
public expenditures and debt. 
As the IMF noted in their OECD Economic Outlook in May 2011, the 
problem in the eurozone then became one in which public finance burdens 
were willingly increased because of faulty assumptions regarding the positive 
economic circumstances enjoyed in the mid-2000s: 
Fiscal consolidation… looked successful, but – as has been a recurrent 
theme in the OECD’s economic history – failure to attain sound under-
lying public finances was masked by very favourable cyclical develop-
ments. Fiscal rules (e.g. the European Stability and Growth Pact) failed 
to provide incentives to encourage the build-up of a sufficient reserve in 
good times. The implications of rising private-sector imbalances for the 
sustainability of public finances were ignored and forecasts of underlying 
public budgets were too optimistic. A possible correction in financial as-
set and real estate prices was not factored in and implicit fiscal liabilities 
were not taken into account.103 
                                                          
103  OECD Economic Outlook, Volume 2011, Issue 1, 320. 
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Figure 4-10: Credit inflows between 2000 and 2007 in southern and SPIGI countries 
also reduced gross domestic savings as both households and governments took on 
additional debt, especially from 2003 to 2007. Such figures are consistent with in-
creased home prices in the SPIGI and southern economies, and rising trade deficits. 
The impact of the recessions following the financial crisis in 2008 and the eurozone 
crisis from 2009 onward is apparent across all countries shown, especially southern 
and SPIGI nations. Source data: OECD Economic Outlook Database. 
What had been a virtuous European circle became the eurozone crisis. In-
stead of convergence, structural imbalances in trade led to a troubled debt-
alliance that left northern countries financing southern neighbours’ consump-
tion of northern goods, while helping to fuel property bubbles and expanding 
public sectors. As productivity improved in the northern countries relative to 
the south, southern economies became relatively less able to generate income 
and more reliant on larger debt. Clearly, this fragile partnership would be in 
danger if credit conditions ever worsened, but, in the mid-2000s, concerns 
about such risks were considerably downplayed – just another immense 
miscalculation worldwide that led to the financial crisis of 2008. Growth in 
southern economies swiftly stopped, and northern creditors found they were 
holding a bag of potentially toxic liabilities with catastrophic consequences 
for the eurozone if the debtors decided not to pay them. 
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Figure 4-11: Government debt relative to GDP remained higher in southern and 
SPIGI countries compared to their northern neighbours. Given that growth was also 
higher in these countries relative to the eurozone, such figures indicate that public 
sector debt grew more quickly as well. Debt/GDP growth greatly accelerated across 
Europe, especially for southern and SPIGI countries after the financial crisis of 2007 
and then the eurozone crisis in late 2009 and 2010. Toward the end of the period, only 
northern country debt/GDP ratios had stabilized, reflecting their stronger economic 
growth. Source: Eurostat. 
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Private and Public Debt-GDP 
   2001
   2007
   2011 
Figure 4-12: Government and private debt relative to GDP in 2001, 2007 and 2011. 
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The next section of this chapter explores the relative economic and political 
situations of each of the debtor eurozone countries. Each SPIGI country case 
study examines the specific conditions that caused the internal recessions. 
The studies provide a thumbnail sketch of the member state’s original moti-
vations to join the EU as well as the political context for their actions. Next, 
the studies delve more deeply into the specific economic composition of each 
country. 
Country Specific Structural Imbalances 
The most troubled countries in the eurozone have been affected by some or 
all of the structural imbalances previously outlined, however, circumstances 
of the crises in each have been unique. Table 4-2 summarizes the degree to 
which symptoms of eurozone imbalances had been present before 2008. The 
SPIGI countries have been the source of most concern during the eurozone 
crisis, and Cyprus represents the first country to require a bailout as a direct 
result of crisis events in other countries, specifically the write-down of Greek 
debt held privately in 2012. The countries are presented in the order in which 
the crisis progressed. 
Greece 
Greece joined the European Union in 1981, just six years after putting an end 
to a military junta that controlled the country from 1967 to 1975. Joining 
NATO only a year earlier in 1980, the idea was that NATO would stabilize 
the country through security guarantees, and the EU would foster it economi-
cally and democratically. By virtue of its geographic position that controls 
the Mediterranean, Western Europe and the United States were strongly sup-
portive of membership in order to stabilize Greece. From the Greek perspec-
tive, joining the EU would put the country on a path to development and 
modernization.104 
Although still one of the poorest countries in Western Europe, Greece 
has gained significantly from EC structural funds and investment. Greek 
farmers have benefited greatly from subsidies under the Common Agricul-
tural Policy. Nonetheless, seventy percent of allocated EU funds go unused. 
In other words, the government is so poorly run that Greece can only imple-
                                                          
104  Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Greece’s course in the EU,” http://www.mfa.gr/en/ 
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ment projects that employ a small portion of the funds, creating an absorption 
rate of only thirty percent.105 
Greece is also viewed as a ‘poor’ European, often eschewing the EU 
culture of consensus and compromise for its own gain. Instead, Greece has 
used its veto often – a social faux pas. Right after Greece acceded, the Pan 
Hellenic Movement (PASOK), the social democratic party, which was op-
posed to EC membership, took power in the Parliament. Greece remained in 
the EC, but as a spoiler. Typically, the EU countries would agree on some-
thing, Greece would veto, and then negotiate a way to be bought off, for 
example, through agricultural concessions, more structural funds, or protec-
tionist measures. In 2015, Greek prime minister Alexis Tsipras played the 
same game by putting the EU’s bailout proposal to a popular referendum, in 
effect creating a popular ‘veto’ in hopes of being able to negotiate a better 
deal. As a political move, it rattled the other EU member states as Greece 
once again played the spoiler rejecting the Brussels culture of consensus 
building. 
With regards to the EU’s goals for harmonized fiscal policies, Greece has 
lagged behind the others in terms of each country’s targets for inflation, debt, 
and fiscal balance. The eurozone crisis began with Greek revisions to na-
tional debt figures in October 2009 after the election of a new centre-left 
government, led by George Papandreou. In an audit of public finances, it was 
revealed that previous Greek governments had, for years, hidden massive 
debts from the rest of the European Union. Greece’s estimated government 
deficit for 2009 had more than tripled, revised from a previous 3.7 percent of 
GDP to 12.5 percent shortly after the new government took office. By April 
2010, new EU figures suggested the deficit was even larger – nearer to four-
teen percent. 
The implications of this admission forced investors worldwide to recon-
sider their faith in the safety of sovereign debt. The EU’s own statistical 
agency, Eurostat, had first suggested Greece was guilty of misreporting 
financial statistics in 2004. Since 2005, the EU had expressed reservations no 
fewer than five times regarding the biannual reporting of Greek debt and 
deficit figures. On November 10, 2009, the European Economic and Finan-
cial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) issued a statement calling for an investigation 
of the ongoing reporting problems in Greece.106 In its follow-up report issued 
in August 2010, the European Commission identified two primary causes of 
                                                          
105  Nikolaos Zahariadis, “Greece: A Most Enthusiastic, Reluctant European,” in The European 
Union and the Member States (eds.) Eleanor E. Zeff and Ellen B Pirro, second edition, 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006), 195. 
106  Council of the European Union, Council conclusions on EU Statistics, 2972nd Economic 
and Financial Affairs Brussels, 10 November 2009, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ 
uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/111007.pdf (accessed 3 August 2015). 
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the repeated pattern of upward revisions: poor accounting procedures and 
poor governance influencing fiscal reporting. While stated more diplomati-
cally, Greece was charged with allowing official agencies to “cook the 
books” when politically expedient. The eventual estimate of the Greek deficit 
would be 15.6 percent of GDP, over four times the level originally reported. 
Table 4-2: Maastricht Criteria Levels by Country Group and Selected Countries 
Debt/GDP Deficit/GDP Inflation 
  
Average Annual Debt to 
GDP ratio (%) 
Average Annual Deficit (-) 
or Surplus (+) to GDP 
ratio (%) 
Average Yearly Rate of 
Consumer Price Change 
  
2001-
2007 
2008-
2012 2012 
2001-
2007 
2008-
2012 2012 
2001-
2007 
2008-
2012 2012 
Greece 102.5% 143.6% 156.9% -5.7% -11.1% -10.0% 3.4% 2.9% 1.00% 
Ireland 29.2% 85.1% 117.6% 1.0% -14.6% -7.6% 3.3% 0.4% 1.0% 
Portugal 62.5% 96.3% 123.6% -4.3% -7.0% -6.4% 3.1% 1.9% 2.8% 
Spain 46.1% 61.8% 84.2% 0.6% -9.1% -10.6% 3.2% 2.3% 2.4% 
Italy 105.1% 117.9% 127.0% -3.2% -3.9% -3.0% 2.3% 2.4% 3.3% 
Cyprus 65.7% 65.1% 85.8% -2.5% -4.6% -6.3% 2.4% 2.8% 3.1% 
SPIGI 69.1% 100.9% 121.9% -2.3% -9.1% -7.5% 3.1% 2.0% 2.1% 
South 79.1% 104.9% 122.9% -3.1% -7.7% -7.5% 3.0% 2.4% 2.4% 
North 55.0% 64.2% 69.9% -0.4% -2.2% -2.1% 1.9% 2.2% 2.9% 
EU-12 60.8% 79.7% 91.6% -1.2% -5.3% -4.60% 2.5% 2.2% 2.5% 
A swollen public service sector and an ineffective and inefficient tax collec-
tion system were the primary causes of the large deficits. Public servants, 
once hired, had jobs that were constitutionally protected and guaranteed for 
life. Although originally intended to isolate the public service from political 
pressures, instead, they became bribes for political support. From 1970 to 
2009, public sector employment increased fivefold, creating a powerful 
political constituency of over 700,000 people consisting of public service 
workers and their families. Public sector employment growth during this 
same period was four percent compared to an average growth rate of less than 
one percent in the private sector. 
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Table 4-3: Economic Indicators by Group and Selected Eurozone Countries 
 Real GDP 
Growth 
Home Prices Labour Produc-
tivity 
Trade Balance 
 Average Yearly 
% Change 
Average Yearly % 
Change 
Euros per hour 
worked at 2005 
prices 
Average yearly 
Current Account to 
GDP ratio (%) 
 2001-
2007 
2008-
2012 
2003-
2007 
2008-
2011 
2001-
2007 
2008-
2012 
2001-
2007 
2008-
2012 
Greece 4.2% -4.4% 5.3% -3.0% 19.5 20.9 -12.0% -9.7% 
Ireland 5.1% -1.2% 11.3% -12.6% 49.1 57.0 13.4% 18.0% 
Portugal 1.1% -1.1% 1.5% 1.5% 16.9 18.1 -8.5% -6.0% 
Spain 3.4% -0.8% 13.7% -4.3% 27.8 29.6 -5.0% -1.9% 
Italy 1.3% -1.4% 6.1% 0.1% 32.2 32.3 0.4% -0.1% 
Cyprus 3.6% 0.2% 8.7%* -3.5% 19.8 21.2 -2.2% -5.5% 
SPIGI 3.0% -1.8% 7.6% -3.7% 29.1 31.6 -2.2% -0.1% 
South 2.5% -1.9% 6.6% 1.4% 24.1 25.2 -6.1% -4.6% 
North 2.2% 0.2% 3.2% 1.9% 44.3 46.4 5.7% 4.8% 
EU-12 2.7% -0.6% 7.1% -0.3% 37.5 39.3 3.4% 4.1% 
Public sector wages had climbed to a level almost fifty percent greater than in 
private sector earnings, and accounted for twenty-seven percent of total gov-
ernment expenditures. OECD estimates indicated overstaffing levels in the 
Greek public sector at over fifty percent. In the decade from 2000 to 2009, 
wage and social program expenditures in Greece rose by 6.5 per cent annu-
ally while revenues increased by only five percent annually. The result was 
an ever widening government expenditure deficit.107 From 2004 to 2009, 
according to documents submitted to the EU by the Greek Ministry of Fi-
nance, “output increased in nominal terms by 40 percent, central government 
primary expenditures increased by 87 percent against an increase of only 31 
percent in tax revenues.”108 Over the period of Greek membership in the euro 
from 2001 to 2007, the average government deficit was 5.7 percent of GDP 
and the Greek debt-GDP ratio was 102.5 percent (see table 4-2). With respect 
                                                          
107  Data on Greek public sector employment from J. Sfakianakis, “The Cost of Protecting 
Greece’s Public Sector,” The New York Times, 10 October 2012.  
108  Greece, Ministry of Finance, “Update of the Hellenic Stability and Growth Programme,” 
submitted to the European Commission, January 2010, 14.  
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to revenues, tax evasion remained a long-standing problem and one that little 
was done to correct. 
The large, inefficient, and expanding public sector, growing at four times 
the rate of the private sector, undermined productivity, growth, and trade 
competitiveness. Additionally, from 2005 to 2007, Greek home prices grew 
at an average rate of 8.5 percent. The real estate and consumption bubbles in 
Greece reduced private savings, while increasing private and public debt 
loads. Debt was sustained by very large and persistent trade deficits, which 
averaged twelve percent. 
Before the financial crisis, Greek economic growth had been among the 
strongest of the eurozone countries, averaging 4.2 percent annually. How-
ever, after 2008, the world financial crisis disrupted the shipping and tourism 
industries severely impacting local economies. The ensuing recession re-
duced Greek economic output by 0.2 percent in 2008 and a further 3.5 per-
cent in 2009, straining Greek public finances further as social program costs 
escalated. The government’s own revelations regarding Greek financial 
mismanagement resulted in an almost immediate series of credit rating 
downgrades on Greek sovereign debt. Greek ten-year bond yields rose from 
under 4.5 percent to over eight percent in the period from October 2009 to 
May 2010, a level almost triple the yield paid on German bonds. In April 
2010, Greek two-year bond yields rose to over fifteen percent and five-year 
bonds exceeded ten percent. Finding international financing of its debt ser-
vice and operations unsustainable, the Greek government was forced to re-
quest a bailout from the EU and IMF on 23 April. On 2 May 2010, the EU 
and IMF agreed to finance loans totalling €110 billion, granted for three 
years at an interest rate of 5.5 percent. 
Of all the SPIGI countries, Greece alone has suffered from all the eco-
nomic ills possible: a decline in productivity relative to the northern coun-
tries; an increased trade deficit; a housing bubble; declining national savings; 
an increasing debt to GDP ratio, and a government that is both corrupt and 
ineffective. As result, Greece has had, by far, the most difficult hill to climb 
towards economic recovery. 
Ireland 
Like Greece, Ireland saw membership as a vehicle for development and mod-
ernization as well as a way to reduce its economic dependence on the United 
Kingdom. Whereas, in essence, Ireland was England’s first colony, member-
ship in the EU gave it equal status with Britain, allowing the Irish find their 
own place in continental politics and in the world. Membership in the EU 
also meant access to CAP and structural or regional development funds to 
invest in infrastructure and the like, as well as a larger market for Irish goods. 
By 1975, Ireland had already received 500 million pounds from the European 
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Community. Not wanting to rock the boat, Ireland has been very supportive 
of the Commission in almost all of its pursuits. In 1979, Ireland joined the 
EMS, which allowed the Irish to break the punt’s link with the pound sterling 
for the first time – another symbolic break with Britain. 
Historically, one of the poorest countries in Western Europe, by 2007, 
Ireland became second only to Luxembourg as the richest in the eurozone on 
a GDP per capita basis. This turnaround earned Ireland the nickname the 
“Celtic Tiger”, putting it in the same league as the so-called Asian Tigers: 
South Korea; Singapore; Hong Kong; and Taiwan. Its recipe for success 
included adopting one of the lowest corporate tax rates in Europe and in-
vestment in education. The government directed thirty-five percent of EU 
structural funds to developing human capital, more than any other recipient 
country, encouraging the growth of a new high tech industry. Subsidies also 
encouraged high-tech firms to locate in Ireland. By the 2000s, Irish high-tech 
manufacturing had led to significant trade surpluses with the rest of the world 
and Europe. Favourable location and relatively lower wages were also often 
cited as factors in Ireland’s economic success. 
Annual growth rates of real GDP from 1984 to 2000 averaged 6.3 per-
cent; from 1996 to 2000, they averaged an astounding 10.3 percent. During 
the period of the euro from 2001 to 2007, real GDP growth continued at a 
still very high 5.1 percent average pace, despite a period of relative easing 
during the early 2000s due to the “dot.com” bubble bursting and the infor-
mation technology slowdown in the United States. High rates of economic 
growth allowed Ireland to run persistent budget surpluses, reducing its gov-
ernment debt to GDP ratio from over ninety percent to less than forty percent 
in the decade of the 1990s alone. Debt to GDP ratios continued to fall 
through 2007 and averaged 29.1 percent from 2001 to 2007 (table 4-2). 
Again, this performance was among the best in the currency union, and, by 
2007, Ireland’s debt-GDP ratio was bettered only by Luxembourg. 
Unlike other troubled countries in the eurozone, as shown in table 4-3, 
the most serious source of imbalance in Ireland’s economy was a real estate 
bubble that began to inflate in the early 2000s. Rates of home price increases 
exceeded fourteen percent in 2003 and 2006 and averaged 11.3 percent be-
tween 2003 and 2007, propelled by economic growth, foreign investment, 
and easy credit. Cheap credit was driven by bond yields on Irish sovereign 
debt that were often lower than that paid on equivalent German bonds, tradi-
tionally the benchmark rate to which other countries’ debts have been com-
pared. Growth in high-tech manufacturing, corporate relocation to Ireland, 
and high levels of foreign investment also encouraged house price increases. 
The US real estate bubble in 2007 burst at the same time as Ireland’s, and 
soon, the Irish banking system was in crisis. Banks in Ireland, as in the 
United States, had financed much of the long-term real estate investment 
using short-term borrowed credit. As concerns mounted over the ability to 
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repay these loans, Irish banks faced an illiquidity problem. As the Irish econ-
omy fell into its first recession since 2003, in an attempt to stabilize the 
banking system and open credit markets, the Irish government issued an 
unlimited guarantee backing six of its national banks. The Irish government 
also implemented deeply unpopular social spending cutbacks in an attempt to 
reverse a budget deficit that exceeded seven percent of national output, the 
first deficit since the 1980s. In response to these actions, November 2010 saw 
one of the largest protests in the country’s history.109 
By the end of the year, the government took out a seventy-five percent 
ownership stake in order to bailout the Anglo-Irish Bank, the one worst hit by 
the property collapse. This single bank would eventually lose over €34 bil-
lion, worth almost half of its investments and a loss equivalent to almost 
twenty percent of Irish GDP in 2008. From 2007 to 2009, unemployment 
climbed from 4.7 percent to twelve percent as the recession worsened. In 
September 2009, Ireland created the National Asset Management Agency, a 
“bad bank” in which to transfer the Irish banks’ non-performing assets. For a 
second year, the Irish government also offered an unlimited bank guarantee 
to back these institutions in another attempt to open credit markets to Irish 
financial institutions. Credit market conditions, however, only worsened after 
Greece announced the first of its deficit revisions in November 2009. Irish 
ten-year sovereign bond yields, which had averaged only a half percent pre-
mium over German bonds in 2008, climbed to a level sixty percent greater 
than the yield on comparable German notes. By the end of 2009, the Irish 
budget deficit was 13.9 percent of GDP, and the Irish economy had con-
tracted by over three percent. By mid 2010, Irish 10-year bond yields were 
double those of Germany’s; the Irish government had to guarantee Irish bank 
obligations for a third year. With these bank liabilities, now worth over thirty 
percent of Irish GDP, the Irish government would no longer finance its ex-
penditure and expanding liability using sovereign credit. It requested a 
bailout from the IMF and EU, and, on 28 November 2010, was granted an 
€85 billion rescue package. 
Although Ireland was the second country to succumb to the financial cri-
sis, unlike Greece, it had no productivity decline, no trade deficit, and no 
savings decline. Its debt-to-GDP ratio was healthy as was its government. 
However, it did suffer from a housing bubble that burst and made the econ-
omy go bust. 
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Portugal 
Despite its dictatorship under António de Oliveira Salazar, Portugal was both 
a founding member of NATO in 1949 and of the European Free Trade Asso-
ciation (EFTA) in 1960 – the EU alternative for those unable or unwilling to 
join, but still interested in trade. Although Portugal could not have been ad-
mitted to the European Community at the time, Salazar would not have 
wanted to become a member: he was a very keen nationalist preferring inter-
governmental organizations. This strong nationalist bent runs through Portu-
gal today. 
After Salazar’s death in 1970 and the Carnation Revolution that ended 
the dictatorship in 1974, Western European aid rushed in to protect the nas-
cent democracy. Portugal applied for membership in the European Commu-
nity in 1977, just one year after they had drafted their constitution. Negotia-
tions began, and Portugal entered the EC along with Spain in 1986. As in 
Greece and Spain, a key goal of membership was democratization. 
Although Portugal does not receive CAP funding, it has received a tre-
mendous influx of development aid from the EU. Nevertheless, Portuguese 
enthusiasm for the European project has been mixed. As one of the “poor 
four”, being part of the EU has exposed the backwardness of Portuguese 
agriculture and industry. During the 1994 European Parliament elections, the 
Social Democrats’ (the ruling party) slogan was “European yes, Portugal 
forever!” The communists, some Greens, and a small right wing party called 
the Social Democratic Centre Popular Party won nine percent of the vote on 
an anti-EU platform describing “a Europe bent on turning Portugal into 
nothing better than a backwater where richer Europeans spend their holi-
days.” Even the socialist president asked, “are we to be the waiters of Eu-
rope?”110 Still, the Portuguese public generally supports European integration 
and undertook all the requirements necessary to become one of the founding 
members of the eurozone, albeit one of the weakest. 
Even after the introduction of the euro, Portuguese growth faltered. Bur-
dened by a large and inefficient public sector, low productivity throughout 
the economy, and higher inflation than in the eurozone as a whole, trade 
deficits averaged over eight percent of GDP. Growth of real GDP averaged 
1.1 percent from 2001 to 2007, the lowest among the original eurozone 
countries. Government deficits averaged over four percent, resulting in gov-
ernment gross debt to GDP ratios climbing in excess of sixty percent. Both 
deficit and debt ratios persistently exceeded the Maastricht guidelines re-
quired of eurozone countries. Despite threatened sanctions, Portugal was not 
penalized under the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) rules. Bond yields 
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also remained low; interest rates on Portuguese ten-year bonds averaged only 
0.17 percent more than German bonds from 2001 to 2007. 
As the worldwide economy worsened, the Portuguese economy also 
slowed, falling into recession at the end of 2008. Deficits rose to over ten 
percent of GDP by 2009, with government debt to GDP rising to over sev-
enty percent in 2008 and eighty percent in 2009. In late 2008, Portugal was 
forced to nationalize one of its largest banks after a banking scandal and 
severe losses. A second bank also fell victim to management scandal, and, in 
early 2010, was liquidated by the Portuguese central bank. At the end of 
2009, following the Greek deficit revelations, ten-year bond yields on Portu-
guese debt began to reflect investor concerns regarding that country’s debt 
sustainability. By the end of 2010, Portuguese ten-year debt approached yield 
levels of seven percent, a level 4.5 percent higher and over two and half times 
the rate on comparable German debt. With Portuguese debt yields at record 
highs and unemployment over eleven percent, in April 2011 Portugal ap-
proached the IMF and EU for assistance and was granted a €78 billion 
bailout package. 
Although one of the worst battered by the eurozone crisis, anti-European 
populist parties have not gained much ground. Portuguese economist João 
Ferreira do Amaral’s book, Why We Should Leave the Euro, topped the best 
seller list in 2013, but, in opinion polls, seventy-two percent of Portuguese 
still wanted to remain in the euro.111 In 2014, Portugal managed a clean exit 
from bailout – a success story. 
Portugal fell into the crisis due to its weak economy, but not owing to 
any malfeasance. Portugal suffered from a host of the economic ills: produc-
tivity decline; increasing trade deficit; declining national savings; increasing 
debt-to-GDP ratio, but no housing bubble. Politically, the government is 
neither corrupt nor ineffective. However, as was the case with Ireland, the 
government was not able to steer the economy away from the rocks. 
Spain 
Spain’s background and reasons for joining the European Community were 
similar to Portugal’s. As early as the sixties, Spain had free trade agreements 
with the EC; nevertheless, there was no chance of Spain joining as long as 
the country was under fascist dictatorship. After Francisco Franco died in 
1975, Spain applied for membership in 1977. Like Portugal, the EC gave 
Spain abundant aid and accepted its application in hopes of stabilizing the 
region. In 1982, Spain joined NATO; in 1986, Spain joined the EC. 
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The Spanish have benefited from EU membership by receiving millions 
in structural funds and CAP supports. In terms of politics, the Spanish have 
been strong integrationists. They have little trouble with a federal Europe, a 
common foreign and security policy, or a common currency. Spain does well 
in Brussels because they usually side with France. Having such a powerful 
ally combined with its size means that it has greater influence than Portugal 
and other members of the ‘poor four’. 
Growth in Spain from 2001 to 2007, spurred by public construction and 
home building booms, averaged 3.5 percent, well above the rates of most of 
the original twelve eurozone countries. The high growth rates caused by this 
activity masked the costs of large and inefficient public works projects 
throughout the country. Despite these expenditures, government budgets 
remained in surplus, and the debt-GDP ratio fell to levels well below those in 
most other countries, achieving a level of 36.3 percent in 2007. Behind these 
figures, however, a large and persistent trade deficit continued. As in Portu-
gal, economic reforms were deferred, but unlike in Portugal, painful reforms 
seemed far less justified as high growth continued. Despite this growth, 
productivity improvements failed to keep pace with northern competitors, 
and with wage and inflation rates reflected in housing prices, overall Spanish 
trade competitiveness was persistently challenged, and large trade deficits 
continued. 
In late 2007, the Spanish property bubble burst, as it did in Ireland and 
the United States. The Spanish banking sector had supported the financing of 
large public construction projects and real estate in large part through its 
cajas, smaller regional savings banks whose boards and lending decisions 
were often influenced by local and regional politicians. The bursting of the 
housing market bubble left many of these institutions in desperate financial 
circumstances. Still, with economic conditions slowly improving in 2010, 
authorities chose to support the cajas sector by merging several of the most 
impacted institutions into a single new entity renamed Bankia. Ten-year bond 
rates on Spanish debt briefly increased to levels one percent higher than 
German debt in early 2009, then returning to rates only half a percent higher 
by summer. 
Rates began rising again in May 2010 after the Irish bailout. The Spanish 
economy re-entered recession as property prices fell and default rates contin-
ued to escalate, causing losses to mount in the Spanish banking system. In the 
autumn of 2011, the ECB intervened in markets for Spanish debt, buying 
limited numbers of Spanish bonds on the secondary market in an effort to 
reduce interest rates, now more than three percent above German rates. While 
Spain was “too big to fail,” it was also too big to bailout as resources and 
support for such efforts dwindled after aid was offered to Greece, Ireland, 
and Portugal. By mid-2012, however, continuing Spanish banking losses 
required the country to request aid from the EU to recapitalize its banking 
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system; in June 2012, European leaders announced approval for loan guar-
antees up to €100 billion. Unlike previous bailout efforts, these funds would 
be made available as needed, and would be made directly to the banking 
system rather than through the national government. In theory, this tactic 
would stem the pressure on Spanish sovereign debt rates by avoiding Spain’s 
accumulation of additional debt and the perception of greater default risk. 
While conditions in bond markets improved in 2012-13 after the ECB guar-
anteed the necessary funds to ensure the euro would survive, unemployment 
and economic growth in the region has remained sluggish. 
In March 2014, protesters came from all over Spain to participate in a 
“march of dignity” against government austerity measures. The rally turned 
violent as demonstrators clashed with police. Unemployment rates had in-
creased to twenty-six percent with youth unemployment reaching fifty-six 
percent. 
Of all the SPIGI countries, Spain was closest to Greece in its economic 
and political troubles. Spain experienced a productivity decline, an increased 
trade deficit, a housing bubble, and a decline in national savings. Unlike 
Greece, it did not suffer from an increasing debt-to-GDP ratio. However, 
politically, it too had an ineffective and corrupt government. 
Italy 
As a founding member of the European Coal and Steel Community and one 
of the largest members of the Union, Italy has always been pro-integration, 
pro-enlargement, and seen itself as a conciliator during European summits. It 
benefits a great deal from the EU economically with its regional funds, 
mostly aimed towards the south, as well as CAP funding. Nevertheless, Italy 
has had less influence on European politics than might be expected, due to 
government instability, scandals, and corruption. In addition, Italy suffers 
from an almost split personality with its extremely wealthy, autonomy-
minded north and its less developed south with poorer infrastructure and 
weak governance. 
Although Italy was severely in debt when negotiating entry into the cur-
rency union, Prime Minister Romano Prodi was able to persuade Germany to 
let it join as a way to increase the market for Bavarian dairy products. Prodi 
recalled how, in 1996, “he pitched ‘a big milk pipeline from Bavaria,’ point-
ing to a three-year, 40 percent plunge in the Italian lira that was hurting dairy 
sales. ‘To have Italy outside the euro, a huge quantity of exports from Ger-
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many would have been endangered.’”112 Therefore, Italy became a founding 
member of the eurozone, but not without costs. Using the opportunity to 
attack opposition leader and former European Commission president Romano 
Prodi before Italy’s 2005 elections, Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi called 
the euro a “disaster” and a “rip-off” that “screwed everybody”.113 
Like Portugal, Italy experienced slow growth throughout the decade of 
the 2000s, averaging annual rates of growth from 2001 to 2007 of only 1.3 
percent. The third largest economy in the eurozone after Germany and 
France, Italy was allowed to enter the currency union with a debt to GDP 
ratio in excess of 110 percent in 1999, much greater than originally envi-
sioned by its architects. Deficit levels were also at or above Maastricht treaty 
limits throughout the period from 2001 to 2007. However, unlike Portugal, 
Italian deficits were structural in the sense that they reflected slow economic 
growth and were driven by debt-service. Despite these challenges, by 2007, 
debt restructuring, permitted by the lower sovereign debt rates available after 
the euro was introduced, allowed Italy’s debt-to-GDP level to be reduced to 
103 percent from over 113 percent in 1999. These same low interest rates 
also created an escalation in housing prices, as they had in several other 
countries. Nevertheless, these price challenges did not cause inflation to rise 
relative to levels in the rest of the eurozone as they had in Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal and Spain. Italy’s trade deficit remained slightly positive throughout 
most of the first decade of the euro, and, even since 2008, has been nearly 
balanced, although its relative productivity compared to northern eurozone 
states has declined. 
Concerns with respect to Italy’s economy have centred on its compara-
tively large debt level and the cost to service it. While weak economic per-
formance did not improve greatly after adopting the euro, consistent with its 
Maastricht obligations, Italy did manage to reduce its debt load. Unfortu-
nately, by 2009, these debt levels had again begun to escalate as the world-
wide recession of 2008 also caused deficits in Italy to increase, making Italy 
very sensitive to sovereign debt rates. Since the failure of Lehman Brothers 
Bank in the United States in the autumn of 2008, yields have averaged over 
one percent higher than German ten-year bonds, a level more than twenty-
five percent higher from what Germany pays creditors. Since 2010, this 
spread has increased to two percent or more, and, at times, approached levels 
that could make debt servicing unsustainable. Like Spain, the size of Italy’s 
economy renders it impossible for Europe to bail out; the resources necessary 
are simply unavailable politically. 
                                                          
112  James G. Neuger, “Euro Breakup Talk Increases as Germany Loses Proxy (Update1),” 
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With unemployment rates of 12.6 percent and youth unemployment at 
forty-three percent, populist anti-EU parties have gained ground during the 
crisis. Although Italy has had very strong popular support for integration, 
averaging seventy percent from 1973-2002, from that point onward, support 
plummeted to forty-one percent in 2011. Silvio Berlusconi, leader of the 
main conservative coalition, campaigned on Italy leaving the euro. In 2009, 
Beppe Grillo, a comedian and Italian television star, founded an anti-estab-
lishment political party called MoVimento, or the Five Star Movement. Time 
magazine called him a “European hero” for his jokes “draped around barbed 
social commentary” and “over-the-top humor to probe the serious social 
issues that leaders don’t want to touch”114. In 2013, he upset the status quo by 
coming in third, ahead of the centrist and outgoing prime minister Mario 
Monti’s party, Civic Choice. Grillo referred to the prime minister as “Rigor 
Montis” mocking his seriousness.115 In his blog (see box above), Grillo con-
cludes, “Today to impose a dictatorship, force is no longer necessary. The so 
called ‘reforms…’ are enough.”116 
Italy has only some of the problems that the other SPIGI countries have 
had. It has had a productivity decline as well as a housing bubble, but no 
issues with a decline in national savings, a trade deficit, or an increasing debt-
to-GDP ratio. However, along with Spain and Greece, its government is both 
ineffectual and corrupt. 
Cyprus 
A small island economy dominated by Greek heritage, Cyprus joined the Euro-
pean Union in the 2004 enlargement. Its longstanding dispute with Turkey de-
layed its entry into the Union; it is the only EU member with a permanent 
United Nations peacekeeping force on its territory. Cyprus joined the common 
currency in 2008, but only accounted for 0.2 percent of total eurozone output 
that year. The next smallest economies (Portugal, Ireland and Finland) are each 
almost ten times larger. Prior to its membership in the euro, Cyprus enjoyed 
high growth, but also high inflation in the early 2000s. Inflation rates were, in 
part, driven by another real estate bubble where prices rose at over eight per-
cent per year. Since joining the currency union, Cyprus has also become an off-
shore banking centre, particularly for Russian depositors eager for access to 
Europe. The two countries have traditionally had warm relations: the USSR 
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was one of the first states to recognize Cyprus’s independence from the UK in 
1960. By 2012, the banking sector in Cyprus accumulated deposits in excess of 
eight times the island nation’s GDP. In addition to banking, Cyprus is also 
strongly dependent on tourism, making its overall economy very susceptible to 
symptoms of the European financial crisis. 
In July 2011, an explosion at a Cypriot naval station resulted in the de-
struction of a power station that produced approximately half of Cyprus’s 
electricity. This resulted in several weeks of rolling blackouts, forcing the 
country to import power at considerable expense. The cost to repair the sta-
tion was estimated to be over €20 billion, or over ten percent of its GDP. The 
cost of the electricity imports and blackouts to economic output were large 
and partially contributed to the recession that occurred in the last half of 2011 
and 2012, which, in turn, contributed to a bank crisis, requiring a bailout in 
2013. Other contributing factors were the severe economic downturns in 
other southern European countries, especially Greece, and the second negoti-
ated Greek bailout, which deeply affected the value of Greek bonds held by 
Cypriot banks. As a result, credit has dried up as have businesses. 
 
Image 4-1: A street of empty shops in Nicosia, Cyprus, August 2015, photo by Janet 
Constantinides. 
Cyprus is an odd case in the eurozone crisis. Although the government is 
sound according to Transparency International and the World Bank, it has lax 
banking regulations and turns a blind-eye to possible money laundering from 
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overseas, especially from Russia. As a result, Cyprus is the only country that 
has had its bank depositors contribute to the bailout. That aside, it also suf-
fered from productivity decline, an increasing trade deficit, and a housing 
bubble, but had no issue with national savings or its debt-to-GDP ratio. 
Conclusions 
In summary, the creation of the eurozone has turned out to have serious flaws 
resulting from the fact that it is a monetary union without a strong fiscal 
union. Long-term stability of the union would require strong institutional 
restraints necessary to achieve the sound fiscal footing. The Maastricht treaty 
requirements were expected to create these conditions: once the eurozone 
was achieved, many believed fiscal integration would follow. Fiscal pacts, 
however, are politically messy. While convincing countries to abdicate con-
trol of national currencies was difficult, the idea of ceding national fiscal 
sovereignty to a supranational organization was even more so. With so many 
countries and varying national ideologies, historical fears, and even national 
prejudices still existing in the EU, attempts to achieve such a fiscal union 
were stymied. With growth seeming to occur anyway, the pressure to make 
such politically difficult decisions faded, but the flaws in the design of the 
eurozone remained. Worse yet, politics also undermined adherence to Maas-
tricht requirements. Therefore, the institutional brakes intended to ensure debt 
sustainability were undercut. 
Table 4-4: Structural Imbalances among Troubled Countries, 2001-2007. 
Country Productivity 
decline 
relative to 
northern 
countries 
Increasing 
trade 
deficit  
Housing 
bubble 
Declining 
National 
Savings  
Increasing 
Debt/GDP
Corruption Poor 
Governance 
Greece 
      
Ireland 
    
Portugal
      
Spain 
      
Italy 
    
Cyprus 
     
Despite these problems, proponents of the currency union reasoned the adop-
tion of the euro would create the political breathing space to allow the 
realisation of the necessary structural reforms. Strong economic growth 
among many eurozone countries after the adoption of the euro also seemed to 
suggest that, at least among poorer countries, an economic convergence was 
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occurring. Unfortunately, the economic growth transpiring during this period 
was not driven by productivity, improving investment, or market reforms, but 
by expanding public sectors, consumption and property bubbles. What ap-
peared to be growth that would lead to convergence across economies was 
really just temporary growth induced by greater credit access – access that 
was in part propelled by trade imbalances between the north and the south 
within the eurozone. Table 4-4 below summarizes these imbalances. 
Economic convergence in the eurozone required not only strong growth, 
but underlying productivity and competitiveness improvements to avoid 
structural imbalances. Achieving such improvements would require difficult 
internal decisions in many member countries to dismantle uncompetitive 
institutions that undermined their productivity, including reductions in 
bloated public sectors, breaking guild control of large sectors of the economy 
resistant to reform, and removal of public subsidies and barriers to entry in 
some sectors. These were politically contentious issues, and as labour unrest 
and riots in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain over austerity measures intro-
duced throughout the crisis have shown, it is extremely difficult to reform 
economies where people have historically relied on such institutions. 
Without such reforms, however, convergence cannot occur. The lack of 
movement towards such reforms, particularly in less-competitive southern 
countries, created significant economic imbalances. These imbalances, with 
respect to trade and credit flows, weakened economies and contributed to the 
emergence of the European financial crisis that has since caused serious un-
employment and hardship, not only in southern and SPIGI countries, but in 
much of Europe as well. In the long-term, if the European common currency 
union is to be preserved, the flaws of the eurozone must be addressed in order 
to avoid the development of similar imbalances in the future. Doing so will 
require addressing the causes of the fiscal and trade imbalances present in the 
eurozone, and importantly, the institutional structures necessary to stabilize the 
currency union. Although, as Mario Draghi put it, the European currency union 
bumblebee was able to fly despite its apparent violation of economic theory, to 
continue, the bumblebee will now have to learn to fly according to the rules. 
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Chapter V: 
Misperception of European Risk, Market Reactions 
and Policy Response – A Timeline of the Eurozone 
Crisis 
Introduction 
The following chapter presents a timeline of the eurozone crisis. Before the 
world financial crisis of 2008 and the European financial crisis that followed, 
optimism dominated the world in many ways. Optimism made it easier to 
ignore messy details of all sorts, including, in the US, the quality of the mort-
gages in mortgage-backed securities, and, in the EU, the structure of the 
European monetary union, its underlying trade and credit flows, as well as its 
banking and debt composition. As ECB President Mario Draghi noted in July 
2012, like a bumblebee, the currency union flew even though it should not 
have been able to. Since the financial crises, markets have become sceptical 
and questioning: how and why it flies now matter. Markets must be con-
vinced the union can survive- but can it? 
In the United States, one lesson drawn from the financial crisis was that a 
crisis in a single sector of the economy could unleash consequences that 
affected the entire financial system, particularly when conditions of high 
leverage and debt existed. Previously, early warnings concerning real estate 
markets, in the US and elsewhere, were shrugged off by analysts and policy-
makers alike. Even in a worst-case scenario, they could not imagine their 
collapse would seriously affect the whole economy. The fall of Bear Stearns 
and, then, Lehman Brothers, followed by a cascade of financial failures and 
near-failures across the US economy and the world, exposed the web of debt 
that was built on top of the real estate sector. So intertwined is the world 
economy that it did indeed destabilize the entire international financial sys-
tem. Given that a single economic sector in one economy could create such 
turmoil, what could happen if an entire country defaulted on its debts? 
“Leverage”, or the accumulation of debt, was the key. Debts were uti-
lized to create assets, in this case, mortgages, and those assets were subse-
quently used to collateralize further borrowing. As long as confidence re-
mained that all the underlying debts were good, the process of leveraging 
continued and drove increased economic activity as lending begat the ability 
to borrow more. When confidence faded, lending vanished, and total debt had 
to be reduced to match the new supply. More often than not, the unwinding 
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of previously accumulated debt occurred through default, resulting in painful 
economic contractions throughout most of the developed world.117 Financial 
market depth and breadth, interlocking webs of debt, and their potential ef-
fects on the larger economy would no longer be ignored. 
These lessons were not lost on markets when, in late 2009, the new 
Greek government revealed the true state of its public finances. In Europe, 
the debt of Greece and other eurozone countries had similarly been leveraged 
into something much larger. The mistake was that sovereign debt in the euro-
zone had been considered nearly risk free. During the mid-2000s, a tighter 
convergence among eurozone country bond rates occurred, suggesting that all 
member countries posed similarly low risks of default, even those member 
countries that had previously been considered the least dependable. Rein-
forcing this assumption, international credit agencies also assigned eurozone 
members’ sovereign bonds investor-grade ratings.118 Such an interest rate 
convergence was consistent with a market belief that either eurozone rules 
would cause previously problematic countries to reform, or that commitment 
to the currency union would ensure that the fiscal strength of stronger north-
ern economies, such as Germany’s, would always support the previously less 
dependable, peripheral ones if a crisis threatened their solvency. 
In hindsight, such market beliefs were clearly questionable: the rules re-
garding debt and deficit in member states had often been ignored, and the 
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118  See for example The New York Times, “Ratings Firms misread Signs of Greek Woes,” 
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rules of the eurozone limited liability among member states for each others’ 
debt. The Greek revelations caused markets to realize and reconsider the 
unrealistic assumptions that had been made and, as in the US, the change in 
outlook was immediately felt in credit markets. Lending to Greece evapo-
rated; the eurozone crisis had begun. 
During the period from November 2009 through December 2011, market 
uncertainties worsened as policy reactions proved inadequate, often ill timed, 
and ineffective. Far from improving, economic conditions deteriorated across 
the eurozone. Bailout actions meant to save the euro became deeply unpopu-
lar in both donor and recipient member states. Perceived treaty limitations 
constrained ECB actions, and domestic politics constrained EU strategy. The 
continued decline in market confidence, as exhibited by a relentless rise in 
EU sovereign bond interest rates, stressed the very fabric of the eurozone, 
threatening to tear it and the European project apart. In the end, given the 
price the world demanded to lend to member-state countries, the ECB chose 
“to do what it takes” and EU leaders adopted unpopular measures in order to 
save the euro, but only after more than two years of difficult negotiations and 
political soul-searching. 
 
In some ways, the experience of European leaders during the eurozone crisis 
could be compared to the famous five phases of grief: denial, anger, bar-
gaining, depression, and acceptance.119 The crisis had come as a shock and 
threatened to end the currency union that had been the culmination of so 
many years of European integration efforts. The first reaction was one of 
denial. Leaders’ reactions during the earliest months of the crisis were 
broadly similar to those seen in late 1980s and early 1990s when Europe 
implemented fixed exchange rate systems and market pressures emerged to 
destabilize these rates. As it was two decades earlier, market pressures were 
predicated on analyses that suggested country-specific fundamentals did not 
support targeted market outcomes. In the eurozone crisis, interest rates began 
to climb when markets realized the presence of previously unrealized risk in 
the sovereign debt markets for particular countries. Once this risk was real-
ized, the price of borrowing adjusted accordingly. Denial affected the will-
ingness of European leaders to accept the causes of the situation in late 2009. 
Overwhelmingly, European leaders initially blamed the US for the financial 
crisis, ignoring fundamental problems in their own economies. Where Euro-
pean blame was due, it was assigned to failures of governance in Greece and 
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not to the larger architecture of the eurozone. EU leaders’ outlooks were 
additionally clouded by overly optimistic projections of imminent and rapid 
recovery in Europe from both the effects of the US crisis and those later in 
Greece. 
IMF officials were similarly too optimistic regarding economic condi-
tions in Europe and Greece, and underestimated the effects onerous austerity 
conditions would have across the eurozone.120 The prevailing viewpoint in 
2009 argued the crisis would be short-lived, even in Greece, with growth 
returning by 2012. Such optimism was reflected in the IMF’s use of a Stand-
By Arrangement (SBA), in its participation in the first Greek bailout, an 
arrangement that, by definition, was not to last longer than thirty-six months. 
By mid-2010, the IMF had already begun to realize the errors in its assess-
ments, and began to reconsider the time that recovery would require. Re-
flecting that concern, its participation in later bailouts took the form, not of 
an SBA, but of an Extended Fund Facility, a medium-term program meant to 
provide assistance to countries over a longer period. Only slowly did the IMF 
and EU policy-makers begin to appreciate the true threat the crisis posed. 
Anger, bargaining and depression – the classic second, third and fourth 
stages of grief – eventually followed. Anger was manifest across Europe, 
with eurozone leaders and residents of creditor countries unhappy with 
Greece initially, and resentful of Ireland and Portugal later on, while citizens 
of the recipient member states became angrier at the harsh and punitive terms 
of their aid. Many across the eurozone also seemed to resent the euro for the 
situation they now found themselves in. The bargaining that followed each 
crisis promised much; however, in each bailout, the costs seemed undersold 
while the prospects for success were oversold. Bargaining was ongoing as 
debtor states struggled to find the resources to save their struggling econo-
mies from default, and in creditor states, which were forced to work hard to 
sell the necessary obligations required to prop up ailing countries in an at-
tempt to resolve the crisis. 
The inevitable result was depression, which manifested itself in various 
ways. Emotionally, the high hopes the currency union had originally created 
were dashed; economically, a depression would soon exist in each of the 
aided countries, and even some that had not sought aid. In certain economies, 
that depression would turn to despair, worsening human welfare and even 
resulting in a spike in suicides121 as conditions steadily deteriorated. 
The final stage of grief, acceptance, characterizes the point at which eu-
rozone policymakers began to realize effective actions would require deeper 
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changes than those contemplated in the first two years of the crisis. Reforms 
would be required, not only of troubled countries, but also of creditor nations. 
Policies to manage the crisis would require new practices to be implemented 
if financial and banking stability in the eurozone were to be assured in the 
short-term. In the longer term, boosting market confidence might even neces-
sitate the formation of a fiscal and banking union. Minimally, it would re-
quire greater coordination and oversight regarding the countries’ fiscal debt 
and deficit, and the regulation of the entire union’s banking system. By 2012, 
to preserve the euro, the architecture of the eurozone would require modifi-
cation in ways that could not even have been contemplated two years earlier. 
Timeline of the Crisis 
Policy reactions to the eurozone crisis can be separated into two phases. The 
first represented an evolution of, and an increase in, the original types of 
policy efforts used to deal with the crisis as it degenerated during its first two 
years. These policy responses attempted to work within the existing structure 
of the eurozone and EU Treaty framework. Major policy actions were taken 
primarily by the eurozone member states and “the Troika”, i.e., the EU 
Commission, aided by the ECB, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
The second stage occurred as a complementary set of actions that began 
to alter the architecture and treaty framework of the currency union, with one 
set of efforts undertaken by the ECB and the other by the EU Commission in 
cooperation with eurozone national governments. In this stage of the crisis, 
the ECB mostly initiated policy actions, while eurozone member states con-
centrated on treaty reforms meant to alter the long-term structure of the euro-
zone with respect to fiscal and banking sovereignty. These changes in EU 
structure and ECB practices would have likely been politically impossible 
before the crisis. However, after earlier policies that operated within the rules 
of the EU failed to arrest a worsening situation, a shift of outlook occurred 
allowing extraordinary measures to be taken. 
Necessity is often the mother of invention and so EU reforms have by 
necessity begun to develop the greater political integration some economic 
theorists have argued was required since the formation of the currency union. 
In the following section, a chronological summary of the major events of the 
crisis between 2009 and 2012 are detailed. While the immediate financial 
crisis may have ended in the latter half of 2012, conditions in Europe have 
remained fragile and depressed. More policy responses have been necessary 
to deal with its aftermath and to avoid another crisis occurring. Some of these 
efforts are also described. 
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Image 5-1: The banner on the Berlaymont, the European Commission building in 
October 2011. Despite the crisis, the Commission’s message to the world was pure 
optimism. Photo by Stephanie Anderson. 
October 2009 to July 2011 – A Period of Denial, Anger, Credit 
Guarantees, and Bailouts 
Clearly, EU leaders did not foresee the eurozone crisis coming. In 2009, 
many European economies appeared to be recovering from the short and 
sharp downturn that had followed the US financial crisis of 2008. Greek 
revelations and the market reaction to it caught policymakers off guard and 
flat-footed in their response. The first policy phase, characterized by limited 
reactions constrained by the exigencies of the eurosystem, persisted for the 
first two years of the crisis. These reactions attempted to maintain market 
confidence through a series of optimistic assessments that Greek (and later 
Irish and Portuguese) debt problems could be dealt with internally through 
market reforms. While markets became increasingly driven by what they 
perceived to be market fundamentals, i.e., country-specific economic condi-
tions, European policymakers emphasized that the situation was under con-
trol. As conditions worsened in European sovereign debt markets, leaders 
tried to “talk the markets down,” often listing reasons why they were overre-
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acting. Leaders of the major European economies, particularly Germany and 
France, and the affected economies of Greece, Ireland and Portugal avoided 
even mention of the word “default”, refusing to admit that new market con-
ditions could become serious problems or that a default was a possibility. 
While outwardly attempting to exude confidence, calm, and control, be-
hind closed doors, leaders were apparently taken by surprise and angered by 
Greek admissions in late 2009. Negotiations to define necessary policy ac-
tions were difficult as leaders struggled to understand the implications of the 
crisis they faced. There was some uncertainty as to whether anything would 
be done at all to save Greece. For a time, markets were unconvinced any aid 
would be forthcoming for Greece, leading to a rapid deterioration in Greek 
bond rates.122 Contributing to market uncertainty was a lack of action by 
leaders as market conditions worsened and policy remained undefined 
through early spring 2010. The new Greek government promised fundamen-
tal and wide-ranging reforms to tax collection and government expenditures, 
yet these promises were deemed neither credible nor sufficient to reverse the 
course of their sovereign debt crisis. Greek debt was too large. Meanwhile, 
eurozone leaders struggled to create and justify the political will necessary to 
support Greece. The EU had no experience in managing a sovereign debt 
crisis within one of its own member states. Soliciting aid from the IMF, the 
agency generally tasked with managing aid to countries in such crises, was 
considered politically embarrassing.123 Europe was accustomed to providing 
aid, not requesting it. 
The European public, especially in Germany, railed at the idea of their 
tax euros going to stabilize Greece. This backlash caused German leaders to 
hesitate in supporting any bailout action. Having struggled with the increased 
debt levels and slow growth caused by German unification, Germans argued 
that the principle of independence was paramount. The eurozone was inten-
tionally designed with prohibitions against joint liability. To aid a country, 
especially one that had “cooked its books” in order to appear in step with 
Maastricht Treaty rules, would only encourage moral hazard, allowing 
Greece to avoid the consequences of its own decisions and poor governance. 
As credit market conditions for Greece in early 2010 continued to de-
grade, leaders had to act. Despite popular opposition, they swallowed their 
pride and requested aid from the IMF as it became clear that: (i) action was 
necessary – Greece would definitely need external aid if it were to avoid 
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default; (ii) the amount of aid needed was large and would be very politically 
difficult to raise internally, thus requiring IMF resources; and (iii) the EU 
needed IMF expertise to develop a coherent policy response.124 
Despite the distaste leaders expressed for the principle of assistance, 
there was really no choice. Default by Greece could potentially create a cha-
otic and unpredictable situation, similar to the one caused by the failure of 
Lehman Brothers in the United States. Europe’s financial institutions were 
not ready to face another serious shock. They had barely recovered from the 
fallout following the US financial crisis. 
The European/IMF response, the first of the European bailouts, arrived 
six months after the crisis began. The bailout plan unveiled in May 2010 by 
the Troika would cost €110 billion, or almost forty-eight percent of Greece’s 
entire GDP from the previous year, and rested on three pillars: 
1. Fiscal reduction: Greece would be required to reduce its fiscal deficit 
by 14.5 percent of GDP by 2014, a huge reduction by international 
standards. This would be accomplished through a series of expendi-
ture, social benefit and pension reductions, and tax revenue in-
creases. 
2. Structural reform: Greece would be required to reduce or eliminate 
labour market protections, and implement productivity improve-
ments meant to return the economy to growth by 2012. 
3. Financial market stability: A dedicated set of funds would support 
the Greek banking system, thereby avoiding a sector collapse and 
providing the liquidity necessary to sustain an eventual economic re-
covery. 
To protect Europe from the fallout of the Greek crisis, the ECB began a lim-
ited intervention in the secondary markets, buying Greek bonds in an attempt 
to stabilize interest rates. Intervention also began in Portuguese and Irish 
markets. In addition, to prevent Greek market instability from spilling over 
into other eurozone members, in May 2010, the EU created a financial fire-
wall, the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). This temporary three-
year credit facility, created specifically to address the debt crisis, provided a 
lending capacity of €500 billion to finance additional bailouts should they be 
necessary.125 
Popular opposition to aiding a country that was considered to have 
fraudulently represented its finances to preserve increasingly profligate 
spending – spending that provided more generous social and retirement bene-
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fits than offered in the countries now expected to provide aid – was under-
standable. As interest rates fell with the introduction of the euro, debt-driven 
growth had led to unsustainable increases in the Greek public sector, swelling 
the size and pay levels of the its civil service. Simultaneously, Greek pension 
programs had become increasingly underfunded as entitlements became more 
generous and as publicly provided social benefits expanded.126 European 
leaders seemed to resent the politically untenable position they had been put 
into: protecting the union they had worked hard to create would require aid-
ing the country whose actions now put that union at risk. After Angela Mer-
kel agreed to support the Greek bailout, in May 2010, her party, the Christian 
Democratic Union (CDU), suffered its worst defeat ever in the state election 
of Germany’s most populous state, North Rhine-Westphalia. Popular resent-
ment was high in Germany and stereotypes of lazy or dishonest Greeks be-
came common in the German press. 
Popular Greek anger at the situation the country found itself in was 
equally venomous, and was directed not only at its own government, but at 
the EU in general, and especially at Germany. Part of this was a reflexive 
response to the reactions outside the country, reviving German stereotypes in 
Greece and opening decades-old wounds. In a radio interview in February 
2010, the Greek Deputy Prime Minister, Theodoros Pangalos, stated that 
Germany had never returned gold stolen from the Bank of Greece by the 
Nazis. Coming on the heels of a twenty-four hour general strike, he added, “I 
don’t say they have to give back the money necessarily but they have at least 
to say ‘thanks’.”127 Posters depicting Angela Merkel simultaneously as a 
seductress holding a single rose, and as a Nazi officer with a swastika sur-
rounded by the EU circle of stars with the label “public nuisance”, covered 
Athens. Portrayal of the eurozone crisis as a replay of World War II was 
ubiquitous in political cartoons and newspapers. In 2012, the newspaper, 
Democracy, led with the headline “Memorandum macht frei” or “(The 
bailout) Memoradum makes (you) free” in an allusion to the sign over 
Auschwitz. 
Confidence in European sovereign debt had been irreparably impaired 
despite Greek aid efforts and the creation of the EFSF firewall. Instability in 
the financial markets soon spread as markets anticipated the need for bailouts 
in other troubled countries. The first of these was Ireland, where domestic 
financial conditions there, set off by the bursting of a vast real estate bubble 
three years earlier in 2007, continued to deteriorate. Given EU rules that 
                                                          
126  For a description of events see IMF (2013), “Greece: Ex Post Evaluation of Exceptional 
Access under the 2010 Stand-By Arrangement,” IMF Country Report No. 13/156, June 2013.  
127  Andrew Willis, “Germany failed to pay WWII compensation, Greece says,” 
EUOberver.com, 25 February 2010, http://euobserver.com/economic/29551 (accessed 3 
August 2015). 
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required member states to manage their banking systems independently, 
banking guarantees the country had made to prop up its financial system now 
approached thirty-five percent of GDP. Membership in the currency union 
meant Ireland would have to acquire the funds needed to save its banks in 
sovereign debt markets. Although Irish public finances had otherwise re-
mained conservative throughout the past decade and market reforms in that 
economy had made it among the most competitive in Europe, the cost of 
borrowing became prohibitive as markets began to recognize the unsustaina-
ble position the country was in. As interest rates continued to climb, the Irish 
government, realizing its situation was irreconcilable, requested an €85 bil-
lion bailout in November 2010. 
Markets then turned their attention to Portugal. Persistently anaemic 
growth throughout the previous decade, combined with high sovereign debt 
levels and an economy that had become less and less competitive as the gov-
ernment failed to enact productivity reforms, resulted in market concerns 
with ten-year sovereign bond rates rising above ten percent. With a rapidly 
deteriorating economy and ballooning government deficit, Portugal was cor-
respondingly forced to seek a €78 billion aid package in May 2011. The IMF 
and EU financed both the Irish and Portuguese bailouts jointly, the latter’s 
aid provided through the new EFSF. Each aid package was based on the same 
principles Greek aid had been. In return for aid, the country pledged to take 
on onerous austerity measures. Portugal, like Greece, promised significant 
structural reforms to make its economy more competitive. In both cases, 
markets anticipated the need for bailouts months before authorities admitted 
their necessity. Again, delays occurred for the same reasons as they had in 
Greece. Contributing countries’ electorates rapidly began to suffer from 
‘bailout’ fatigue, as the expansive and expensive credit guarantees were un-
successful in stemming market pressures. Delays in addressing the problem 
swiftly and soundly left markets doubting whether the eventual actions taken 
were enough to stem the tide of the financial contagion now washing over 
Europe. 
Bailouts were intended as a final solution to restore market confidence. 
Financed by credit guarantees from northern countries, the same countries 
also demanded stiff austerity conditions in return for aid. Austerity programs, 
characterized by sharp reductions in government expenditures for pensions, 
income support, social programs, and public sector workforces, plus state 
asset sales, played two roles. For bond markets, they were meant to signal 
reforms and budgetary changes that would ensure future debt stability, al-
lowing credit markets to reopen. In addition, austerity programs addressed 
the question of moral hazard: if northern economies were to risk their own 
reserves, the recipient countries would have to engage in permanent reform, 
especially of any profligate spending practices. 
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Despite these efforts, however, market pressures continued. Bailout 
measures, as significant as they were, totalling almost fifty percent of the 
combined 2009 GDP of the aided countries, did not restore market confi-
dence. Instead, actions seemed “too little and too late”. Markets were more 
impressed by the frictions in implementing these policies – i.e., the denials 
and delays caused by political scepticism and populist anger in creditor 
countries that impeded the Troika’s efforts – than by the funds themselves. 
The progression of interest rate increases, followed by bailouts, followed 
by concerns arising in a new country is reflected in the pattern of interest rate 
increases. In each case, a bailout in one country that was intended to arrest 
the crisis only caused market concerns to focus elsewhere. Eventually, mar-
ket concerns returned to Greece. Interest rates there continued to rise as mar-
kets correctly reasoned the resources pledged in the first bailout were inade-
quate. Austerity programs that appeared only to create greater recessions in 
troubled countries led to civil unrest and greater uncertainty. At the same 
time, they also contributed to a deteriorating economy, causing greater de-
clines in state revenues and worsening debt sustainability. To tame markets, 
the EU would have to change its approach. 
July to December 2011: A Period of Bargaining and Depression as the 
Economic Crisis volves into a Political One 
The end of the first phase of the crisis could be defined as occurring when EU 
leaders began to realize palliative actions were not enough. Austerity 
measures, social unrest, and political uncertainty had plunged the Greek 
economy into a far worse recession than the IMF and EU had forecast.128 
Austerity also had similar effects in Ireland and Portugal, especially in the 
months following their bailouts. These recessions, combined with the uncer-
tainty that now lay like a grey cloud over all of Europe, worsened economic 
conditions throughout the eurozone. The crisis was not to be short-lived. 
As conditions worsened and time went on, leaders realized that treating 
the symptoms of the crisis was not enough: they would now have to consider 
creating new EU structures to better deal with the crises and to prevent them 
in the future. In late 2010, plans were made to implement a permanent euro-
zone bailout fund through treaty reforms, to replace the EFSF when it expired 
in mid-2013. The ECB also began to use its ability to support markets 
through bond purchases in ways that had not been undertaken previously. 
                                                          
128  In a later reappraisal, the IMF reported that it ignored its own internal rules in supporting a 
bailout to a bankrupt country. Further, it admitted that estimates of the costs to the Greek 
economy of the austerity measures the first bailout imposed were underestimated. See IMF 
(2013), “Greece: Ex Post Evaluation of Exceptional Access under the 2010 Stand-By Ar-
rangement,” IMF Country Report No. 13/156, International Monetary Fund.  
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Additionally, the Troika began to consider new means to deal with the crisis, 
including allowing private creditors, who had been previously protected in 
bailout efforts in an attempt to maintain bond-market confidence, to realize 
losses on sovereign bonds. 
Greater resources were needed, leading to an understanding that some 
cost would have to be borne by the private sector regardless of the immediate 
effects it might create in bond markets. Such measures were both ethically 
and economically imperative if the crisis were to be long lasting. The Troika 
now began to consider how they would officially require what would soon be 
referred to in official documents as “private sector involvement” or PSI in 
bailout agreements. Unofficially, these efforts have been referred to as debt 
“haircuts” or bail-ins; those who owned the bonds would now suffer some 
losses in return for having the rest of the original investment preserved. Alt-
hough considered previously, it only became official policy when formally 
announced as part of the second Greek bailout, in July 2011.129 Supported by 
the IMF, where the practice was common in IMF-sponsored bailouts else-
where in the world, the ECB and some EU members of the Troika had re-
sisted the idea during the first phase of the crisis, arguing the threat of private 
sector losses could further destabilize markets, undermining the purpose of 
aid efforts. Considering additional resources were needed to stabilize Greece 
as part of a larger agreement, such concerns were overruled. This important 
policy decision, however, was only the first in a lengthy negotiation to re-
solve the second aid package for Greece. 
The voters took out their anger on those in charge. In Ireland and Portu-
gal, bailouts were followed by the collapse of the ruling governments, while 
in Greece the bailout was followed by an immediate drop in support of the 
newly elected one. Creditor states’ electorates suffered from bailout fatigue. 
Critics, in Germany and elsewhere, argued these efforts violated the terms of 
the Maastricht Treaty, specifically the prohibitions against countries taking 
on liability for another country’s debt. While such arguments fell upon deaf 
ears as legislation passed national parliaments and was upheld in German 
constitutional courts, criticism remained vocal as opponents saw both 
bailouts and ECB market interventions as contraventions of EU treaties in 
principle, if not technically.130 For many, bailouts implied the breaking of a 
                                                          
129  So called ‘haircuts’ on privately held debt had apparently been discussed since at least 
October of 2010, when comments regarding this option were leaked to the press at an EU 
summit in Deauville.  
130  In Germany, there have been several challenges to the bailouts. Terms of the bailouts have 
been debated fiercely before being passed by the German Parliament. On 7 September 
2011, the German constitutional court ruled against a challenge brought by a coalition of 
economists, business executives, and lawmakers who had argued that the terms of the 
bailouts undermined Parliament’s ability to determine government spending and budgetary 
planning.  
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moral principle, one in which debtors should be exclusively responsible for 
their own obligations and the consequences of not meeting them. Detractors 
of bailout efforts argued they soley created moral hazard, protecting both 
member states who had taken on too much debt, and private investors who 
financed them from the risk these decisions implied, protecting them from the 
discipline of the market and encouraging such eventual behaviour again. 
 
Image 5-2: A mural sponsored by the Berlin Artist Program displayed on a building 
near Oranienburger Strasse from 2011-2012. Photo by Stephanie Anderson. 
Given the fact that Greece would require greater support to remain solvent, 
creditor nations faced a deeper dilemma. Without additional assistance, 
Greece faced default. Fallout from such an event would pose significant risk 
to Europe’s financial system, especially to France and Germany, the largest 
creditor nations, whose banks still had the greatest exposure to Greek debt. 
Electorates and leaders in creditor countries, particularly in Germany, how-
ever, had tired of the possibility of continued calls for aid knowing that 
should it come, they would carry the greatest burden. Voices in Germany and 
elsewhere began to ask whether such efforts were worthwhile or merely post-
poning the inevitable – a default. Should a “Grexit”, a Greek exit from the 
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euro, just be allowed? The eurozone had to decide whether it was committed 
to keeping Greece in the currency union. Similarly, Greece had to decide 
whether it was committed to the conditions staying in the eurozone required. 
This question would dominate discussions for the next eight months of the 
crisis from the summer of 2011 through early spring 2012. 
The second phase of the crisis marked a period of significantly greater 
uncertainty as the politics of continued aid worsened. When the initial 
framework of a new Greek bailout agreement was announced in July of 2011, 
sovereign debt markets were initially calmed, and bond rates began to fall. As 
negotiations dragged on into autumn 2011 between the Troika and Greece, it 
appeared increasingly questionable whether there was the political will to 
find any solution at all. In Greece, austerity protests worsened. Speculation 
began to mount as to whether the Greeks themselves would elect to default 
and leave the euro in order to avoid accepting the greater austerity conditions 
additional aid would require. Targets mandated in the original aid package 
regarding tax collection and public workforce cuts in Greece were missed. In 
creditor nations, leaders were frustrated, suspecting Greek unwillingness and 
inability to deliver the promised reforms and deficit reductions demanded in 
the first bailout. Some began to wonder whether instead of Greece leaving the 
euro, Germany would instead, as the inevitable burden of bailouts appeared 
to increase.131 Negotiations became bogged down with recriminations regard-
ing each other’s dedication to the European project and the euro. 
In the background, bond rates had begun to rise across the southern Eu-
ropean states as concerns worsened regarding Spanish and Italian debt, espe-
cially given the new policy of bondholder losses that had been invoked. 
Urged by Europe and the United States, these two countries began pre-emp-
tive austerity programs of their own to reverse rising deficits. In an effort to 
stabilize the situation in their sovereign bond markets, the ECB also ex-
panded its Securities Markets Program (SMP) begun in May 2010, increasing 
purchases of Spanish and Italian bonds in August 2011 despite objections 
from Bundesbank officials in Frankfurt. German protests against these new 
efforts became so vocal that court challenges were threatened in Germany, 
and Jürgen Stark, the influential Bundesbank representative on the ECB’s 
Executive Committee, sometimes referred to as its “chief economist”, re-
signed his appointment in symbolic protest.132 Observers of the crisis began 
                                                          
131  Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, the influential international business editor of The Daily Tele-
graph (London) was one of the first to suggest this option. See “Should Germany bail out 
Club Med or leave the euro altogether?” Daily Telegraph, 31 January 2010, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/7119986/Should-Germany-bail-out-Club-
Med-or-leave-the-euro-altogether.html (accessed 3 August 2015). 
132  There is no such official position as the “chief economist” of the ECB, however Stark’s 
position as the Executive Board member responsible for Monetary Analysis is often re-
ferred to in this way. Stark announced his intent to resign in protest in September 2011. 
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to question whether the willingness to preserve the monetary union was even 
present among the policy makers tasked with preserving it. 
By mid-September, consensus among eurozone members appeared to be 
breaking down. As conditions worsened in debt markets for troubled coun-
tries, the European Commission proposed collectivizing European debt using 
Eurobonds, bonds that could be swapped for individual nation’s debts and 
backed by the entire eurozone. Eurobond plans called for explicitly backing 
the debt of troubled nations collectively, by using the resources of the entire 
eurozone and the strong credit ratings of northern states to restore market 
confidence by removing the possibility of a default. They also, however, 
would spread the liability for such debts jointly across the member states. 
Germany, among other countries, was staunch in its opposition to such pro-
posals, arguing that such actions would not only violate the terms of the 
Maastricht Treaty, but would further create moral hazard in aided countries, 
reducing the pressure to enact the difficult economic reforms necessary to 
increase productivity.133 Opinion polls indicated a great variance of support 
for Eurobonds across member state electorates, ranging from a high of sixty-
seven percent in Belgium to a low of a mere twenty-six percent in Ger-
many.134 When France publicly backed German opposition to such plans, the 
proposals were quietly dropped. Without the resources and official support of 
Europe’s two largest economies, it would be impossible for this proposal to 
be considered. 
The Eurobond controversy demonstrated the strength of one member 
state’s – Germany – influence over EU policy. Merkel championed a diet of 
fiscal rectitude for other EU countries, a policy that sat well with her ruling 
CDU/CSU coalition as well as perhaps with her Lutheran upbringing: 
                                                          
Purchases of sovereign debt had actually started in May 2010, but on a very limited scale. 
The decision in August of 2011 expanded the powers to do so. His resignation followed the 
resignation of Germany’s head of the Bundesbank (the German central bank) Axel Weber 
over the same measures. In addition to being opposed to the use of monetary policy to re-
duce pressure on international interest rates for troubled countries, both men had argued 
previously that such efforts violated the ECB’s prohibition of buying country’s sovereign 
debt and also believed the ECB’s political independence was being undermined in the face 
of political pressures due to the debt crisis. The ECB argued that the actions were an at-
tempt to stabilize financial markets, a responsibility within its mandate. Unlike quantitative 
easing actions in the United States, these purchases did not result in an increase in the 
money supply as the ECB sterilized these purchases with offsetting bond sales. 
133  France also opposed this policy, however, internally it appeared the proposal had much 
more traction in France than in Germany.  
134  Eurobarometer 78, “Europeans, the EU and the Crisis,” (Autumn 2012): 40, http://ec. 
europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb78/eb78_cri_en.pdf. (accessed 3 August 2015). 
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Image 5-3: Grafitti on the Bank of Greece located on 22 Panepistimiou Street in 
Athens on 10 February 2012. Photo by Nick LaBonde. 
If Ms. Merkel refuses to support so-called euro bonds, it is not because it 
would be like giving free money to the undeserving poor, but because it 
would not help the redeemed poor take responsibility for their own 
houses and grow strong for both themselves and their needy neighbors. 
He who receives, recovers, and profits from society in a time of need has 
a moral responsibility to pay society back by acting in turn as a strong 
citizen who can help fill the common chests and sacrifice for his now 
needy neighbors, who had once helped him. Such is the sacrificial 
Lutheran society.135 
Without any other alternatives, German opposition to Eurobonds made it dif-
ficult to deal with the immediate bond market issues that besieged European 
countries in trouble. While outspoken in their opposition to Eurobonds, Ger-
many did eventually agree to a second Greek bailout. Merkel easily won a 
confidence vote over the decision, although the debate highlighted the politi-
cal tightrope she was walking within Germany despite her tough stances at 
European negotiations. 
                                                          
135  Steven Ozement, “German Austerity’s Lutheran Core,” The New York Times, August 11, 
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/12/opinion/sunday/in-euro-crisis-germany-looks-
to-martin-luther.html?_r=0 (accessed 3 August 2015). 
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Across southern Europe, protests and violent confrontations became 
more common as austerity policies now gripping these countries affected 
more and more people. The austerity costs of the previous bailout agreements 
led to a political backlash in Portugal, and, additionally in Spain and Italy, 
where austerity efforts had also been undertaken to reduce pressures in their 
own sovereign debt markets. In Greece, support for Prime Minister George 
Papandreou’s government quickly eroded. Negotiations over the new bailout 
continued into the autumn despite the apparent agreement the previous July. 
As fiscal targets were missed, eurozone creditors demanded greater cuts. The 
Greeks argued that the same austerity measures were responsible for plung-
ing the economy deeper into its current recession, forcing the government to 
miss its fiscal goals. Critics in Europe countered that easing austerity would 
only encourage moral hazard. Both sides had logic on their side, however 
only one had the resources. The golden rule of finance was inevitably in-
voked – “he who has the gold makes the rules” – but as might be expected, 
this reality only created additional political resentment. 
Despite the fact that a Greek default would almost certainly result in a fi-
nancial crisis across Europe, countries appeared to hesitate in their efforts to 
quell the situation. In July 2011, an agreement in principle was announced, 
but the debate over the details dragged on. Some of the aid promised in the 
first Greek bailout became a casualty of this inaction. By late summer, spec-
ulation was much louder regarding whether an agreement would ever be 
reached, and some suggested that Greece would be forced to default and 
leave the euro altogether. 
Markets became even more unsettled and rates continued to rise as sum-
mer 2011 ended, and the ECB continued its limited intervention into the bond 
markets, expanding purchases of Spanish and Italian sovereign bonds. De-
spite these efforts, market conditions for Spanish, Portuguese, Greek, and 
Italian debt continued to deteriorate, as did the economic conditions across 
much of Western Europe. 
The threat of Italy presented the eurozone with especially grave con-
cerns. Its economy faced severe structural problems, with significant reforms 
considered necessary to reduce the size of its public sector, open its economy 
to competition, and liberalize its labour markets to generate greater competi-
tiveness with its European trade partners. Internal politics under successive 
Berlusconi governments had not resulted in significant economic reforms. 
The size of the country’s debt-to-GDP ratio, while having fallen in the past 
decade, was still quite large, making Italy extremely vulnerable to increased 
interest rates that could render the debt unsustainable. Generating 16.8 per-
cent of eurozone output, Italy’s economy was almost three times larger than 
that of Greece, Ireland, and Portugal combined. Using IMF figures from 
September 2011, Italy’s total public debt was over €1.9 trillion ($2.4 trillion 
in US dollars), larger than the combined annual economic output of twelve of 
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the sixteen other nations in the eurozone, and dwarfing the collective liabili-
ties of Greece, Ireland and Portugal, which totalled €693 billion in the same 
period. In late summer 2011, the eurozone was stretched politically to sup-
port the bailouts already incurred. If Italy were to become unable to support 
its debts in private markets, EU resources would not be large enough simply 
to create another bailout. In other words, if Italy fell, the eurozone would, 
too. 
These concerns added to those already troubling markets. As the autumn 
of 2011 wore on, every day that went by without a Greek deal being reached 
increased uncertainty and undermined world confidence that Europe would 
be able to address its problems, or that EU leaders even had control of the 
situation. Concerns grew deeper that Greece might actually default, as inac-
tion on the part of the Troika to finalize Greece’s debt relief suggested a 
breakup of the eurozone might be imminent. Time appeared to be running out 
as pending debt payments loomed, and Greece did not have the resources to 
meet them. Without a deal in place, Europe would not follow through on the 
previously promised funds that were necessary to avoid a default. Politics, 
not economics, seemed to be driving the decision making process, and the 
result was falling bond and stock markets across Europe. 
As anxieties grew more shrill, negotiations finally culminated in an elev-
enth hour deal in late October over the final weekend that Greece had left to 
come to an agreement. The new bailout arrangement between the Troika and 
Greece had been difficult to negotiate for both sides. While greeted with 
relief and approval in most of Europe, the reaction in Greece was not nearly 
as kind. With a majority of Greeks opposed, the deal was met with outrage in 
Greece for the additional austerity measures it imposed.136 In a twist, only 
four days after the deal was announced and faced with greater opposition 
than had been expected domestically, Greece’s prime minister appeared to 
back away from the deal, suggesting that acceptance would require a national 
referendum. European response was immediate and incredulous. Papan-
dreou’s reversal seemed only to underline Troika concerns that the Greeks 
were unwilling partners in the aid efforts being made to avoid a Greek de-
fault. The suggestion of a bailout referendum was eventually withdrawn, but 
the damage was done. The Greek government’s indecision was also pun-
ished; while it narrowly won a vote of no confidence in the first week of 
November, negotiations to heal the fractures within the governing party by 
forming a unity government also failed. As a result, no political party would 
take power since doing so would require administering the painful bailout 
                                                          
136  Polls over the weekend, after the deal was reached, suggested as many as sixty percent of 
Greeks opposed the deal or thought it would be bad for the country. Reports like this one 
were common. http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/31/us-greece-referendum-idUSTRE 
79U5PQ20111031 (accessed 30 November 2014.) 
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commitments. With the public now blaming establishment politicians in both 
parties for the troubles the country found itself in, no party wanted to be 
associated with the controversial bailout. 
The result was the imposition of an unelected, technocratic government 
charged with implementing previously agreed to bailout terms and negotiat-
ing a new agreement. It would serve until new elections could be held the 
following spring. Bailout conditions remained unresolved, and public anger 
in Greece only worsened as many people felt democracy had been suspended. 
Politics had also become more uncertain, and, suddenly, it appeared as if 
democracy might be coming apart in southern Europe as elected governments 
seemed to be exchanged for unelected ones. Cynics in Greece and elsewhere 
complained that Berlin and Brussels were now deciding not just economic 
policy, but governments as well. 
These complaints were amplified when almost simultaneously the Italian 
government fell while the drama of the Greek negotiations and government’s 
failure still dominated the news. Although ostensibly committed to reducing 
its debt level, the Italian government had failed to implement promised re-
forms. In what appeared a populist bid for support, prime minister Silvio 
Berlusconi began to question publicly the austerity calls the Troika were 
making in exchange for aid elsewhere. Again, the eurozone was taken by 
surprise as Italy was expected to cooperate in presenting a common EU-
Troika front as negotiations continued with Greece. Berlusconi’s tactics 
seemed to backfire, however, when opponents of the Italian government took 
advantage of the public’s disapproval and decreasing support for the sitting 
government and engineered an unsuccessful budgetary vote. The negative 
result forced Berlusconi to step down in a matter of days. Events that fol-
lowed his step down mirrored events in Greece only days before. 
As in Athens, once more opposition parties in Italy were unwilling to 
take the reins of power to implement what were certain to be unpopular poli-
cies in the midst of the greater crisis in Europe. Italy’s ruling government was 
also replaced by a technocratic one, with a mandate extending to the next 
election in 2013. Its leader, former European commissioner Mario Monti, 
portrayed himself as an agreeable partner in attempting to stabilize the crisis. 
Like the interim administration in Greece, the new Italian government’s 
charge was to implement the austerity measures and market reforms neces-
sary to maintain the country’s perceived debt sustainability, which had been 
eroded both by a worsening recession and rising bond rates, and now political 
crisis. Again, those bearing the costs of austerity wondered whether democ-
racy had been suspended and whether their interests were being sacrificed for 
those elsewhere. 
Political dramas continued across southern Europe. The government of 
Spain fell a week after the Italian government did. Deeply unpopular, the 
sitting government was defeated in an election landslide over its management 
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of the economy, which was widely blamed for both the recession that had 
occurred after the Spanish real estate bubble had burst in 2007, and for the 
austerity measures implemented to appease sovereign bond pressures. By the 
end of November 2011, three governments had fallen in less than a month. In 
less than a year, the crisis had taken down all five SPIGI governments, each 
failing due to the political fallout of austerity actions taken to earn Troika aid 
and seemingly made necessary by credit market conditions. These political 
upheavals only reinforced the political discontent spreading across Europe. In 
each case, from the first bailout in Greece to the bailouts that followed in 
Ireland and Portugal, after the voluntary actions taken in Italy and Spain 
through to the second bailout agreement for Greece, and all the efforts in 
between to calm markets, quite the opposite had happened. Actions taken to 
address the crisis seemingly only made it worse, and far from reducing un-
certainty, confidence in the monetary union’s future grew more pessimistic. 
December 2011 to March 2013: A Period of Acceptance – 
Recognizing the Need for Structural Reforms 
As the end of the year drew near, the events of 2011 had left the European 
continent unsure of its future. Markets were more uncertain after a year of 
efforts to address the financial crisis than at the beginning almost twelve 
months earlier. Politics had grown more and more acrimonious between 
“Club Med” southern states and their northern creditors. Not only were EU 
leaders challenged to find workable agreements among countries, they were 
also constrained by their own domestic politics, which were becoming in-
creasingly resentful of the bailout efforts. In the north, the tolerance for 
greater accommodation of their troubled southern neighbours, particularly in 
Germany, Austria, and Finland, was quickly running out, as was their pa-
tience to see meaningful reform. In Mediterranean countries, resentment was 
growing too, at the increasing pain austerity measures were inflicting on 
society, as pensions and social programs were cut while recessions worsened. 
Street protests in Spain, Portugal, and especially Italy had become larger, 
more vocal, and more violent, making the negotiations to stem the crisis that 
much more difficult. 
As the crisis degenerated, the “blame game” poisoned politics across the 
continent, serving no useful purpose. Whoever was responsible, the mistakes 
leading up to the crisis could not be undone. Many began to argue more 
loudly that to recreate confidence in the markets, deeper structural reforms 
that both addressed the problems that led to the crisis and signified a greater 
commitment to the union, were necessary. 
The first signal of this change came with the ECB in December 2011. 
Throughout the crisis, although conservative in its approach, critics claimed 
its actions violated fundamental principles that were argued to be at the core 
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of the monetary union. The ECB had been modelled on the German Bundes-
bank, and like the Bundesbank before it, it was expected by many, especially 
those in Germany, to remain politically independent, and committed to only 
one goal – stabilizing prices and the currency. Independence in this case 
implied avoiding any discretionary actions that might ease political condi-
tions or be seen to interfere with market outcomes to favour member states. 
Actions the previous summer to support Spain and Italy on international bond 
markets had been seen by some to cross that line. Pundits of European policy, 
however, had complained loudly, especially in the British and US press that 
the bank could do much more if it would only release itself from the shackles 
of its perceived role as a passive central bank. Specifically, these critics 
wanted the central bank to act more forcefully, like the Federal Reserve had 
in the United States in 2008. 
As financial crises cause banks to become illiquid, banks become unable 
to borrow due to market fears regarding their solvency, and such fears tend to 
become self-fulfilling. Banks fail as they cannot obtain financing to cover 
their debt obligations despite the fact that they may be fundamentally sound. 
The potential means to arrest such crises had been known since the 1870s 
when Walter Bagehot wrote Lombard Street. That account described how a 
central bank, acting as a lender of last resort, could arrest financial crises by 
providing massive quantities of liquidity into financial markets.137 Such ac-
tions, he argued, reverse the destructive expectations process causing the 
crisis by restoring its liquidity and faith in the financial system, thus allowing 
it to function once again. Used successfully in numerous financial crises 
since, including in the United States in 2008, it appeared the financial mar-
kets would only be satisfied if the central bank in Europe followed the script 
that had worked so often before. Previous efforts had been too little, too late; 
only something far more impressive could staunch bleeding in European 
financial markets now. 
Doubts regarding the euro’s future were leading deposits to flee troubled 
and weaker countries’ banks for those in stronger countries such as Germany, 
or causing deposits to flee the union altogether. The euro continued its fall in 
international currency markets as confidence dwindled that it would survive. 
Credit markets within Europe had dried up, and this lack of lending was 
turning a financial crisis into a full-blown recession as businesses were 
starved of the credit they needed to operate or expand. Rising unemployment 
and worsening demand only made conditions worse as investors became 
increasingly unwilling to take business risks in Europe. Finally, these same 
effects were worsening sovereign bond markets across much of the continent, 
and especially for those countries that faced worsening banking conditions as 
                                                          
137  Walter Bagehot, Lombard Street, (New York: Scribner, Armstong & Co, 1873). 
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investors began to consider which country might be next to suffer a banking 
crisis like those seen in Ireland and Portugal. 
In 2011, the ‘too big to fail’ and ‘too big to bail’ countries, Spain and 
Italy, had begun having difficulty in their bond markets. ECB bond-buying 
efforts in the late summer of 2011 had only slowed this for a time, but, as the 
year ended, conditions again began to deteriorate as interest rates on Italian 
and Spanish sovereign debt climbed ever higher. Banks in troubled SPIGI 
economies, in particular, were known to have significant amounts of debt due 
early in the New Year, and credit markets had almost dried up as financial 
institutions anticipated the credit scarcity this would cause. Under current 
conditions, it did not appear that financing this amount of debt would be 
possible, and market analysts had already begun the process of predicting 
which banks were likely to fail when the inevitable credit crunch came in 
early 2012. 
Market watchers feared these failures could tip new countries into crisis, 
particularly Italy and Spain. It seemed clear that the resources and willing-
ness to address such bailouts, should they occur, had been exhausted over the 
previous year. In fact, given the scale of these economies, there could likely 
never have been the resources to address failures of the magnitude these 
countries would represent. 
The second phase of the crisis, one in which Europe began to address the 
crisis in new and more creative ways, began on 21 December 2011. On this 
day, and to the surprise of the markets, the ECB began leveraging its options 
as a central bank in ways that were not used during the first two years of the 
crisis, and on a much more massive scale. To address the financial concerns 
now roiling markets, particularly the concerns regarding the large amounts of 
debt that would have to be financed in the New Year, the ECB unexpectedly 
announced a bold new lending program, one meant to eliminate such con-
cerns on the market, not just for a short time, but for good. Opening its mas-
sive purse, the ECB allowed banks across the euro-area access to three-year 
low-interest loans, referred to officially as the ECB’s Long Term Refinancing 
Operation (LTRO). These loans allowed banks to refinance the debt obliga-
tions coming due, neatly avoiding what appeared to be an impending finan-
cial crisis. They also allowed financial institutions the ability to earn income 
by using lower interest loans to purchase higher yielding sovereign debt in 
their own countries, which reduced pressures in sovereign debt markets as 
well. The scale of the loans was unprecedented: in the course of twenty-four 
hours, almost half a trillion euros in credit was extended to beleaguered Eu-
ropean banks. 
The injection of liquidity the ECB’s actions represented immediately 
caused market concerns to ease and eurozone sovereign bond rates to decline. 
While the crisis was by no means thought to be over, 2011 ended on an opti-
mistic note that few would have thought possible less than two weeks before. 
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To emphasize its willingness to stabilize the crisis, a second round of loans 
was offered in February 2012, and together, the two actions poured more than 
€1 trillion into eurozone banks. This unprecedented ECB effort to restore 
liquidity to eurozone financial institutions seemed to be the type of effort the 
markets had been looking for. Whereas only weeks before, many market 
watchers had written off the euro and anticipated its failure as only a matter 
of time, like the new shoots of spring beginning to emerge from winter’s 
darkness across Europe, there seemed to be new hope that the crisis could yet 
find a solution. The LTRO succeeded, allowing credit markets to loosen and 
sovereign bond rates to decline, giving the eurozone some much needed 
breathing space to develop longer-term policies. 
The change in the ECB’s role seemed to coincide with its new leader 
Mario Draghi taking the reins of the bank. An Italian, educated in economics 
in the United States, he had taken over the previous November for Jean-
Claude Trichet, who had presided over the bank since 2003. Trichet had long 
defended the bank’s conservative approach to the crisis, and, earlier in the 
summer of 2011, had even presided over the ECB raising interest rates twice, 
which actually reduced liquidity in the eurozone, to combat what he saw as 
an inflation threat in countries such as Germany.138 These actions had many 
market observers suggesting that the ECB had not taken the threat the crisis 
posed to Europe’s credit markets seriously enough. They argued the ECB 
was doing exactly the opposite of what was needed given the crisis. Draghi’s 
elevation to the post of ECB president had increased hopes that he would 
oversee a bank charting a different course. The LTRO efforts marked this sea 
change. The reduction of ECB interest rates Draghi had presided over in the 
weeks since his appointment had also stoked such hopes, but the massive 
injection the LTRO actions represented were a turning point. Coupled with 
the fact that they were an example of using extraordinary and non-traditional 
means to combat the market turmoil, these actions were interpreted by many 
observers as signaling the ECB was now willing to use its considerable fi-
nancial power to take a much more active role in arresting the crisis. 
                                                          
138  In fact, Trichet had argued that eurozone governments needed to rein in deficits. His move 
to raise interest rates was seen as ending what he argued might be perceived as too gener-
ous support of eurozone economies. The decision to raise interest rates suggested that the 
bank would remain vigorously independent of concerns regarding economic conditions and 
the potential effects of the financial crisis, and would instead follow its price stability man-
date. This increase in interest rates is now widely regarded as having been premature, and 
two days after Draghi assumed office, the ECB promptly reduced rates by a quarter percent 
on 3 November 2011, and then again on 8 December 2011. These changes fully reversed 
the interest rate increases made under Trichet in April and July 2011. Between July 2012 
and September 2014 the ECB continued to lower interest rates to what was considered the 
absolute minimum possible – a level of 0.05 percent (nearly zero).  
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The ECB actions and the effects these had on credit markets also allowed 
EU leaders some breathing room to reconsider their policy strategy. Whereas 
during the first phase of the crisis from 2009 to the end of 2011, EU policy 
had focused on stemming immediate issues – reacting to sovereign debt 
problems in markets with bailouts and bail-ins, and developing a firewall to 
shield additional countries should the contagion in sovereign debt markets 
spread – in the second phase of the crisis, the EU would now focus on ad-
dressing the long-term problems that had contributed to it in the first place. 
The strategy utilized such efforts as a one-two punch in combination with the 
ECB efforts to attempt to convince markets they could control the crisis. 
To show their new commitment to ensuring that such a crisis could not 
happen again, and to reinforce their commitment to fiscal discipline, the 
eurozone countries devised a new “fiscal compact”, in which all members 
agreed to enact national legislation requiring limits on national debt and defi-
cits. Specifically, the compact required eurozone countries to implement 
constitutional-level laws requiring their structural deficits not exceed one-half 
of one percent of a country’s GDP and to agree to mandated debt reductions 
if the debt-to-GDP ratios exceeded the Maastricht maximum of sixty per-
cent.139 Exceptions would only be allowed under special circumstances and 
would require the approval of the European Commission. The agreement 
came into force in January 2013. 
The ECB’s LTRO actions had also allowed the EU to take additional ac-
tions to strengthen the union against adverse conditions in the future. During 
this period of calm, the Troika concluded a comprehensive new Greek aid 
plan in February 2012. Worth €130 billion, the package included significant 
new austerity actions, and required additional structural reforms and privati-
zation of Greek government assets. The agreement also included strong con-
ditionality, specifying the Greek actions to be implemented before funding 
payments could be released. Funds would be disbursed to a kind of interna-
tional escrow account to ensure they were used as specified. Previously an-
nounced private sector “haircuts” imposed losses to private bondholders of 
53.5 percent in a debt-buyback financed by the EFSF. Overall, the agreement 
decreased Greek debt by an estimated €110 billion, and allowed the plan to 
lower the Greek debt-to-GDP ratio from a forecasted level of 198 percent to 
                                                          
139  The structural deficit refers to the deficit occurring after accounting for expenditures de-
manded by the business cycle – the deficit that would occur if the economy was at full em-
ployment. For example, increases in unemployment and social benefits costs in a recession 
would be netted out of a structural deficit computation. The compact basically reinforced 
the Maastricht limits of three percent deficits and a sixty percent debt-GDP goal, creating 
stronger rules to ensure countries could not ignore these limits. All countries had to pass 
national legislation to agree to these rules and the Compact came into effect when twelve 
states had ratified the rule, which occurred after Finland did so in January 2013. 
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160 percent in 2012, and predicted a decline to 120.5 percent by 2020.140 In 
March 2012, the eurozone also finalized the implementation of its permanent 
bailout fund, a lending capacity worth €500 billion called the European Sta-
bility Mechanism (ESM), to replace the EFSF that was due to expire in June 
2013.141 
As 2012 marched on, however, the period of calm that characterized the 
spring began to fade, precipitated by a series of rapid political and financial 
shocks. In what followed, the necessity of a more activist ECB was con-
firmed. The comparative tranquillity of markets in the first months of the new 
year would soon be shattered by a perfect storm of new political challenges 
that would eventually make the instability of late 2011 seem less dramatic in 
comparison. It is unclear whether these challenges could have been overcome 
without the willingness of the ECB to become much more actively engaged 
than many thought it was ever intended to be. 
Two political shocks dominated events in the crisis only a few weeks fol-
lowing the successful negotiation of the final Greek aid package. While the 
governments had changed in all of the SPIGI countries by the end of 2011, 
the first major change in creditor countries occurred May 2012. French elec-
tions resulted in the defeat of the French president Nicolas Sarkozy. Sarkozy 
and Germany’s chancellor Angela Merkel, leaders of the eurozone’s two 
largest economies, nicknamed in the press ‘Merkozy’, had previously com-
bined their political and economic power to guide eurozone policy since the 
crisis in Greece first began. Merkel went so far as to endorse Sarkozy’s re-
election even before he had announced it himself – a move that was out of the 
ordinary in a union where national sovereignty and independence was a 
fundamental principle. Sarkozy had seemed a bit embarrassed by Merkel’s 
diplomatic gesture, remarking, “I did not know she voted in France.”142 In 
any case, the people did not oblige. The replacement of Sarkozy with the 
newly elected socialist president François Hollande, whose party was not 
allied with chancellor Merkel’s policies, broke this political association, 
leaving Germany alone as the dominant voice of eurozone creditor countries 
and sharply reducing German potential political influence. Witticisms 
abounded as to whether Merkel would like her policy with a “sauce Hol-
                                                          
140  See Eurogroup Statement, February 21, 2012. National central banks and states in the in the 
EU, including the ECB holding Greek bonds were exempt from the write-down. Profits 
made on these debts were to be allocated to the bailout.  
141  Actual funds allocated to the ESM, including funds previously allocated to the EFSF, as 
well as funds allocated in previous bailout actions, were expected to total €700 billion, with 
€200 billion kept as a capital reserve.  
142  William Boston and William Horobin, “Merkel to Back Sarkozy in Re-Election,” The Wall 
Street Journal, 30 January 2012 .http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405 
2970204740904577190293163105890 (accessed 3 August 2015). 
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lande-aise” – a reference to the anticipated compromises she might now have 
to accept. 
Sarkozy’s electoral defeat occurred on the same day as elections in 
Greece. Widely viewed as a de facto referendum on the second Greek bailout 
and Greece’s willingness to remain in the eurozone, the results of the election 
were inconclusive; no party was able to create a ruling coalition. Voters, 
clearly frustrated by the deep austerity measures imposed on their economy, 
punished the usual mainstream parties by instead supporting many more 
populist and anti-bailout candidates than had been expected. Results of the 
election underscored concerns that the Greeks might not have the capacity or 
willingness to abide by the most recent bailout agreement or the willingness 
to commit to measures that avoided default. In reaction to the election, mar-
ket sentiments shifted as optimism again evaporated. Markets began to pre-
pare for a potential “Grexit”. A period of uncertainty followed while a second 
election was held culminating in a vote six weeks later. 
The resulting narrow victory by parties supporting the bailout allowed a 
thin majority coalition government to be formed. While the results of the 
second election were widely interpreted as confirming Greek willingness to 
remain in the eurozone, the lack of a result in the first election and the tenu-
ous nature of the resulting ruling coalition after the second did not reassure 
markets. Lingering uncertainty remained. The election ambiguity also proved 
financially costly, delaying the implementation of the Greek bailout reforms 
required in the second agreement reached three months earlier, causing mar-
kets to worry further whether Greece could accept the terms required to re-
main in the currency union. 
As if these shocks were not enough, in quick succession, a third test of 
the eurozone occurred in June 2012, even before the Greek elections were 
resolved. While attention was centred on the Greek elections, it also became 
clear that Spain would require a significant recapitalization of several of its 
largest banks. Despite ongoing efforts, the country was unable to finance 
sustainably the required resources needed to stabilize its banking system. The 
result was a new request for aid in the eurozone. Apprehensions regarding the 
continuing threat of a default in Greece, and now a financial crisis in Spain, 
had a contagious effect on Italian sovereign debt markets, and bond rates for 
Italy soon began to climb. Within a period of two months, the eurozone had 
moved from a period of relative calm to conditions in which three simultane-
ous threats had now emerged: an unresolved election in Greece; a banking 
crisis in Spain; and now a potentially looming sovereign debt crisis in Italy. 
In addition, the election loss of Nicholas Sarkozy in France left overall EU 
leadership in doubt. 
Conditions were different at this stage from what they had been in years 
past. Unlike previous aid negotiations, Spain, as the fourth largest economy 
in the eurozone, found it commanded significant bargaining power over the 
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terms of any bailout due to its economic size. Unlike Greece, Ireland, and 
Portugal, its size meant that it had to be dealt with swiftly as the threat it 
posed to Europe’s financial system was an order of magnitude larger than the 
others. The narrative was also somewhat different. Although Spain had bor-
rowed heavily during its housing boom, it had also pre-emptively imple-
mented significant austerity measures and was committed to important 
structural reforms as it attempted to address the challenges the crisis had 
posed. Its debt relative to GDP was rising quickly, but was not yet at the 
levels seen in previously troubled countries. 
The problem became how to deal with the banking crisis without creating 
another sovereign debt crisis. Given the simultaneous uncertainty created by 
political conditions in Greece and the threat of contagion a Spanish financial 
crisis failure could create in Europe, especially in Italy, the eurozone changed 
its previous bailout strategy and designed an aid package in which the burden 
on Spanish sovereign debt would be minimized. The agreement reached a 
week before the second Greek election created a guarantee to finance up to 
€100 billion in aid specifically to support a Spanish bank bailout. Unlike 
previous bailouts, Spain was able to negotiate a deal that did not include 
similarly onerous austerity conditions to those imposed on Greece, Ireland, 
and Portugal.143 
Still, the agreement to offer Spain credit guarantees and the resolution of 
Greek elections did not quell market concerns, and sovereign bond rates 
remained high. Exacerbating the situation, on 25 June 2012, Cyprus also 
requested bailout aid. Since its entry into the eurozone in 2008, the Cypriot 
banking industry had boomed as an offshore banking centre catering to east-
ern European and non-EU states, amassing total deposits seven times larger 
than its GDP. Clearly if such a banking sector fell into trouble, the national 
government would not have the finances to tackle the problem alone. The 
banking sector had also accumulated significant amounts of Greek debt. Its 
banks had bet heavily that, like previous bailouts, private debt-holders would 
not be held accountable for losses in the most recent negotiation concluded in 
February 2012. They were wrong. The recent Greek bailout agreement, 
which included significant private sector write-downs, had imposed harsh 
losses on private banks holding Greek debt and severely destabilized 
                                                          
143  The Spanish government argued determinedly that the credit guarantee of €100 billion 
should be paid directly to banks, thereby avoiding an increase in sovereign debt. Other eu-
rozone countries resisted this plan arguing that under the current rules of the eurozone the 
debt had to be assumed by the national government, which could then assign it to a national 
bank recapitalization program. The final agreement specified the debt would be assigned to 
Spain’s total sovereign debt load. Conditionality, with respect to the loan, however, was 
otherwise limited.  
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Cyprus’s banking system, prompting the request.144 The amount of aid 
needed was scant relative to previous packages, but given conditions – the 
uncertainty still surrounding Greece, Spain’s banking problems, Italy’s wors-
ening debt rates, and now Cyprus’s request for aid – fears began to mount of 
an imminent set of sovereign debt crises occurring across countries like 
dominos that could serve a death knell to the currency union. The euro’s 
exchange rate against major currencies fell to levels not seen since the start of 
the crisis, and a virtual bank run began across eurozone economies, particu-
larly in southern states, as deposit holders attempted to transfer their wealth 
out of the eurozone or into safe-haven economies, especially in Germany, for 
example, by investing in Berlin real estate. 
The seemingly relentless sequence of challenges that buffeted the euro-
zone over the late spring and early summer of 2012 was like a relentless 
flood-tide that threatened to wash away any defences that Europe had been 
able to mount against the crisis so far. Facing mounting volatility in currency 
and bond markets, Europe’s leaders seemed frozen. Merkel’s sudden political 
weakness after the loss of her closest ally meant that EU policy could soon be 
thwarted by internal dissension. What if Germany and the more conservative 
northern countries could not convince southern countries, now seemingly 
allied with France, to follow the previous austerity script? Would this force 
Germany to leave the euro? Could it undermine Merkel’s support at home? 
Political paralysis threatened to undermine Europe’s ability to act just when it 
might be facing its darkest hour. Uncertainty continued to worsen, and mar-
kets seemed to brace for the eventuality of a eurozone break up. 
It was at this darkest hour that the ECB once more surprised markets by 
acting in a way everyone knew it could, but few had assumed it would. 
Conditions and confidence in the eurozone now, however, had deteriorated to 
the point where the ECB’s official mandate seemed almost a contradiction. 
Charged with maintaining price stability and maintaining the stability of the 
currency, it now faced a choice. Price stability typically meant limited activ-
ism, however, without action, the euro as a currency could fail. Given condi-
tions, the ECB was forced to act, and, at the end of July 2012, it unleashed 
what the media dubbed the “big bazooka”.145 
                                                          
144  While the Cypriot government, as part of the eurozone, had approved the recent Greek 
bailout agreement, a credit downgrade in autumn 2011 and recent events had caused its 
sovereign rates also to climb to unsustainable levels, and the costs necessary to stabilize its 
banking system made bailout aid necessary. 
145  See for example, BBC News, “Euro crisis: Has the ECB created a big bazooka?, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-19096992 (accessed 3 August 2015)or SpiegelOnline, 
“Buying Bonds against the Crisis: How the ECB Plans to Use Its Bazooka” 6 August 2012, 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/how-the-ecb-plans-to-use-its-big-bazooka-a-
848417.html (accessed 3 August 2015). 
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Abiding by its mandate to maintain the stability of the euro, during what 
seemed like an otherwise routine speech in London, ECB president Mario 
Draghi promised very clearly that the ECB would do “whatever it takes” 
using its unlimited euro-resources to stabilize the situation.146 This statement, 
while only a comment in an otherwise seemingly innocuous speech describ-
ing the currency union’s recent experiences, was immediately understood to 
imply the ECB now stood willing to enter sovereign debt markets in an un-
limited way.147 Calling on its potential to be a lender of last resort, the central 
bank had finally indicated it was willing to do what many had argued for 
since shortly after the eurozone crisis had begun. The ECB was now implic-
itly threatening to use its unlimited power to purchase eurozone sovereign 
debt as necessary to stabilize markets. Actions would no longer be limited, as 
they had been in previous programs to protect sovereign interest rates.148 
The initial announcement had an immediate impact on markets, which 
began to stabilize after sovereign bond rates had reached record levels for 
Spain and Italy. Following this statement, a month later, the ECB unveiled its 
Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme, formalizing the condi-
tions under which the ECB would intervene in sovereign bond markets. The 
programme clearly indicated that in cases where a country had applied for 
assistance, and agreed to the conditions under which the assistance was made, 
the ECB would be willing to purchase an unlimited quantity of government 
bonds on the secondary market to reduce interest rate pressures. The roles of 
the ECB and the Troika were now clear. The Troika would define the condi-
tions under which bailouts could ensure sustainable debt levels. The ECB 
would then stand ready to ensure interest rates were maintained to safeguard 
that sustainability. In principle, a bailout agreement should now resolve any 
future questions regarding a country’s debt sustainability. 
Eliminating such concerns also implied the euro’s stability was far 
sounder. As long as a country abided by the terms of its aid agreement, the 
risk of default was removed. Moral hazard also seemed under control; a 
country would receive aid only if it abided by these conditions. After this 
announcement, sovereign bond rates of troubled countries began to decline 
rapidly, and soon approached levels not seen since the beginning of the crisis. 
                                                          
146  Mario Draghi, speech to the Global Investment Conference, London, 26 July 2012. 
147  During Spanish bailout discussions the potential to enter secondary bond markets had been 
widely discussed by legal and economic experts and officials.  
148  The previous Securities Markets Programme, or SMP, had been limited in the sense that all 
transactions were “sterilized”, purchases of one country’s sovereign debt were balanced by 
equivalent value sales of another’s, thereby leaving the money supply in the eurozone unaf-
fected, thereby minimizing any inflationary effect this otherwise might have. In this way 
actions to stabilize currency conditions were tempered by the need to maintain price stabil-
ity by minimizing any perceived inflationary such actions might cause. 
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Buttressing the ECB’s efforts in the summer of 2012, the European 
Commission and ECB also followed up on previous policy initiatives and 
released initial plans for a banking union that September.149 Under these re-
forms, The ECB would also now be the sole regulator of major banks in the 
eurozone, and, as such, would have the power to support them directly should 
recapitalization ever be necessary. This reform would, in principle, perma-
nently allow the link between financial crises and sovereign debt crises to be 
broken, adding an element of stability to the eurozone that had been missing 
since its formation. This reform came into effect in autumn of 2014. The 
reforms also defined a single set of rules to resolve bank failures should they 
occur, allowing such efforts to be completed much more quickly to minimize 
the disruption and uncertainty they could cause to financial markets. Final 
rules were adopted in December of 2014. Other new rules to define common 
capital requirements and other regulatory standards that all financial institu-
tions in the EU must comply with, were passed in 2013 and 2014. These were 
meant to prevent such failures and to eliminate the patchwork of unique and 
different national bank regulations that had previously existed and that had 
contributed to the crisis. In principle, the banking union initially proposed 
would also release individual countries from the responsibility to guarantee 
their own banks deposits up to €100,000 to help break the so-called “doom 
loop”. Such rules proved controversial though and eventually remained the 
responsibility of national banks, but the new banking union rules directed that 
a single pan-European deposit guarantee mechanism be considered by 
2019.150 
As an indication of the reform effort’s success and the calming effects of 
the ECB actions taken in July and August, Spain’s bank bailout required “only” 
€39.5 billion in aid to recapitalize its banking system.151 This was in stark 
contrast to the €100 billion that had been initially approved. The additional 
funds were not needed – a testament to the turnaround that had occurred in the 
                                                          
149  See “Communication from the Commission: A Roadmap towards a Banking Union” 
(September 2012) http://ec.europa.eu/finance/general-policy/banking-union/index_en.htm 
(accessed 30 August 2015).  
150  For a discussion of the rules enacted, see “Banking Union: restoring financial stability in 
the Eurozone” European Commission memo, 15 April 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/finance/ 
general-policy/docs/banking-union/banking-union-memo_en.pdf (Accessed August 30, 
2015), and Understanding the Banking Union,” February 27, 2015 European Commission 
Banking and Finance newsletter, http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/cf/ 
fisma/item-detail.cfm?item_id=20758&newsletter_id=166&lang=en (Accessed August 30, 
2015). Support for trouble banks now comes primarily from the ECB in times of crisis, or 
they are resolved (closed) according to the common mechanism agreed upon, however, a 
common European pool of funds to guarantee deposits up to €100,000 across Europe could 
not be agreed upon. The agreement specified this matter would be revisited before 2019 to 
determine if such a common pool was warranted. 
151  An additional €1.9 was made available in February 2013. 
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crisis. The acute phase of the eurozone crisis was over, but the road to 
economic recovery would still be a long one and stood several years away. 
From Financial Crisis to Political Crisis 
The ECB’s final intervention in summer of 2012 and the ensuing efforts to 
create the missing banking union and make permanent the ESM firewall 
combined to end the financial crisis that had plagued the eurozone for nearly 
four years. Questions regarding whether the euro would fail as a common 
currency quickly faded. At this point, the political crisis began: could gov-
ernments convince voters that the economic decisions made were in their best 
interests? 
2012 ended, much like it had begun, with a new confidence that the euro-
area had weathered the storm. Euro-country bond rates began to realize fur-
ther reductions as confidence returned to the borrowing markets. As the 
financial crisis subsided, it became clearer the challenges the eurozone faced 
were now long-term: how to deal with the deep economic recessions caused 
by the crisis, especially in the SPIGI countries. As of 2015, unemployment 
rates exceeded twenty-three percent in Spain and Greece and thirteen percent 
in Italy, Portugal, and Cyprus. Potentially more troubling, youth unemploy-
ment rates in these countries have risen to more than fifty percent. Even the 
healthiest creditor nations have seen very sluggish growth, too little to reduce 
unemployment to “normal” levels. In fact, since 2012, much of Europe has 
been forced to accept a “new normal”, with persistent and elevated unem-
ployment levels and limited economic expansion. 
Political uncertainty also continued. In February 2013, new Italian elec-
tions resulted in no clear electoral winner. Populist protest parties with no 
clear agenda secured a significant portion of the vote. A weak Italian coali-
tion eventually formed in late April with its policy agenda seemingly defined 
as a dedication to maintaining membership in the euro, but under terms that 
benefited the Italian people, in other words, with growth rather than austerity. 
Political conditions in that country have, nevertheless, remained volatile. 
Enrico Letta was sworn in as Italy’s new prime minister, succeeding Mario 
Monti after the April 2013 elections, but was soon replaced by Matteo Renzi 
in February 2014. Populist resentment of austerity actions and opposition to 
labour market reforms have continued to make change in Italy difficult, and 
economic conditions have remained very weak. 
Cyprus, which had requested aid in late June 2012, continued to negoti-
ate the terms of its bailout until late November 2012 when the Troika’s terms 
were made public. These specified severe austerity measures, reductions in 
public jobs and salaries, pension and benefit cuts, and tax increases. The 
value of the bailout package would be €17.5 billion, with €10 billion financed 
by Troika funding and the remainder through Cyprus’s restructuring and 
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austerity programs. Final agreement on the bailout, however, did not take 
place until March 2013 to accommodate a Cypriot federal election in which a 
change of government took place. What followed was an unfortunate set of 
errors during a two-week period in which the new government was supposed 
to finalize the program. 
The initial plan to finance Cyprus’s share of the bailout had included a 
tax on all existing bank deposits in addition to a series of other austerity ac-
tions and reforms. Some refer to such actions as a “bail-in” as citizens’ de-
posits become part of the resources used during the bailout. A political back-
lash, however, resulted as this plan was unveiled and the general population 
rose up against these costs being imposed on small businesses, regular citi-
zens, and the least wealthy in the economy. This reaction caused the govern-
ment to backtrack from its bailout agreement, and, for a time, it threatened to 
default rather than accept the Troika’s terms. The political deadlock resulted 
in a national financial crisis where all banks closed for a week and financial 
transactions were severely limited. Economic chaos followed on the island as 
most commerce ground to a halt. Avoiding a default, the plan that eventually 
emerged imposed a tax only on deposits over €100,000, limiting public con-
tribution to the bailout to the more affluent, and to those wealthy foreign 
depositors who had previously benefited from the tax advantages of keeping 
their funds in Cypriot banks. The damage, however, was done. The Troika 
and the Cypriot government accepted the package, but the weeklong stale-
mate caused by clumsy negotiations underlined the political disparity among 
countries in the currency union. Large nations still called the shots; small 
ones would have to abide by them. The final result was a serious economic 
recession in Cyprus, one likely made much worse by the ham-fisted course of 
bailout negotiations. Lessons learned also informed the banking union nego-
tiations underway at the time. 
In Germany, the September 2013 election returned chancellor Angela 
Merkel and her ruling party, the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social 
Union, to power with its strongest showing since 1990. Nevertheless, her 
success did not rub off on her former coalition partners, the Free Democrats, 
whose electoral collapse left them without representation in the Bundestag. 
Short five seats, Merkel had no choice but to form a grand coalition with the 
former opposition, the Social Democratic Party (SDP). Since then, the strong 
showing of Merkel’s CDU/CSU party has allowed her to limit her coalition 
partner’s power, resulting in little change with respect to the German crisis 
policies with their emphasis on austerity and reform. Germany’s economy 
remained sluggish, but, by mid-2014, growth began to approach healthy 
levels. Still, in part due to international tensions and consequent trade sanc-
tions with Russia that occurred after that country’s invasion of the Crimea in 
early 2014, the economy has not grown at rates seen in other major econo-
mies such as the United States or the United Kingdom. 
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Since his election in 2012, François Hollande, France’s socialist presi-
dent, has seen his approval ratings fall to thirteen percent, becoming the least 
popular president in France’s history.152 This fall in support coincides with a 
worsening of the economy characterized by little growth and increasing un-
employment. Again, the government has had difficulty reigning in its deficit 
and finds itself in conflict with the EU over its potential to exceed official 
union deficit limits agreed to under the Fiscal Compact. As a result, relations 
with Brussels – and more importantly with Berlin – are strained, resulting in 
even less consensus regarding economic policy across the European Union. 
Conditions in some of the bailout countries and their neighbours in this 
period actually improved at a faster rate than in some creditor nations. Ireland 
recorded strong growth in 2013 and 2014, achieving general unemployment 
rates better than they were in 2009. Portugal’s return to growth has been 
slower, but it, too, has seen an improvement in unemployment, although the 
youth rate still remains significantly elevated. Both countries have since 
reentered sovereign debt markets and exited their bailout agreements, with 
Ireland completing its agreement in December 2013, and Portugal in May 
2014. Growth is also stronger in Spain compared to the rest of the euro-area, 
but high unemployment rates persist, hovering near twenty-three percent. 
Although crisis conditions subsided in sovereign bond and exchange 
markets since the summer of 2012, economic conditions have remained weak 
across much of the eurozone, aside from those countries noted above. Ger-
many and other northern economies have struggled with weak growth, and a 
lack of demand across the continent threatened the continent with deflation. 
Across the EU, frustration with slow growth and especially with the slow 
improvement of unemployment rates has worsened. Elections in 2014 re-
sulted in a large number of populist and anti-EU parties being elected to the 
EU Parliament. 
Despite the ongoing economic malaise in many countries, debate has 
continued to rage among capitals regarding continuing austerity actions, the 
necessity and speed of labour market reforms and deficit reductions. Simi-
larly, the EU has found it very difficult to implement new policies meant to 
more speedily repair current economic conditions and restore growth in the 
union, a problem that may now be the union’s greatest challenge. 
These challenges have been most significant in Greece, where economic 
conditions improved very slowly after 2012. In mid-2014, five years after the 
outbreak of the crisis, the recession officially ended as the Greek economy 
recorded positive growth. Greece was able to return to credit markets in mid-
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2014, issuing new debt at competitive interest rates. Nevertheless, unem-
ployment levels remained high. Tied by the austerity straitjacket of the 2012-
bailout conditions, most people in Greece saw little improvement in their 
economic livelihoods. As a result, populist parties promising to ease austerity 
conditions and demand better bailout terms gained clout. 
A Greek Popular Revolt: The 2015 Referendum 
The Greek coalition government elected in 2012 was able to rule only until 
January 2015 when it was defeated by a coalition of left-wing anti-bailout 
parties. Prior to the election, the Samaras government was persistently chas-
tised by its Troika creditors to speed up reforms. Simultaneously, in its do-
mestic politics, it had to contend with rising electoral discontent over the slow 
pace of economic improvement. Overall, Greece has epitomized the potential 
conflict Rodrik outlined between electoral accountability, state sovereignty, and 
deep integration at a supranational level. Reforms demanded by EU creditors 
left the sitting government no choice but to accede, but doing so undermined its 
political support as imposed austerity actions including labour market, pension 
and institutional reform proved very unpopular. It also proved destabilizing to 
the coalition. In June 2013, one of the coalition partners withdrew, leaving the 
remaining coalition with a slim three-seat majority, and with even less political 
sway to push through additional reforms. 
In April 2014, the country re-entered the bond markets for the first time 
in four years, selling €3 billion euros worth of five-year bonds, offered at a 
yield of 4.95 percent. This return to borrowing was made possible both be-
cause of the decline in interest rates Greece had enjoyed as markets become 
more complacent regarding eurozone woes, and because of the relatively high 
yield they provided in an otherwise very low yield international environment. 
Investors were willing to take the risk this relatively higher yield provided. 
The success of the bond sale was in part caused by the fact that the Greek 
government had experienced revenue problems that made looming debt 
payments problematic, even despite the February 2012 bailout. Terms of that 
bailout had been severe, and despite the size of the aid package, the size of 
Greece’s debt still left little room for error. The election and economic un-
certainty that followed the agreement in second bailout agreement in 2012, 
when two elections were needed to establish a victor, had reduced revenues, 
and the lack of reform and slower than anticipated growth since the last 
bailout had suggested a third bailout of approximately €50 billion might still 
be needed between 2015 and 2020. Avoiding such a politically unpalatable 
outcome had increased pressure from Troika creditors on the Greek gov-
ernment to speed up reforms and left the Greek government looking for addi-
tional revenue options. In February 2014, negotiations began between the 
Troika and Greece regarding the possibility of approximately €15 billion in 
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additional debt relief, but again, to elicit such aid, creditors demanded Greece 
accelerate the pace of unpopular reforms in return. In Rodrik’s trilemma, the 
government found itself in a vice between an unhappy electorate and an im-
patient EU. Bond markets offered what seemed to be a possible solution. 
Despite the success of the bond sale, the Samaras government remained 
unpopular and was branded a lackey of foreign interests by the opposition. 
To bolster its domestic political position, the Samaras government suggested 
it might attempt to leave its bailout program early by relying instead on addi-
tional bond financing to meet debt commitments. The appeal of such a solu-
tion to the domestic audience was clear. If the government could leave the 
bailout program, the harsh conditionality and austerity the Troika had de-
manded would no longer be relevant, allowing the government to claim that 
the Greek peoples’ sacrifices and government efforts had been worthwhile 
and successful. Furthermore, it would undermine the ability of the opposition 
to continue accusing the government of putting the Troika’s interests ahead 
of the electorate’s. 
Nevertheless, such a move was risky. Since Greece’s position was still 
precarious, bond markets might see the withdrawal from the bailout program 
as increasing the chances of default by removing the crutch of external finan-
cial support the program provided. It also increased the possibility of moral 
hazard. Under such circumstances, Greece would have little incentive to 
continue with its unpopular domestic reforms. Unsurprisingly, Troika reac-
tion to the idea of Greece leaving its bailout program ranged from sceptical to 
outright irritation. Some EU states saw this suggested course of action as 
both potentially undermining the commitment to Greek reform they desired 
as well as to the stability of the euro. In addition, they argued such a with-
drawal would only result in another debt crisis down the road. By September, 
market concerns seemed to side with the Troika’s, and were reflected in 
Greek sovereign debt interest rates, which after enjoying a steady two-year 
decline, suddenly began to increase once more. 
Faced with plunging support domestically, and difficulties maintaining 
its coalition, the Greek government in late 2014 made a bold move. It called 
an early presidential election, a procedural move, akin to a vote of confi-
dence, to establish support from its coalition, as such an election occurs in the 
legislature. Under these circumstances, if the ruling party’s candidate does 
not gain majority support, a general election must be called. The Samaras 
government played a high risk game of ‘chicken’, betting that its reluctant 
coalition partners would not dare subject the country to a general election for 
fear of losing to the anti-bailout Syriza party, which was well ahead in the 
polls, and whose win might threaten economic calamity if they attempted to 
abandon the bailout terms. The gamble, however, did not work. In late De-
cember 2014, the Samara’s candidate for President did not gain majority 
support, forcing a general election in late January 2015. 
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The outcome of that election was a win for Syriza and a coalition of left 
wing, mainly anti-bailout parties. Alexis Tsipras, who had risen to promi-
nence in the 2012 elections on an anti-austerity platform, formed a new gov-
ernment on the promise that he would force the Troika to offer a new deal, a 
renegotiation of the current bailout and one in which the people were put 
ahead of EU finances. Difficult and sometimes heated bargaining between the 
new Greek government and the Troika commenced, and the Greek crisis that 
had seemed to be very slowly healing suddenly began to haemorrhage as 
efforts to find a fresh solution with the new government dragged on. 
The election of the Syriza government marked a political turning point in 
the eurozone crisis focusing on the question of austerity. Syriza maintained 
that austerity should be reduced and debt forgiveness extended, while diffi-
cult market reforms in Greece should also be slowed or stopped. The EU saw 
this position as a threat on several levels. Financially, such policies would 
hurt the taxpayers of Europe as collectively they held the majority of Greek 
debt after the bailout of 2012. Politically, such a position would be portrayed 
in creditor states as allowing a government that was blamed with causing the 
crisis in 2009 to avoid paying its bills. It would also mark an about face in the 
policy position of creditor nations throughout the crisis, which have trum-
peted the need for financial and structural reform (austerity) as the solution. 
Ultimately, these questions represented a face-off between the European 
Union and one of its member states. As in Rodrik’s trilemma, which would 
lose out: the deeply integrated economies; domestic preferences; or the sov-
ereign state? In other words, something had to give. Would the euro fail or 
would the Greek people’s preferences be ignored or would the EU become a 
federation where the Greek people’s preferences would be assimilated with 
Europe’s as a whole, meaning sovereign states would be replaced by federated 
ones? After 2012, domestic preferences lost, but the fiscal and banking reforms 
adopted may indicate that the EU is on the path to becoming more akin to a 
federation. The new Greek situation in 2015 offered another opportunity to 
potentially reframe the structure of the EU within Rodrik’s trilemma. 
On 20 February 2015 the Troika and the new Greek government an-
nounced an agreement that would extend the previous bailout another four 
months, allowing the new government time to meet looming debt obligations. 
Afterward, the Greek government was to begin discussions on a new third 
bailout, as its need became rapidly apparent. 
Tax revenues remained uncollected under the new Greek government as 
it became uncertain whether previously imposed increases in taxes would 
remain permanent. The sudden new political uncertainty had also tipped the 
frail Greek economy back into contraction. Avoiding another bailout would 
always have been difficult given the ground previously lost in the summer of 
2012, and the events of early 2015 forced the country to fall off the fiscal 
tightrope. A new bailout would now be necessary, but under what terms? The 
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new Greek government had been elected on a promise to roll-back the hated 
austerity conditions of the previous bailout many Greeks blamed for their 
current misfortunes. The Troika, and especially EU governments, saw the 
reversal of such conditions a recipe not only for future disaster, but also as a 
domestic threat to their own governments given existing anti-bailout senti-
ment in their countries. 
Initially, the February agreement appeared to solve the most recent debt 
crunch; the Syriza government seemed like it would be able to make future 
debt payments as negotiations went on, however, the deal came with condi-
tions attached. Greece was to identify new reforms and plans regarding how 
they would be achieved. However, the new Greek government and the Troika 
did not see eye-to-eye on what reforms were needed. This process began a 
series of new negotiations in which Greek officials produced successive plans 
that were then rejected by Troika officials, particularly EU ministers, who 
found them repeatedly lacking in substance. So unhappy was Brussels with 
Syriza that one EU official quipped, “They are living in cloud-cuckoo land.” 
Yanis Varoufakis, Greece’s finance minister, said he welcomed the animosity 
directed at him across the eurozone.153 As long as such plans were not pro-
duced, a needed €7.2 billion to cover Greek debt obligations in the coming 
months through summer 2015 would not be released. A second impasse be-
gan as talks dragged on while deadlines loomed ever closer. 
 
In May 2015, Greece officially entered recession again after recording two 
consecutive quarters of negative growth (the last quarter of 2014 and the first 
of 2015). Greece’s fiscal position continued to worsen as tax revenues further 
declined, due both to the lack of growth and uncertainty over what taxes were 
even owed in the previous year, given the possibility the new government 
might repeal previous tax increases. With negotiations dragging, the Troika 
withheld the next tranche of bailout aid promised in February 2015. Greek 
bond rates began to soar, and by April 2015 exceeded ten percent. Any return 
to the bond markets was now financially impossible. 
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In April, Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras travelled to Moscow to 
discuss the situation with Russian President Vladimir Putin, to the dismay of 
many in the EU. In the end, Greece did not break ranks with the EU over 
Russian sanctions, and Tsipras left with only Putin’s moral support.154 Alt-
hough unsuccessful, the effort further infuriated some European officials who 
questioned whether Greece was really serious about coming to an agreement 
that would release the final tranche of bailout aid from the 2012 agreement 
and necessary to meet looming debt payments. It was now clear a new bailout 
deal would be needed, however, it was unclear whether Greece might instead 
choose to default on existing loans before such an agreement could be 
reached. Worse, some EU officials even worried whether Greece was seri-
ously trying to avoid such a result. 
In May 2015, the Greek government made its debt payments despite the 
cash-crunch. With domestic revenues collapsing, the Greek government 
managed to pull enough funds together to meet its obligations, but these 
efforts included passing a measure that infuriated the mayors of the many 
cities and towns who, along with other state entities, were told they had to 
hand over any spare cash to the state to aid its repayment efforts. Remarka-
bly, while tempers flared in Brussels and Athens, financial markets in the rest 
of the EU were generally unfazed with this new round of uncertainty regard-
ing Greece’s future in the monetary union. Fears in 2015 that a “Grexit” 
would precipitate a euro failure were far more muted in this round of Greece-
EU negotiations, and bond rates of other SPIGI countries remained relatively 
stable, unlike events in 2011 and 2012. 
Many observers saw the risk of the crisis as mainly one that threatened 
Greece and the political leaders involved in negotiations. The rest of the 
currency union behaved as if it were an optimal one, one in which the bene-
fits of staying were clearly greater than losing the currency. Accordingly, 
markets were unwilling to bet against the euro and the currency. Some pun-
dits even argued a Greek exit might, in fact, bolster the euro as it would 
demonstrate the newfound strength of the currency union’s financial rules. 
Daniel Gros, the director of the Center for European Policy Studies, remarked 
after the February negotiation that it symbolized “…a basic clash between 
national democratic accountability and European rules and obligations… The 
European Union can’t work if every new government can’t keep the com-
mitments of previous governments.”155 
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This time the crisis seemed political, not financial, at least for the rest of 
the EU. When asked whether the EU finance officials and negotiators had 
ignored the Greek electorate’s preferences, Jeroen Dijsselbloem, the head of 
the group of eurozone finance ministers, remarked, “In the Eurogroup we have 
to work with 19 ministers who have 19 mandates,” adding “[and] we have to 
reach a joint decision.” Decisions “will always be about money and about 
conditions,” he added.156 In other words, the debate was not about what to do to 
solve a financial dilemma, but rather about the principles and organization of 
the supranational institutions of the EU and eurozone. The threat the new Greek 
crisis posed was as much about how the EU would continue to be organized in 
the future; whether national democratic accountability would be superseded by 
the member states’ responsibilities under the Maastricht rules and similar treaty 
obligations; or whether Europe would face the fact that its current structure left 
little room to directly recognize, reflect, and be held accountable for the 
preferences of its citizens. If the union were to become more reflective of the 
people’s preferences, it would have to become more of a federation. 
By June, positions had hardened between Greece and the rest of Europe. 
Even France, which had initially seemed sympathetic to the new Greek gov-
ernment’s questioning of the European status quo and emphasis on austerity, 
became tired of the lack of progress in negotiations. Further, it had become 
apparent that Greece was not willing to bargain in the way Europe was used 
to. Instead of avoiding overt conflict with other parties and striving for a 
consensus, Greek politicians brought disputes into the public arena. The me-
dia increasingly reported on the personal feelings expressed by Greek partici-
pants, and, in particular, by their German antagonists. As the month dragged 
on, the Greek government failed to provide any new proposals over which to 
negotiate and seemed instead to become more vocal regarding their demands 
that the Troika reduce the austerity of previous bailouts. Europe and Troika 
members became more frustrated with Greece’s apparent lack of willingness 
to come to a compromise. Any trust left between sides seemed to melt away 
and negotiations seemed to move backward as Troika members, more uncer-
tain than ever about Greece’s commitment to meet any bailout conditions 
should an agreement be reached, began to offer not less but often more aus-
terity in their bargaining positions. Eventually, as the deadlock continued, 
Greece ran out of resources and was forced to miss a €1.6 billion payment in 
June 2015 on an outstanding IMF debt. 
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Image 5-4: Greeks waiting in long lines at ATMs to find ones that still had cash to 
dispense, Athens, summer 2015. Photo by Peter Stavropoulos. 
This event was not technically a default, but world markets reacted as if it 
had been.157 Greek sovereign 10-year bond rates climbed to over fifteen 
percent. Unlike events in 2011 and 2012, other SPIGI countries’ rates were 
hardly affected. This time, markets seemed to take as given the integrity of 
the euro as a currency; the only question was whether Greece would leave the 
eurozone. Withdrawals from Greek banks, which had been accelerating since 
spring 2015 turned into a torrential outflow of cash as savers in Greece 
looked to protect their deposits. The ECB continued to lend to Greek banks to 
maintain their liquidity and to avoid failure; however, with the missed bond 
payment and the threat of default, it was unsure for how long. In a final at-
tempt to come to an agreement, in late June just before the looming IMF 
payment was due, Greece and its Troika creditors engaged in a final set of 
round-the-clock negotiations. 
The Troika, despite the misgivings of some member countries, made one 
final offer in late June. The proposed deal allowed some concessions from 
previous bargaining positions, but after so many months of zero progress the 
terms were harsh, and required increased Greek austerity in many areas. In a 
surprise move on 26 June, the Greek negotiating team abandoned talks, and, 
after banks had closed that Friday, prime minister Tsipras, announced he 
                                                          
157  By IMF rules, such a missed payment is not classified by the IMF as a default. Instead, 
Greece was ruled to be “in arrears”. However, by missing the payment, Greece became the 
first developed economy ever to do so. It was also the Fund’s largest missed payment.  
161 
would call a national referendum for July 5th, allowing Greek citizens to de-
cide whether to accept the final deal offered. 
This decision simultaneously roiled financial markets in Europe and 
Greece, and enraged many negotiators involved in the bailout talks. 
Withdrawal requests from Greek banks morphed from a steady stream to a 
flood as citizens attempted to move money out of their accounts to safeguard 
their savings if Greece abandoned the euro and returned to drachmas or 
another currency, which now seemed much more likely. The ECB did not 
increase bank support to offset this liquidity crunch and, on 29 June, faced 
with potential runs when banks opened for business on that Monday morning, 
Greek banks remained closed, and customers were limited to teller-machine 
withdrawals to a maximum of €60 per day. International transfers were 
halted. The Athens’s stock exchange closed. As had happened in Cyprus, 
capital controls had been imposed on the country to avoid the failure of the 
country’s banks. These institutions would remain closed until after the 
referendum was completed. 
The referendum asked Greeks: 
Should the plan of agreement be accepted, which was submitted by the 
European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International 
Monetary Fund in the Eurogroup of 25.06.2015 and comprises of two 
parts, which constitute their unified proposal? 
The first document is entitled “Reforms For The Completion Of The 
Current Program and Beyond” and the second “Preliminary Debt 
Sustainability Analysis”. 
NOT ACCEPTED/NO 
ACCEPTED/YES158 
The following week saw frenzied campaigning in Greece by both pro- and anti-
bailout forces. Tsipras went on television to ask the people to vote “no” so as to 
bolster Greece’s negotiating position. He explained that the referendum was not 
a vote on leaving the euro or the EU, but, as he put it on the cover of his Twit-
ter page, a vote “for a Greece of dignity, for a Europe of Democracy”.159 Those 
inclined to vote yes disagreed fearing a no-vote would result in Greece leaving 
the euro, and financial calamity. Those against accepting the referendum 
question noted the question merely asked people if they supported accepting 
the terms the Troika had offered. A no-vote, they argued, would only allow 
further negotiations. As can be seen from the question, neither side could claim 
with certainty their view was correct. Many found the referendum language 
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unclear and confusing.160 Moreover, the Council of Europe said the vote fell 
short of its standards, not allowing the public the minimum of two weeks to 
deliberate.161 The Council of State, Greece’s highest court, was also brought 
into the fray, ruling that the vote was legal.162 
 
On Sunday, 5 July, the Greek people rejected the question resoundingly, with 
over sixty percent of ballots cast rejecting the conditions. While Greek mar-
kets and banks remained closed, as soon as world financial markets opened, 
Greek bond-yields soared, with the two-year bond rate reaching forty-eight 
percent. SPIGI bond yields, and even German and French yields, all briefly 
jumped. European and Greek negotiators were forced to meet to defuse the 
looming crisis, and to determine whether Greece would leave the euro. On 13 
July, the Greek government eventually accepted a set of conditions that 
would open new bailout talks and release short-term credit to pay current 
debt obligations and those debts now in arrears. The terms were worse than 
those offered prior to the referendum. 
In the following days, as a line of credit was made to Greece to allow the 
country to pay its debt obligations, including those now overdue, the Greek 
parliament also met to pass the conditions of the new loan guarantee package, 
thereby allowing bailout negotiations to begin. This capitulation to Troika de-
mands created a mutiny within the ruling government’s coalition. Neverthe-
less, on 14 August, a bailout agreement was struck, worth €86 billion. In the 
end, the additional uncertainty, uncollected revenues and the economic con-
traction that had occurred since the January elections had cost Greece and the 
Troika an estimated 36 billion more than what had been estimated the previ-
ous December. 
Following the acceptance of the third Greek bailout program, the Greek 
government passed the necessary measures to see the program go into effect. 
These votes were not without cost, requiring the support of opposition parties 
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to offset the defections within the ruling coalition’s own ranks. In response, 
prime minister Tsipras announced his resignation on 20 August and a new 
national election was called. 
On 20 September, Syriza party won a clear victory, falling only six seats 
short of an outright majority. Tsipras quickly moved to form a coalition with 
the much smaller Independent Greeks (ANEL), meaning he would not have to 
partner with either of the two parties that had ruled Greece for the past forty 
years, the centre-right New Democracy and the centre-left PASOK. The elec-
tion was a victory for Tsipras, and the hard-earned bailout agreement negoti-
ated the previous month, which he promised to implement. Although he failed 
to change Greece’s relationship with its creditors, voters rewarded his gump-
tion.163 Reaction from Brussels was swift to congratulate Tsipras, but also quick 
to remind him that much needed to be done with no time to lose. 
In Athens, the mood remained sombre, and unlike the January election 
when Tsipras first came to power, this time there were no illusions regarding 
a new approach to crisis policies. Weary of the prolonged self-examination, 
political and economic uncertainty, and the exhausting austerity they had 
experienced over the past several years, Greek voter apathy and abstentions 
from the vote reached record highs during this election. As Tsipras and 
Syriza celebrated a new beginning and a fresh start, most Greeks seemed 
more concerned with their everyday struggles than politics. In many ways a 
feeling of defeat fell over much of Greece. Despite the outcome of the par-
liamentary election, Greek politics remain fractured, and it is unclear whether 
Greece’s problems are over, although the populism that had challenged the 
Troika’s policies has now been replaced by a sense of inevitability. 
Nevertheless, Greece’s problems are Europe’s problems. Whether 
Greece leaves the eurozone or muddles through, there are implications for the 
European Union. Yanis Varoufakis, a former finance minister of Greece, 
argued in a New York Times op-ed piece, “If the ‘Athens Spring’ – when the 
Greek people courageously rejected the catastrophic austerity conditions of 
the previous bailouts – has one lesson to teach, it is that Greece will recover 
only when the European Union makes the transition from ‘We the states’ to 
‘We the European people.’”164 
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Conclusions 
Despite warnings from different quarters including from some academics and 
even some EU officials, in general, both the public and politicians had great 
confidence in the euro. Therefore, when the eurozone crisis struck, the Euro-
pean reaction followed the same path as the stages of grief. The first reaction 
to tremors in the eurozone was to deny the common currency was to blame. 
Next, anger flared as European nations criticized others for their problems. In 
the next phase, bargaining ensued and both economic and psychological 
depression set in. The final phase, acceptance, was reached when the ECB 
and eurozone countries implemented the structural changes necessary to end 
the economic crisis. 
Six years after the beginning of the crisis, it is, again, centred in Greece 
alone, exactly where it started in 2009. However, this time, the damage has 
been contained. The causes of the turmoil in 2015 were indecision and conflict 
between the government of Greece and the governments and institutions of the 
Troika. While tumultuous for Greece, in 2015, European markets were only 
minimally affected. The crisis is now purely political and the dilemma Rodrik’s 
trilemma poses is now stark. Despite the democratic wishes of the Greek peo-
ple, solutions contrary to that will were imposed on the country by the state and 
the overall institutions of the greater EU. As Rodrik predicted, under conditions 
like those the common currency creates of deep integration of national econo-
mies, national governments must first react to the rest of the world, or in this 
case the governance of Europe, over the wishes of its own people.
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Chapter VI: 
Counterfactuals, Costs, and Conclusions 
The eurozone crisis was the result of an imperfect currency union. As many 
theorists predicted, member states were neither similar enough nor integrated 
enough to withstand financial shocks, like those of 2008 and 2009, without 
serious consequences. Why was the currency union not optimally designed? 
Because, originally, the political will did not exist. Member states did not 
want to give up their sovereignty in the ways necessary to create a more 
flexible currency union, capable of bending without breaking, in the face of 
such strains. As established in previous chapters, the member states drew the 
line at certain measures such as joint liability of debt, a fully implemented 
banking union, or, more generally, a political and fiscal union that could have 
allowed the currency zone to better accommodate external shocks. Without 
these foundations, the eurozone appears to have been akin to a financial 
house of cards. 
Why pursue a currency union without first securing the political support 
necessary to get it to function properly? Is this not a case of putting the cart 
before the horse? The answer may lie with Robert Schuman who warned, 
“Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be 
built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidar-
ity.”165 The purpose of the euro seems not only to have been to facilitate 
greater economic integration, but to generate the solidarity necessary to cre-
ate, as stated in the Treaty of Rome, “an ever closer union”. In other words, 
the economic union was a precursor to political union. As the European Un-
ion was still member-state centric, the only way to convince national gov-
ernments to surrender more sovereignty to Brussels was slowly to build to-
ward greater integration over time, while simultaneously creating public 
support for such measures. Having a tangible piece of Europe in one’s pocket 
to husband everyday might hasten the process of European integration. 
Did the introduction of the euro increase European solidarity? Did the 
eurozone crisis? The answers seem to be a qualified yes, even after the 
financial crisis. According to public opinion polls, in absolute terms, the 
introduction of the euro cultivated a feeling of ‘Europeaness’ among a per-
centage the citizenry, and the crisis has led to more citizen support rather than 
to less. On the other hand, this achievement is tainted by the antipathy the 
crisis has generated within certain segments of the population. While support 
for pan-European institutions may have increased over time, it appears not to 
                                                          
165  The Schuman Declaration, 9 May 1950, http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-information/ 
symbols/europe-day/schuman-declaration/index_en.htm (accessed 31 August 2015). 
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have created enthusiasm, at least politically. Turnout for European Parlia-
mentary elections is generally low and declining. Furthermore, the voter 
more likely to turn out for elections is the angry one: one more likely to cast 
his or her ballot as a statement of dissatisfaction. This would explain apparent 
contradictions between EU polls that suggest greater support for the EU and 
the euro and recent European Parliament election results, where anti-EU 
parties won a significant minority of seats. Although opinion polls demon-
strate that the idea of the euro did increase solidarity among the citizens as 
Schuman predicted, the crisis also intensified and broadened the anti-EU 
voices on either end of the political spectrum. Eventually, if conditions 
caused by the crisis persist, they could undermine the progress toward greater 
integration the EU and euro have achieved. 
This greater acceptance of the euro may explain why the EU has worked 
so hard to ensure the euro’s survival since 2009. The costs of the crisis have, 
in part, been determined by the response of Europe to it. Political leaders in 
Europe made a decision to protect the euro and the economic union it repre-
sented. Have these efforts been worth it? What costs have they avoided? The 
benefits of a currency union have been previously described, but the costs of 
maintaining the currency throughout the crisis have not been negligible fi-
nancially or politically. 
The following sections describe estimates of the immediate economic 
costs that might have occurred had the euro failed. Next, the chapter assesses 
the economic and political costs and benefits of the measures taken to protect 
the euro, in particular, the choice of greater fiscal austerity. Actions to protect 
the euro have been of two sorts: palliative actions in response to the immedi-
ate crisis; and structural changes that were heretofore unimaginable before 
the crisis. Finally, the authors discuss lessons learned from the crisis, specifi-
cally, that while strides have been made toward a more integrated continent; 
the Union is still not one of equals. The EU is still member-state centric; each 
member state is self interested in terms of politics, and these realties make 
reform difficult. Nevertheless, the eurozone crisis has been a momentous 
event in the evolution of the European Union. 
Where are We Now? Economic and Political Costs 
In 2014, conditions in sovereign debt markets were the best they had been 
since before the European financial crisis began, but the same could not be 
said for most of the eurozone’s economies, many of which have suffered 
from severe unemployment and economic recession as a consequence. Was 
the price of the policies used worth it? Is the eurozone better off than had 
nothing been done or had the euro been allowed to fail? 
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Economic costs 
Answering these questions requires an estimate of outcomes as they would 
have been had the currency union collapsed. While such estimates are too 
complex to hope to predict exactly, many calculations were attempted to 
determine the possible losses such a collapse would have caused. Table 6-1 
estimates how each of the first twelve and largest economies of the eurozone 
would have been impacted by the collapse of the monetary union given con-
ditions in late 2011 and early 2012. The consequences were grim. In SPIGI 
countries, the average decline in economic output two years after the break 
up of the eurozone was estimated to be 12.5 percent, and among the other 
seven nations, the average decline was predicted to total 9.9 percent. 
Table 6-1: Potential Economic Impacts of a eurozone Failure (Spring 2012 estimates). 
Sources: Der Spiegel, ING. 
The stark differences and damages caused by a break-up of the currency un-
ion were reflected in other measures as well. Unemployment would have 
been even more severely impacted, rising by an average of twenty percent in 
SPIGI nations and 10.6 percent in the remainder. A eurozone break up would 
have been worse than any previous recession since World War II. 
Country Change in Out-
put  
Change in Unemploy-
ment  
Change in Inflation 
Rate 
 (change two 
years after last 
year of Euro) 
(change two years after 
last year of Euro) 
(relative to last year 
of Euro) 
Greece -15.4% +23.8% +18.6% 
Ireland -8.9% +19.4% +9.5% 
Portugal -14.9% +18.0% +13.1% 
Spain -11.0% +26.7% +12.9% 
Italy -12.3% +12.3% +10.3% 
Germany -9.2% +9.3% -0.9% 
Austria -9.7% +8.6% +0.8% 
Finland -8.4% 11.7% +0.8% 
Netherlands -10.8% +8.8% +0.7% 
France -11.6% +15.9% +1.2% 
Belgium -10.4% +11.8% +1.1% 
Luxembourg -9.3% +8.4% +0.8% 
SPIGI Average -12.5% +20.0% +12.9% 
Non-SPIGI 
Average 
-9.9% +10.6% +0.6% 
12-Country 
Average 
-11.0% +14.6% +5.7% 
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As previously noted, labour market rigidities would make economies less 
able to adjust internally to an external shock, worsening economic outcomes 
in those countries where rigidities were the most severe. For example, if, after 
such a negative economic shock, labour released in one sector could not be 
quickly absorbed into another, then unemployment outcomes would be worse 
and persist longer. In SPIGI countries, these rigidities have been measured as 
higher. In other words, differences in labour rules by country result in more 
rigid wages, more closed professions, or greater cultural differences that 
result in a greater reluctance of people to leave their country for a new mem-
ber state. These rigidities partly explain the more severe employment out-
comes predicted in these countries had the euro failed. Differences in these 
same rigidities have been very important in understanding the regional dis-
parities that have actually occurred during the crisis as countries with more 
open labour markets have been far less affected than others. 
Predictions based on the data in table 6-1 also demonstrated that inflation 
would vary by country. In SPIGI member states, the re-adoption of national 
currencies would result in precipitous declines in exchange rates relative to 
levels during the time of the euro, which would lead to rapid increases in the 
costs of imports, causing very high inflation. Since unemployment was pre-
dicted to rise, had the euro also failed, this would have led to even worse 
conditions than had unemployment risen alone, as people would have had 
less money with which to buy more expensive goods. Conversely, in stronger 
eurozone countries, the price effects were forecast to be much more moderate 
as these stronger economies would be better able to manage their currencies 
to stabilize domestic price shocks. Depending on the country, exchange rates 
in countries less troubled by the crisis, the northern and central creditor 
countries, would vary little or actually appreciate; quite the opposite to that 
effect experienced in SPIGI nations, again suggesting that weaker economies 
would have fared worse regardless of whether the euro survived or failed. 
How do the outcomes that actually occurred compare to these predicted 
outcomes? Results in table 6-1 can be compared to the actual outcomes that 
occurred during the crisis to get some sense of both the success and cost of 
the policies implemented. A comparison suggests that policy efforts have 
allowed some economies to avoid the potentially devastating recessions a 
monetary union failure could have caused. In particular, those states in north-
ern and central Europe, that have acted as creditor nations during the crisis, 
have experienced far better outcomes than they might have. Aided states, 
however, particularly those in the south, have not fared as well. SPIGI econ-
omies that were either forced to implement severe austerity measures as a 
condition of their aid or, like Spain and Italy, that did so defensively, have 
experienced severe recessions. In some cases, the recessions that occurred 
were almost as harsh as the predicted outcomes had the euro failed. 
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Figure 6-1: Eurozone Country Real GDP Annual Growth Rates: 2012 to 2014. 
Growth slowed to its lowest levels in many countries in 2012 as the majority of coun-
tries using the euro were in recession when the crisis reached its worst point. In 2013, 
growth rates improved in most countries; however, in eight of the countries using the 
euro, and in the eurozone as a whole, growth was still negative. By October 2014, 
growth was forecast to return to all states using the euro except Cyprus, Italy, and 
Finland. EU countries not using the euro averaged better growth rates than those using 
the common currency in all three years. Source data: IMF World Economic Outlook 
October 2014. 
The severity of the recessions some countries have faced can be seen in the 
growth and unemployment outcomes that occurred since 2012, the worst year 
of the crisis. Figure 6-1 describes the GDP growth outcomes in 2012 and 
2013, and forecasted outcomes for 2014. Output across the eurozone in 2012 
contracted at an annual rate of 0.7 percent, and the recession continued into 
2013 with contraction continuing at a 0.4 percent pace. In the sub-group of 
the original twelve that, combined, contribute over ninety-eight percent of 
total eurozone output, the 2012 contraction was worse than in the eurozone as 
a whole. Among these countries, the growth rate averaged negative 1.3 per-
cent of GDP measured at an annual rate, and fell another 0.6 percent the 
following year. Across these countries, however, economic outcomes varied 
significantly. 
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Figure 6-2: Eurozone Unemployment Rates (August 2014). Data labels identify the 
country and its respective youth (under 25) and overall unemployment rates. In most 
countries, rates are far above what would be expected at full employment, and, in 
several countries, they are at depression levels, especially in Greece and Spain. On 
average, almost one in four youth willing to work in the eurozone are unemployed. In 
Spain and Greece, it is half, with one in four people in the overall workforce still 
unemployed almost five years after the crisis began and two years after the ECB 
intervened, promising to “do what it takes” to avoid the failure of the euro in the 
summer of 2012. Source data: Eurostat. 
The worst outcomes have, not unexpectedly, occurred in southern states. 
Greek output declined by seven percent in 2012. Another 3.9 percent decline 
occurred in 2013, resulting in a reduction of over ten percent of the econ-
omy’s income in only two years, and approximately twenty-five percent 
since the crisis began in 2009. Only in 2014 was growth projected to return 
and the recession predicted to end. Other southern Europe countries have also 
been hard hit by the crisis. Cyprus’s economy fell by over 2.4 percent in 2012 
and, after their banking crisis and Troika-financed bailout, declined a further 
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5.4 percent in 2013, with a further contraction of 2.3 percent in 2014.166 
Portugal experienced an economic contraction of 3.3 percent in 2012 and a 
further 1.4 percent in 2013 before returning to growth. Italy and Spain also 
saw recessions last across 2012 and 2013. Of the SPIGI countries and Cy-
prus, only Ireland avoided contraction after 2012, returning to growth by 
2013 and experiencing the strongest growth of any of the original twelve 
countries in 2014. However, Irish growth figures can be deceiving. A labour 
exodus during the crisis resulted in many of the most talented workers leav-
ing for opportunities elsewhere. Mortgage failures also continued to occur in 
the housing market, leaving banks weak and construction moribund for sev-
eral years after the bailout.167 
At the other end of the spectrum, seven countries of the seventeen using 
the euro in 2012 experienced positive growth in 2012, albeit weak. Among 
the largest economies, Germany barely saw any growth in 2012, recording an 
increase in output of only 0.9 percent, while France recorded growth of 0.3 
percent. For comparison, in 2012 Australian growth was 3.6 percent, the 
United States’ growth was 2.3 percent, while in Canada it was 1.7 percent, 
and in Japan 1.5 percent, highlighting how the crisis worsened outcomes in 
Europe relative to similar developed economies worldwide. 
Unemployment outcomes across the eurozone two years after the summer 
of 2012, the worst year of the crisis, are shown in figure 6-2.168 As one might 
expect given growth figures, unemployment rates were generally very high 
across the monetary union and followed a worsening trend as the crisis contin-
ued. A full five years after those 2009 elections in Greece that precipitated the 
crisis, unemployment rates were still very high. In August 2014, the unem-
ployment rate across the euro-area was 11.5 percent, 1.5 percent more than in 
the same month in 2009, which itself was elevated because of the effects of the 
recession that followed the 2008 financial crisis. Worse was the unemployment 
rate for those under twenty-five years of age, reaching 23.5 percent in the 
eurozone overall and in the double-digits in every eurozone country except 
                                                          
166  2013 and 2014 figures were reported as preliminary by Eurostat at the time of this writing. 
167  By mid-2013, the effects of the real estate crisis in that country were still being felt with 15.8 
percent of all mortgages found to be over ninety days in arrears, and 26.9 percent over ninety 
days overdue for buy-to-let mortgages. Twenty-five percent of small and medium size 
business loans held by banks were judged to be “impaired”, and bank lending had slowed 
significantly, further slowing business and consumer activity. The credit crunch in Ireland was 
especially obvious in the statistics for bank loan refusal rates compared to other countries in 
the EU, where Ireland ranked second highest (IMF 2013b). See IMF country Report 13/163, 
“Ireland, Tenth Review under the extended arrangement,” June 2013. Since that time credit 
has continued to be difficult despite a general recovery in the Irish economy. 
168  By spring of 2015, European unemployment rates still stubbornly remained very close to those 
recorded the summer previous and shown in figure 6-2. The overall eurozone unemployment 
rate had fallen from 11.5 percent in August 2014 to 11.3 percent in March 2015, and youth 
unemployment across the eurozone from 23.8 percent to 22.7 percent over the same period. 
174 
Germany and Austria. Conditions were worst in Greece and Spain where the 
overall unemployment rate in each country hovered at nearly twenty-five per-
cent, and where among those twenty-four years old and younger, it remained at 
nearly fifty percent or more. Among the other SPIGI states, Portugal and Italy 
still had unemployment rates in the thirteen percent range, with youth unem-
ployment over twenty percent in Portugal and over forty percent in Italy. Only 
Ireland had actually achieved unemployment rate improvements relative to 
2009 with both its overall and youth unemployment rates below those at the 
beginning of the crisis. However, such figures are deceiving considering that, in 
2009, Ireland was already in a deep slump after its housing market bust, and 
that it has a history of using emigration to solve unemployment issues at home. 
Across the rest of the eurozone, only Germany, Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia, and 
Malta recorded improved unemployment rates since 2009. Again, the previ-
ously mentioned developed economies outside of Europe have all seen dra-
matic improvements in their employment conditions, emphasizing the stagna-
tion that has taken place over the past five years in the EU. 
For policy-makers, youth unemployment figures are potentially the most 
worrisome economic outcome of the crisis. The crisis has clearly had a 
differential impact on the peoples of Europe, both geographically and also 
demographically where a disproportionate share of the cost has fallen on 
young people. The potential implications and political fallout such a “lost 
generation” might have on the continent in the future are of grave concern. 
Overall, even if robust growth were to return to Europe, the rates of unem-
ployment now present will take years to clear out of labour markets, with 
costs in potential output, earnings, and in depressed demand remaining high 
for years to come. The costs to future productivity will likewise be high as 
prolonged periods of unemployment undermine future human capital and 
depreciate people’s skillsets. Clearly, such conditions could also sow the 
seeds of political discontent and social instability in a union already chal-
lenged by the events of the past several years. 
Another trend is apparent in figure 6-4. Across the eurozone, deficits 
have been slashed. Compared to 2012, most countries are at or below the 
Maastricht required deficit limit of three percent of GDP. Those that are not 
have also reduced their deficits, most very significantly.169 Despite the slow 
recovery, the majority of countries in the eurozone have embarked on an EU-
mandated fiscal reduction to bring their deficit and debt targets back in line 
with EU requirements as defined by the Maastricht treaty and the more recent 
fiscal compact agreed to in 2012. 
                                                          
169  The exceptions are Slovenia and Finland. The former endured a banking crisis in 2013, 
resulting in bank aid, which caused the deficit to rise, while in Finland, the country had al-
ready achieved its target and an economic slowdown caused the deficit as a share of GDP 
to rise. This was allowable since its debt/GDP ratio was below sixty percent. 
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Figures 6-3 and 6-4: Eurozone Country Debt and Deficit to GDP levels (2012): Poor 
economic conditions in 2012 due to the eurozone crisis took a toll on deficit and debt 
levels. Only six countries in the currency union met their deficit target defined by the 
Maastricht Treaty, and only five were able to meet their debt-to-GDP requirement. This 
outcome suggests the trade-off that faced the currency union: either the eurozone would 
have to relax its Maastricht requirements or significant additional austerity would be 
necessary for most countries to reach these goals. Clearly, such a policy could threaten 
to worsen economic conditions at a time when most members were already in recession. 
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Slow growth and high unemployment have taken their toll on the fiscal 
positions of eurozone countries, too. Debt and deficit levels have spiralled 
as economic contraction has reduced tax revenues and increased social 
program costs. Compared to pre-crisis levels, the impact of the eurozone 
crisis is clear. By the end of 2013, only five countries could claim to meet 
the basic treaty obligations European monetary union requires – maintain-
ing deficit levels under three percent of GDP and gross debt levels under 
sixty percent of GDP. Of the remaining thirteen states, most were well 
outside these requirements, and will remain so for some time. Simultane-
ously, unemployment levels in most countries will remain elevated for a 
number of years. Overall, the debt and deficit in the eurozone has signifi-
cant implications for the area’s ability to address growth and unemploy-
ment challenges moving forward. 
Austerity versus Stimulus 
The eurozone now faces a dilemma. Creditor and aided member states alike 
face weak economic conditions. The common currency means that troubled 
economies cannot simply devalue their currencies to stimulate their econo-
mies through greater exports. If treaty obligations were to be strictly followed 
in the future, significant austerity would be required in the countries where 
deficit and debt outcomes exceed Maastricht guidelines. Alternatively, even 
if treaty requirements were relaxed, given the levels of debt and deficit, 
member states have little fiscal space to engage in any form of stimulative 
policy to reverse current growth trends and improve unemployment out-
comes. These circumstances lead to the most pressing short run policy ques-
tions. First, to improve current conditions, should governments be allowed to 
relax Maastricht requirements to allow additional expenditures intended to 
rekindle growth, or should they attempt to return government deficit and debt 
outcomes to those required by Maastricht? Fundamentally, this question is 
about policy effectiveness: is there a trade-off between “greater austerity” 
and growth, or are these policies mutually compatible? Second, if there were 
a desire to stimulate economies, where would the funds for such efforts come 
from? 
This first question has dominated the eurozone crisis political debate 
since 2010 and reflects a longstanding policy debate in theoretical eco-
nomics. Traditional macroeconomics would suggest that, in times of reces-
sion, governments should not reduce their fiscal position. Among 
“Keynesian” economists, policy advice would go further and advocate the 
expansion of government expenditures and deficits when economic condi-
tions are like those in the eurozone, as other countries did in the aftermath 
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of the world financial crisis of 2008.170 In contrast, opponents argue that 
governments cannot stimulate economic activity in any real or permanent 
manner. Therefore, governments should only ensure stable economic 
finances: debt or deficit should be limited to long term efforts to increase 
capacity and capital that would otherwise not be provided privately or in 
optimal quantities. As a result, many creditor countries, particularly those 
that have proven the most fiscally conservative through the crisis – 
Germany, Austria, The Netherlands, and Finland – support lowering deficit 
and debt, or an austerity policy when government deficits exceed the 
Maastricht threshold of three percent. 
Some advocating this argument would go even further, suggesting just 
the opposite view to Keynesians, that additional austerity would not hurt 
growth and might actually help it by creating additional confidence in bond 
markets through a demonstrated dedication to fiscal prudence. Such increases 
in confidence, they argue, would then lead to expansionary effects in the 
private sector economy, resulting in growth without increasing debt. Which 
viewpoint is true is an empirical question. 
Since 2010, the eurozone has provided a useful Petri dish for a policy 
experiment across developed nations, as countries collectively increased 
austerity in reaction to events in bond markets following Greece’s revela-
tions regarding its debt and deficit. Major economies that had previously 
been focused on economic recovery after the worldwide financial crisis of 
2008 now had a new fear – too much debt and becoming “the next Greece” 
in the eyes of bond markets. The debate to stimulate or cut back occurred 
among global leaders at the G-20 economic summit meeting in Toronto in 
June 2010. On one side, US president Barack Obama went to the summit 
with a plan to convince G-20 countries of the need for stimulus and a 
worldwide focus on job creation. At this meeting, however, Britain’s prime 
minister David Cameron, Germany’s chancellor Angela Merkel, and Cana-
dian prime minister Stephen Harper’s arguments for austerity carried the 
conference. As a result, world economic policy made a sharp U-turn, shift-
ing its focus to debt, not recovery. Governments rapidly began to raise 
taxes and decrease expenditure. 
                                                          
170  The best known of these was likely the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 
in the United States that allocated over $700 billion in stimulus funds to stem the recession 
that followed the 2008 financial crisis there. 
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Figure 6-5: Austerity and Growth across Selected Countries: The relationship between 
increased austerity, (total combined increases in fiscal revenues and expenditure 
reductions), as a proportion of GDP generally appears to decrease real GDP growth. 
Using a cross-section of twenty-three developed countries’ data from 2009 to 2012, 
the trend line shows that, on average, a one percent increase in austerity was associ-
ated with a 1.39 percent decrease in real GDP growth. Source Data: IMF Fiscal 
Monitor, October 2012 and World Economic Outlook Database, figure and computa-
tion created by the authors. 
What has been the effect of these policies? While a simple association is not 
proof of causality, figure 6-5 uses the IMF’s online data from 2009 to 2012 to 
summarize growth and austerity outcomes; each point shows a single coun-
try’s austerity and growth outcome over this period. Of the twenty-three 
countries included in figure 6-5, some were recovering or had recovered from 
the financial crisis of 2008 and associated recession afterward (such as the 
United States) while some were still in recession or had slipped back into 
recession (like many of the countries affected by the eurozone crisis). While 
recovering countries tended to see tax revenues increase after the recession 
because of improved economic conditions, the majority of the countries 
shown here reduced their fiscal position regardless of the state of their econ-
omies by some combination of increased taxes or reduced expenditures. On 
average, across the countries shown, government austerity increased by 2.5 
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percent of GDP. The collection of countries shown includes thirteen from the 
eurozone where austerity increased by an average 3.5 percent of GDP. Aus-
terity in the eurozone ranged from a low of -0.5 percent in Finland, when 
GDP grew by 6.4 percent over the same period (Finland’s fiscal position 
increased as a percent of GDP, the opposite of austerity) to a high of 14.9 
percent in Greece. Greece’s government increased its tax revenues and de-
creased expenditure by an amount equivalent to 14.9 percent of the econ-
omy’s output. At the same time, Greece’s economic output contracted by 
almost sixteen percent over the three year period. 
To estimate the implied relationship in Figure 6-5 between austerity and 
growth, a simple regression analysis was conducted, which is summarized by 
the trend line shown in the figure. More austerity, (from increased tax reve-
nues, decreased expenditures or both) as measured by the total change in a 
country’s fiscal position as a percentage of its economic output between 2009 
and 2012, is shown by moving rightward along the horizontal axis of the 
chart. A country’s economic growth over the same period is shown on the 
vertical axis as the percentage change in GDP. As shown by the estimated 
trend line’s negative slope, on average, an increase in austerity relative to 
GDP of one percent (increased taxes and/or reduced expenditures) was asso-
ciated with 1.39 percent decline in economic growth.171 The data from this 
period support a view consistent with Keynesian economists: that economic 
growth slows when a government contributes less and takes more from the 
economy. There appears to be little evidence that greater austerity is con-
sistent with increased growth. More sophisticated analyses also reinforce the 
results shown. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) issued a widely read 
report in late 2012 that detailed its analysis of the cost of austerity’s efforts 
on world economic growth.172 It concluded that the effects of increased 
austerity across the world likely decreased economic growth significantly. 
                                                          
171  One must not interpret the relationship presented between austerity and growth as causal. 
The trend line only summarizes the average correspondence. A more carefully detailed 
structural study is necessary to determine whether this is causal. A traditional Keynesian 
framework would argue greater austerity is causal with respect to output contraction, and 
that the degree of contraction is determined by the fiscal multiplier. A discussion can be 
found in Blanchard and Leigh regarding the possible size of multipliers at the time of the 
data presented: Oliver J. Blanchard, and Daniel Leigh, Growth forecast errors and fiscal 
multipliers.,no. w18779, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2013, http://www. 
sindacalmente.org/sites/www.sindacalmente.org/files/wp1301_studio_fmi.pdf (accessed 22 
August 2015). 
172  See IMF, World Economic Outlook, October 2012. The analysis did not just rely on the 
simple relationship shown in figure 6-5, it also relied on an analysis of IMF forecasts and 
actual outcomes to determine whether the IMF estimates of what is known as the “fiscal 
multiplier” were consistently underestimated. This is reported in more detail in Oliver 
Blanchard and Daniel Leigh, “Growth Forecast Errors and Fiscal Multipliers” IMF Work-
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These results have important implications for European macroeconomic 
policy. First, they suggest less austerity would be better than more. To pro-
mote growth, especially in the economies most affected by the crisis, auster-
ity demands may have to be reduced, and, stimulus may, in fact, be appropri-
ate. However, how would such a policy change be financed? Few options 
exist. Delivering aid in the form of EU grants or external stimulus could be 
one possibility, but where would these funds come from? Creditor countries 
have already financed several bailouts, and have exhausted the public’s po-
litical will to extend further financing to the troubled countries, especially to 
the extent that would be necessary to meaningfully increase employment and 
growth in those troubled economies of Europe. 
Alternatively, troubled countries could finance their own stimulus, but, 
again, where would the funds come from? The troubled economies that might 
benefit most from such stimulus are exactly the countries that have been 
unable to access international credit markets during the crisis. While all the 
SPIGI countries have since resumed new borrowing on sovereign debt mar-
kets, the expansion of credit necessary to stimulate their economies may not 
be possible, and embarking on such efforts could undermine the newly re-
stored confidence these countries have been able to earn regarding their debt. 
Creditor countries would likely have to be the source of funds, and again, the 
political will does not seem to be present. Given these practical constraints, 
reducing austerity demands is probably the most realistic means to deliver 
swifter recovery within the troubled economies. Opponents to such plans, 
however, would argue that such actions could undermine the future stability 
of the currency and reduce the incentives for economic reforms that are nec-
essary to make troubled economies more competitive. 
A focus on troubled economies, however, threatens to lose sight of the 
potential for economic improvement elsewhere. With respect to stimulating 
the most troubled economies in Europe, it is possible that stimulus in the least 
troubled economies could be an effective recovery policy. Specifically, if the 
strongest economies were to take actions to stimulate their own economies 
internally, such growth could lead to two positive outcomes where recovery 
is needed most. First, growth in the strongest economies is likely to increase 
export demand from weaker economies. It could also create employment for 
migrants from high unemployment states. Increased incomes in wealthier 
economies could also stimulate tourism and other economic activity in south-
ern economies in Europe, thereby further aiding their growth. Second, strong 
growth in creditor economies is also likely to increase inflation in these 
countries, raising wage levels. Such a change could improve the relative 
competitiveness of weaker eurozone economies, further stimulating their 
                                                          
ing Paper WP/13/1, (January 2013) https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/ 
wp1301.pdf.  
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export growth. Stimulus in creditor economies would also have another ad-
vantage of avoiding the type of political resistance increasing financing to 
troubled countries would create. Since growth in creditor economies has not 
been strong, efforts to improve growth in these countries would likely be 
welcomed. As is clear in figure 6-5 though, the opposite has occurred as 
economies across the eurozone have consolidated their fiscal budgets. 
The problem of finding funds to stimulate troubled economies in the 
eurozone was well illustrated by the EU’s response in 2012 and 2013. In 
2012, a “Growth Pact” championed by France was suggested as a means of 
balancing Germany’s efforts to achieve the Fiscal Compact. In June 2012, the 
EU announced it would allocate €130 billion to programs to be used to help 
troubled economies in the eurozone recover. Nevertheless, practically no new 
funds were on offer. Almost half of the announced funds were merely repur-
posed from existing EU regional development funds. Further, the remaining 
funds pledged were contingent on private sector contributions that would 
have to come from external private investment with the ECB providing lim-
ited loan guarantees. Of course, given conditions in the eurozone, there was 
little private appetite to provide such funding.173 
In 2013, an additional EU sponsored Youth Unemployment Initiative 
promised €6 billion in aid for the jobless. However, such an effort was far 
less than was necessary to make a dent in the EU’s unemployment problem 
given the economy’s €13 trillion size. Such efforts suggest the difficulty in 
defining meaningful policy under the eurozone’s current economic circum-
stances and such announcements appear to be made more for political effect 
than to accomplish meaningful change. 
The most politically acceptable policies are likely to be those that focus 
on improving short-term recovery in creditor nation economies. Such efforts 
could focus on increasing economic activity in the strongest eurozone econ-
omies, Germany’s for example, then allowing this increased demand to raise 
export demand in troubled economies elsewhere. In this way, the stronger 
economies could pull the weaker ones out of recession through stronger 
growth. Furthermore, higher growth in stronger countries could result in 
greater wage growth in these economies, thereby increasing the relative 
competitiveness of the troubled economies where internal devaluation has 
caused wage costs to fall. Such plans also have the additional benefit of being 
more politically acceptable as stimulus funds are used in the countries 
providing them. Ultimately, political constraints bind more tightly than eco-
nomic. Indeed, Germany has already indicated that it is unwilling to expand 
its fiscal budget to finance growth oriented policies and unwilling to relax 
Maastricht commitments for other countries. 
                                                          
173  Similar programs were also been announced in 2014 regarding expansion of infrastructure 
expenditures, but few new funds were pledged to the efforts.  
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Political Costs 
What would have happened politically had the euro broken up? In the end, 
Angela Merkel chose to support the euro because, as she put it, “If the euro 
falls, then Europe falls.”174 The European Union derives much of its legiti-
macy from economic prosperity; therefore, the feared depression that would 
have ensued with a breakup of the euro would have discredited the European 
project. Fritz W. Scharf and Walter Lacqueur both went so far as to argue 
that the damage had already been done. According to Scharf, the EU’s le-
gitimacy has already suffered as it proved itself unable to deliver the pros-
perity promised in the euro.175 Lacqueur stated the eurozone crisis put Europe 
as a whole on the road to decline, rendering it merely a living “museum or a 
cultural amusement park for the nouveau riche of globalization.”176 So im-
portant is the euro to the EU that Wolfgang Münchau asked, “What is the 
point of the EU beyond the eurozone?” He posited that between the European 
Economic Area and the proposed Transatlantic Free Trade Area, there were 
few advantages to a country outside the euro to remain in the EU. 
What of it? What would it mean if the European Union ceased to exist, as 
we know it? Practically speaking, without the European level of govern-
ance,177 member states would have to renationalize policy, which would be 
less efficient and give them less influence in the world. As Charles Kupchan 
explained: 
From London to Berlin to Warsaw, Europe is experiencing a renationali-
zation of political life, with countries clawing back the sovereignty they 
once willingly sacrificed in pursuit of a collective ideal. … If these trends 
continue, they could compromise one of the most significant and unlikely 
accomplishments of the 20th century: an integrated Europe, at peace with 
itself, seeking to project power as a cohesive whole. The result would be 
individual nations consigned to geopolitical irrelevance – and a United 
States bereft of a partner willing or able to shoulder global burdens.178 
                                                          
174  Peter Spiegel, “If the euro falls, Europe falls”, part 3 of the series “How the euro was 
saved” Financial Times, 15 May 2014.  
175  Fritz W. Scharpf, “Political Legitimacy in a Non-Optimal Currency Area,” KFG Working 
Paper 52 (Berlin: Freie Universität Berlin 2013) http://userpage.fu-berlin.de/kfgeu/kfgwp/ 
wpseries/WorkingPaperKFG_52.pdf (accessed 3 August 2015). 
176  “‘An Anxious Continent’: Walter Laqueur on Europe’s Decline” Der Spiegel, 26 July 
2013,www.spiegel.de/international/europe/interview-with-historian-walter-laqueur-on-the-
decline-of-europe-a-912837.html(accessed 3 August 2015). 
177  For more on multi-level governance, see Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, Multilevel 
Governance and European Integration (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001). 
178  Charles Kupchan, “As Nationalism Rises, Will the European Union Fail?” Washington 
Post, 29 August 2010.  
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Integration takes advantage of economies and politics of scale to increase the 
prosperity and influence of all participants. Economically, integration has in-
creased the wealth of every member state. Politically, integration has stabi-
lized nascent democracies, for example, in Greece, Spain, and Portugal. The 
EU has strengthened the voice of Europe in international affairs. En bref, 
European integration coincides with the longest period of peace and prosper-
ity Europe has ever known. Ultimately, Merkel was right: the euro is too big 
to fail because the European project is too big to fail, hence, the importance 
of the euro. 
In general, the Europeans at the grassroots level recognize these accom-
plishments. In a Eurobarometer poll, a majority of people pointed to free 
movement of people, goods and services as well as peace among the member 
states as the top two accomplishments of the EU. The euro came in third 
above student exchange programs, the EU’s political and diplomatic influ-
ence in the world, the EU’s economic power, social welfare and the Common 
Agricultural Policy.179 
Andrew Moravcsik thought reports of Europe’s demise were greatly 
exaggerated: 
The euro crisis itself has even allowed European policy to intensify in 
existing areas, such as monetary and banking regulation. And even a 
collapse of the euro would not jeopardize the existence of the EU, despite 
what such commentators as Walter Laqueur and Wolfgang Münchau 
have at times suggested. Whatever the outcome of the crisis, the EU will 
remain without rival the most ambitious and successful example of vol-
untary international cooperation in world history.180 
How much damage did the eurozone crisis cause the European Union politi-
cally? Certainly, the EU’s image was tarnished during the crisis, but, at the 
same time, support for the euro remained positive. Opinion polls demonstrate 
that, although backing for the EU and the euro dipped during the eurozone 
crisis, at the same time, many Europeans recognized that more integration 
was the solution. Trust in the EU went down significantly, and, yet, it still 
remained the most trusted governmental entity surpassing trust in both na-
tional governments and parliaments. Furthermore, it persisted as the organi-
zation of choice to resolve the crisis. According to the polls, SPIGI country 
residents (excluding Greece) actually felt closer to other Europeans after the 
crisis. The power of the idea of the euro endured, increasing the foundations 
of solidarity on which further integration could take root. 
                                                          
179  Eurobarometer 81, (spring 2014), 32. 
180  Andrew Moravcsik, “Europe After the Crisis: How to Sustain a Common Currency” For-
eign Affairs (May/June 2012) https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2012-05-
01/europe-after-crisis (accessed 3 August 2015).  
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Did the eurozone crisis spawn a new age of Euro-scepticism under the 
extreme right? While the extreme right received a strong boost from the 
crisis, their support may wane as economic conditions improve. The extreme 
right has always flourished under the ‘politics of despair’: when people are 
desperate, desperate solutions seem more plausible. Moreover, people are 
prone to vote extreme right when they want to punish the mainstream parties. 
They are also more likely to turn out in an election.181 Although the right had 
a stunning victory in the 2014 European Parliament elections, turnout was the 
lowest ever at 42.5 percent. Most likely, those who made the effort to vote 
were disproportionately supportive of the right compared to the electorate as 
a whole. In general, the extreme right does better among the less educated 
whereas the EU has greater support among the more highly educated. Euro-
barometer polls show that the EU continues to have strong support from this 
larger demographic.182 
The following opinion polls document public sentiment towards the euro, 
in general, and towards the EU during the crisis. The advent of the euro in 
2002 boosted a small amount of pro-Europe feeling. The crisis itself activated 
some rally-round-the-flag support among some SPIGI citizens, especially, 
and in several eurozone countries, in general; however, it accentuated suspi-
cion of the euro in non-eurozone countries and in specific eurozone ones (e.g. 
Germany and Greece). Broadly speaking, the more directly a member state 
was affected by the crisis, for better or even for worse, the more likely the 
crisis was to create pro-Europe support among its inhabitants. 
Public Attitudes Towards the Euro 
How successful is the euro as a political tool, that is, as a device to enhance 
public support for the integration project? In general, the answer is quite 
good. Contrary to Scharf, Thomas Risse argued, “In sum, there is an emerg-
ing demos in the European polity and it has been strengthened during the 
euro crisis.”183 Both the introduction of the euro and – perhaps counter-intui-
tively – the subsequent crisis created an uptick in European feeling among 
the people, especially those in the eurozone. 
The European Union feted the arrival of the euro on New Year’s 2002 as 
the birth of a new age. Once the fanfare subsided, public support for the euro 
                                                          
181  Anger is a great motivator in getting people to the polls. See Nicholas A. Valentino, et al., 
“Election night’s alright [sic] for fighting: The role of emotions in political participation”, 
The Journal of Politics 73 (2011): 156-170. 
182  For more in-depth analysis, see Marcel Lubbers, Exclusionist electorates. Extreme right
wing voting in Western Europe, (Nijmegen: KUN/ICS, 2001). 
183  Thomas Risse, “No Demos? Identities and Public Spheres in the Euro Crisis,” JCMS: 
Journal of Common Market Studies 52.6 (2014): 1215. 
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remained strong. In 2002, Eurobarometer asked whether citizens were more 
likely to feel ‘European’ after using the common currency for a year. The 
great majority of the people felt no change. However, on average, eighteen 
percent did feel more European, and a much more significant thirty-two 
percent did in Ireland and Italy (see figure 6-6). In terms of creating more 
European solidarity, the introduction of the euro had negligible negative 
consequences. 
 
Figure 6-6: Flash Eurobarometer 139 “The euro, one year later” (2002), 71. 
Certainly, Europeans were ‘happy’ about it. Luxembourgers, the Irish and the 
Belgians were happiest about the euro; Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain 
were all in the middle. Sixty-eight percent of Germans were unhappy about 
losing the Deutsche Mark, a symbol of post-War regrowth and rehabilitation. 
Overall, fifty percent were happy or very happy. Removing Germany from 
the average, 62.5 percent of the other eleven eurozone countries were ‘happy’ 
about the euro. 
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Despite the overall levels of ‘happiness’, the pollsters at Eurobarometer wor-
ried about the general downward trend from a year earlier: 
Changes in the level of satisfaction are worrying. This seems to result 
from a number of elements on which negative opinions were expressed 
as part of this survey, such as difficulties experienced in using the euro 
and the feeling of being cheated upon when converting prices. But this 
could also be explained by the adverse economic background in which 
the survey took place.184 
Two lessons can be taken from the above quotation. First, the numbers were 
still high albeit down from a year earlier. Second, adverse economic condi-
tions affect popular support for the euro. Therefore, one can predict that pop-
ular support for the euro vacillates depending on the health of the economy. 
Public Attitudes During the Eurozone Crisis 
The eurozone crisis has had a mixed effect on the public. Very often, the 
people will pull together during a crisis, what is known as the “rally-round-
the-flag” effect. Despite some anger and disillusionment, people agreed that 
more integration was the answer. In 2012, more than seventy percent of 
respondents agreed that the following measures would be effective in tack-
ling the financial and economic crisis: “a stronger coordination of economic 
policy among all the EU member states”; “a stronger coordination of eco-
nomic and financial policies” among eurozone countries; and “a more im-
portant role for the EU in regulating financial services”.185 A whopping 
eighty-five percent agreed that “as a consequence of the crisis, EU countries 
will have to work more closely together.” A majority believed the crisis 
would make the EU stronger in the long run.186 
The economic and financial crisis has also not cooled enthusiasm for the 
euro. The following graph charts support for the common currency from 
2004 to 2014. Among all EU countries, support for the euro fell to its lowest 
ebb in 2013 with fifty-one percent, showing that even at its lowest point, a 
majority of Europeans were in favour of the euro. Among eurozone countries, 
that is, the people the most affected, 2013 also had the lowest showing of 
sixty-two percent. The graph demonstrates that support for the euro is ex-
tremely resilient. The main opposition to the euro comes from those outside 
it.187 
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Figure 6-9: Net trust change in support for the European Union from 2007-2012. Jose 
Ignacio Torreblanca and Mark Leonard, “The continent-wide rise of Euroscepticism” 
European Council on Foreign Relations Policy Memo, May 2013 http://www.ecfr.eu/ 
page/-/ECFR79_EUROSCEPTICISM_BRIEF_AW.pdf (accessed 3 August 2015). 
 
Figure 6-10: Eurobarometer 81 spring 2014, 19. 
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
TrustinEuropeanUnion:NetSupport(2007to2012)
2007 2012
50%
44% 45%
48%
45%
57%
48%
50%
47% 47% 47% 48%
42% 43% 41%
34%
31%
33%
31% 31% 31%
38%
35% 35%
38%
33%
43%
35% 34% 34%
36%
32%
30% 31% 31%
33%
27% 28% 28%
26% 25%
28%
34%
31% 31%
35%
30%
41%
34%
32%
34%
38%
32%
29% 29% 28%
32%
24%
28% 27%
25% 23%
27%
TrustinEUGovernmentInstitutions
TheEuropeanUnion The(Nationality)Parliament The(Nationality)Government
190 
Trust in the EU fell to record levels in 2013, making headlines,188 but alt-
hough true, the numbers were not as negative as one might think. The Euro-
pean Council on Foreign Relations took Eurobarometer figures to determine 
net trust in the EU. Their chart below shows the severe decline in the peo-
ple’s trust of the EU from 2007 to 2012.189 That said, the European Union 
remains more trusted than national governments, national parliaments, the 
IMF, the G-20, and the United States.190 The following time series demon-
strates that the EU has held its place as the most trusted institution over the 
past ten years.191 In other words, despite these steep declines, the EU remains 
the most trusted governmental organization among those polled. While the 
people were unhappy with the economic situation, they choose not to change 
horses. Daniel Debomy argued that while more people might say “no” to the 
EU, in general support for the euro remained.192 
In the spring 2014 Eurobarometer, many indicators regarding the EU 
were on the rise, most likely because the economy was doing better.193 In 
terms of identity, the crisis has made forty-one percent of EU citizens overall 
feel closer to each other.194 In eurozone countries, 43.2 percent felt closer. 
Among the SPIGI countries, the figure jumped to 48.6 percent. If one adds in 
Cyprus, the average increases to 50.5.195 Therefore, the more one is affected 
by the crisis, the more likely the citizen is to have a feeling of increased 
closeness with his and her fellow Europeans. Notably, socio-demographics 
made no difference in the responses to these questions.196 Moreover, with the 
upturn in the economy, the spring 2014 Eurobarometer showed the highest 
levels of feelings of EU citizenship since 2010. Fully sixty-five percent of 
respondents said they felt they were EU citizens, a six percent increase from 
the year before. Most interestingly, the six point increase was reflected in the 
category “yes, definitely”.197 The German Marshall fund concluded “The 
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Great Recession and the sovereign debt crisis left Europeans somewhat 
unsure about the euro but still committed to the European Union as an eco-
nomic entity. Public opinion seems to support the argument that crises tend to 
lead to more citizen support for integration rather than less.”198 
Nevertheless, decisions in the EU are not made by continental majority. 
Instead they are made at the country level, so it is important not to confuse a 
general result across the EU for a meaningful one. After all, it could take only 
one country to leave the euro and/or a major country like Germany to pull its 
support for the eurozone to crumble. Pan-European support will not translate 
in to pro-European action. Therefore, it is unclear whether support for the 
euro and the EU has improved or not in a meaningful way that could lead to 
greater reform. Ultimately, it is easier to say “no” than to come up with 
structural modifications that pass muster with every member state. 
The Rise of Euro-Scepticism 
While a majority of Europeans continued to support the European project, 
almost half became much more anti-EU. EC president José Manuel Barroso 
warned: “Socially and politically, one policy that is only seen as austerity is, 
of course, not sustainable. … We haven’t done everything right … The pol-
icy has reached its limits because it has to have a minimum of political and 
social support.”199 Economic contraction and unemployment – especially 
youth unemployment – led to despair. In Gallup polls from Spring 2011, 
more people believed their economic situation was deteriorating rather than 
improving, with numbers reaching seventy-one percent and sixty-one percent 
in Greece and Portugal respectively.200 
The rise of extreme right parties and the popularity of their nationalist 
and protectionist messages during periods of economic crisis may be due to 
their ability to provide scapegoats. Historically, these have been foreigners as 
they have blamed immigration policies, but, during the crisis, they have 
blamed the EU. In The Netherlands, the Party for Freedom, came in third in 
the 2010 parliamentary elections. Their leader, Geer Wilders, advocated 
returning to the guilder. In Finland, the True Finn party won nineteen percent 
of the vote in the 2011 elections. In 2012, in France, National Front candidate 
Marine Le Pen came in third in the presidential election with almost eighteen 
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percent of the vote. In Greece, in 2012, the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn, running 
on an anti-austerity and anti-immigrant platform, had its best showing win-
ning seven percent of the vote and seats in the Hellenic parliament. 
Other anti-establishment or simply anti-EU or euro parties have done 
well during the crisis, too. In the UK, the United Kingdom Independence 
Party (UKIP) has improved its standing, garnering almost one quarter of the 
vote in local elections and coming in third with 12.6 percent of the vote in the 
2015 general election. UKIP’s popularity has even forced the prime minister, 
David Cameron, to promise a referendum on Britain’s membership in the EU 
should he win re-election. He did, and the referendum is tentatively sched-
uled for 2017. 
In Italy, Beppo Grillo began the Five Star Movement in 2010. On an 
anti-establishment and anti-euro platform, his party won over twenty-five 
percent of the vote in the 2013 election. In Germany, the anti-euro, although 
not anti-EU, party, Alternative for Germany, founded in 2013, won 4.7 per-
cent of the vote in the general election, just shy of the five percent threshold 
needed to win a seat in the Bundestag. With many academic and intellectual 
supporters, the party used slogans such as “The euro splits Europe”, “The 
courage to tell the truth: Citizens are what matter to our system, and nothing 
else,” and “So that Europe doesn’t fail due to the euro”201. One year later, the 
party won seven out of Germany’s ninety-six seats in the European Parlia-
ment and secured seats in the state parliaments of Saxony, Brandenburg, and 
Thuringia. 
Together, these anti-EU parties had their best showing to date in the 2014 
European Parliament election. They gained ten percent more seats in parlia-
ment bringing the number of anti-Europe parties in the EP to thirty percent.202 
This statistic should, however, be taken with a grain of salt. The European 
Parliament saw its lowest turnout in 2014 of 42.5 percent, the latest in a 
thirty-year-long downward trend. For better or for worse, most voters were 
apathetic. In addition, as explained earlier, support for the extreme right usu-
ally spikes during periods of economic strife, meaning that this rise will be as 
short or long-lived as the recession. Finally, the European Parliament has 
restricted powers; therefore, the rise in anti-EU MEPs will most likely have 
limited impact on the EU, especially considering that this group is so nation-
alist that it seldom crosses state lines to cooperate together within the EP 
setting. 
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The Eurozone Crisis and Anti-Semitism 
Special attention must also be drawn to the rise of anti-Semitism in the con-
text of the eurozone crisis. According to a poll from the Anti-Defamation 
League, “Overall, 31 percent of respondents across Europe blame Jews in the 
financial industry either “a great deal,” “a good amount” or “a little” for the 
current global economic crisis.”203 Although this Europe-wide surge in anti-
Semitism springs from different sources, “In Spain, Italy and Greece the 
Judeophobia feeds off resentment towards the global financial system, which 
is widely blamed for these countries’ economic woes and deep recession.”204 
Anti-foreigner as well as anti-Jewish and anti-Roma sentiment is partic-
ularly strong in Hungary. Hungarian philosopher Gaspar Miklos Tamas 
claimed Hungary has, “a new official state ideology [calling it] a mixture of 
euro-skeptic nationalism and ethnicism.”205 Hungary’s Jobbik party206, 
branded by its leader Gabor Vona as “the strongest national radical party” in 
Europe, won twenty percent of the vote in the 2014 election returning Prime 
Minister Viktor Orbán to power in a right-wing coalition with Oban’s party 
Fidesz. Jobbik advocated detention camps for Roma “deviants” and has 
argued that Jews are a “national security risk”207 One Jobbik MP went so far 
as to propose national registration lists for Jews.208 While Orbán tried to 
downplay Hungarian anti-Semitism before the World Jewish Congress in 
2013, Der Spiegel reported: 
Orbán also appeared to attribute Hungarian anti-Semitism to the alleged 
failures of the European Union, which has criticized the Fidesz govern-
ment on a raft of issues, from a restrictive media law to a controversial 
new constitution, which Orban [sic] on Sunday called Hungary’s “first, 
democratic Constitution,” implying that the country had operated with a 
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non-democratic Constitution until Fidsez returned to power three years 
ago. “The economic crisis is shaking Europe to the core, and the unsuc-
cessful crisis management of European leaders is causing increasingly 
deep frustration, and consuming people’s hope,” Orbán said209 
Nevertheless, the Israeli left-of-centre newspaper, Haaretz, concluded that 
although a “crisis”, the rise in anti-Semitism is not a “catastrophe” and has 
not spawned a mass exodus of Jews.210 
Overall, one could argue that the rise of anti-EU parties reflects the im-
pact of voter alienation that Rodrik’s trilemma suggests is inevitable in the 
EU. Policy during the crisis estranged many voters, particularly those in 
crisis countries, who had to endure the hardship of their bailouts’ austerity 
conditions. Outside these countries, events of the crisis, particularly political 
ones, may also have offended the principles of other EU citizens who worry 
preservation of the Union might undermine sovereignty and democracy in 
individual countries. To reverse this potential, the EU should create a more 
integrated, transparent, and accountable form of governance for European 
voters to preserve support for the Union. 
In conclusion, politically, the eurozone crisis seems to have created 
feelings of ‘Europeaness’ among more than half of the EU population. That 
said, it also activated antipathy among the nearly other half. The EU’s leaders 
took advantage of this moment to address major structural reforms to keep 
the integration process on track, so as to avoid future financial crises. These 
actions may also have had the effect of improving economic conditions, 
thereby reducing the power of the anti-EU movement. Nevertheless, the re-
forms have met with opposition stemming back to the intergovernmental-
ist/federalist debate, and may yet feed increased resentment and nationalist 
feelings among non-supporters of such reforms, and the most economically 
disaffected. 
The question now is how economic circumstances will evolve in the EU. 
If conditions were to remain poor, support could erode for greater integration 
or for the continued support of the EU, tipping in favour of anti-EU, populist, 
and/or right-wing nationalist parties. The evolution of political support for 
the Union could fundamentally change if crisis conditions do not improve – 
and swiftly – given the high unemployment in Europe, which has improved 
little since 2012. 
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Reforming The Eurozone’s Economic Architecture 
As stated in chapter three, a perfect currency union should have a banking 
union, to regulate banks, and a fiscal union, to regulate national spending and 
budgets. In the case of the EU, each requires that the member state surrender 
sovereignty to Brussels, in other words, that the member states take a collec-
tive step towards political union. Before the crisis, the idea of banking and 
fiscal unions was a non-starter. The crisis forced the issue, but not without 
controversy. The continual intergovernmentalist-versus-federalist tensions, in 
addition to a split and more passionate electorate, means that, despite the 
necessity for such unions economically, the politicians must tread lightly. 
The Banking System 
The Eurosystem was designed to preserve sovereign control of each coun-
try’s banking system and to create a strong and independent central bank, the 
ECB. The regulation of each national banking system was left to its respec-
tive country. The lack of strong oversight in some member states, however, 
led to significant problems building up in the mid-2000s. Banks both in Ire-
land and Spain accrued significant portfolios of risky real estate debt that 
later led to banking crises in both countries. In Cyprus, the banking system 
accumulated assets greater than eight times the country’s GDP, and then 
found itself undercapitalized when investments in Greek bonds incurred 
heavy losses, resulting in the need of an eventual bailout. Even in Germany, 
large international institutions such as Deutsche Bank were allowed to oper-
ate with very low levels of capital, allowing the firm to potentially threaten 
that country’s financial system. National banking system crises have been 
pivotal in the evolution of the eurozone crisis, leading to bailouts being re-
quired in Ireland, Spain, and Cyprus. 
Breaking the “doom-loop”, as the linkage between banking system crises 
and sovereign debt crises has been called, required several changes to the 
Eurosystem’s structure, specifically, the creation of a European banking 
union initiated in September 2012.211 Creation of such a union required three 
new elements to be instituted in the existing Eurosystem structure: a single 
common supervisor and set of banking standards across all banks in the EU; 
a well-defined resolution process to determine how illiquid and insolvent 
institutions would be dealt with; and a common deposit protection scheme 
covering all EU deposits. 
                                                          
211  See EU (2012) “A roadmap towards a banking union,” Communication from the Commis-
sion to the European Parliament, 12 September 2012 http://ec.europa.eu/finance/ 
general-policy/docs/committees/reform/20120912-com-2012-510_en.pdf (accessed 3 Au-
gust 2015). 
196 
Before the financial crisis, member states eschewed the idea of a banking 
union for fear of relinquishing sovereign control of their own banking sys-
tems and for fear of being liable for other states’ debts, reintroducing the 
principle of moral hazard. If a common pool were established for bank re-
capitalization or to finance a single deposit insurance scheme, then the liabil-
ity for bank failures in a single country could be spread across all currency 
union members. To reduce that liability and to reduce the moral hazard, a 
single system-wide regulator could ensure proper bank compliance across the 
eurozone, but only by having the states give up their sovereign control over 
their banking systems. 
How Would the Banking Union Work? 
The first of these new standards would be accomplished by having the ECB 
take over the regulation of all banking systems in the EU, and imposing a 
common set of operating standards across each. The common rulebook 
would ensure that the pressures of bank competition do not result in the worst 
regulatory practices becoming standard practice, a concern in the past. Fur-
ther, a single regulator would ensure that similar banking problems in differ-
ent nations were addressed coherently and consistently, avoiding the build-up 
of destabilizing problems in some countries and not others. Such a change 
would reduce uncertainty among regulated banks, and avoid problems seen in 
the past when domestic political incentives reduced the willingness of na-
tional regulators to deal with banking problems. 
The second reform, the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) created 
consistency and greater certainty across the eurozone by instituting a com-
mon set of practices by which troubled banks would be shut down or recapi-
talized. Critical to this process is the determination of how such recapitaliza-
tion might be funded to avoid such actions triggering a national sovereign 
debt crisis, that is, the “doom loop”. One suggestion was to allow the Euro-
pean Stability Mechanism or ESM to inject capital directly into banks, 
thereby transferring the liability incurred by such actions to the greater EU 
and not to the country where the problems occurred. This suggestion, how-
ever, has been controversial, and opponents to the plan have argued little 
incentive would be created for careful regulation if someone else’s funds 
were available to finance the costs of a failed bank, again leading to moral 
hazard. In June 2013, common EU resolution rules were initially agreed 
upon, which included allowing the official use of ESM funds for bank recap-
italization.212 As a compromise to ensure that nationalist interests did not 
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interfere with bank regulation, the EU created the Single Supervisory Mecha-
nism (SSM) in November 2014, allowing the ECB to directly oversee the 
largest banks, while allowing national regulators to oversee the other ap-
proximately 6,000 banks in the euro area, or in any other countries that chose 
to be under this system. 
The final reform necessary to create a banking union is a common bank 
deposit insurance system. In the past, banking insurance guarantees have 
been the responsibility of individual nations. If, however, a country were 
perceived as unable to guarantee the deposits due to its sovereign debt posi-
tion, such fears would lead depositors, in times of financial crisis, to with-
draw their funds and transfer them to banks in countries perceived as safer, 
thereby weakening already troubled banks and exacerbating the situation in 
troubled countries. A common banking insurance scheme funded by a single 
pool across all of Europe would undermine such withdrawal incentives. Such 
a system could be financed by a tax or levy on each bank proportional to their 
deposit base and guarantee all deposits in the EU up to some limit.213 The 
idea of creating a common deposit insurance system, allowing the ESM to be 
used to recapitalize troubled banking systems directly, and imposing a com-
mon regulator over all European banks has been controversial and to date not 
yet adopted. 
The German Constitutional Court has been the site of several of the legal 
battles against the concept of joint liability. Several reforms made, since the 
crisis began, have potentially undermined the principle banning joint liability 
in the Maastricht Treaty. Specifically, the creation of a jointly funded perma-
nent bailout mechanism, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), the 
ECB’s program to intervene in sovereign debt markets to purchase member 
state bonds, and the banking union itself, have raised the ire of those who 
wish the Union to adhere to the original Maastricht principles. In January 
2014, the Court in Karlsruhe ruled that the ECB’s Outright Monetary Trans-
actions (OTM), or bond buying scheme, violated the German constitution.214 
Peter Gauweiler, the German MP who brought the case, revelled in the rul-
ing: “Karlsruhe has shown ECB President Mario Draghi what a bazooka 
really is.”215 However, the OTM action, although never put in force, was not 
cancelled; the Court referred the case to the European Court of Justice. As of 
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publication, the ECJ had not yet ruled. In March 2014, the German Court 
ruled that the ESM was legal because it did not violate the Bundestag’s 
autonomy over federal budgetary measures.216 In July 2014, five academics 
filed a case arguing that the banking union had “no legal basis in the EU 
treaties and so represents a breach of constitutional rights.” Markus Kerber, a 
finance professor at Berlin Technical University (TUB), and one of the 
plaintiffs, told reporters that the ECB’s supervisory system with the power to 
oversee and, if necessary, shut down European banks is the “pinnacle of 
Brussels power-grabbing to date.”217 That said, without power and autonomy, 
the ECB is useless. Der Spiegel summarized the matter as a choice between 
“Europe or Democracy”.218 Clearly, the politics of the banking union have yet 
to be resolved. 
Fiscal Union 
The goal of the fiscal union is to codify budgetary discipline to ensure that 
member states do not exceed certain levels of debt, so as to avoid similar 
financial crises in the future. Eurozone members originally signed the Stabil-
ity and Growth Pact, which entered into force in two stages in 1998 and 
1999, requiring that governments keep deficits to three percent of GDP and 
debt to sixty percent of GDP. However, the pact was viewed as too inflexible 
and too unenforceable, so much so that European Commission President 
Romano Prodi called it “stupid”.219 Although Germany insisted on the pact to 
shield itself from others’ poor economic decisions, it, itself, violated the pact 
in 2002; France did as well soon thereafter. The two major powers insisted on 
reform in 2005 to loosen the rules. 
With the onset of the sovereign debt crisis, the member states set out to 
revise the rules once again. The EU’s new fiscal governance has several parts 
including the Six-Pack, the Two-Pack, the Fiscal Compact, and the Treaty on 
Stability, Coordination, and Governance (TSCG). Five regulations and one 
directive, hence the Six-Pack, came into force on 13 December 2011 provid-
ing fiscal and macroeconomic surveillance. Through clearer definitions and a 
stronger sanction system supported by Reverse Qualified Majority Voting 
                                                          
216  Deutsche Welle “Germany’s top court upholds legality of ESM rescue fund” 18 March 2014 
http://www.dw.de/germanys-top-court-upholds-legality-of-esm-rescue-fund/a-17503069. 
217  Honor Mahony, “Banking union faces legal challenge in Germany” EUObserver 28 July 
2014, http://euobserver.com/economic/125117. 
218  “Europe or Democracy? What German Court Ruling Means for the Euro” Der Spiegel 
February 10, 2014, http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/german-court-calls-ecb-
bond-buying-into-question-a-952556.html. 
219  The Economist, “Charlemagne: Reforming the EU’s stability pact” 24 October 2002, 
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(QMV), where a QMV in the Council must be attained to stop such sanctions 
from occurring, the Six-Pack strengthens the Stability and Growth Pact. 
In March 2012, the EU leaders signed the Treaty on Stability, Coordina-
tion, and Growth, including the Fiscal Compact, to run alongside both the 
SGP and the Six-Pack. In May 2013, the Two-Pack came into force provid-
ing for budgetary surveillance. At Germany’s insistence, the compact en-
shrined the “golden rule”, committing states to balanced budgets. The Com-
pact requires national parliaments to adopt country-specific, medium-term 
objectives (MTO) to facilitate both convergence and compliance. Its imple-
mentation has, in part, accelerated some labour market reforms. The compact, 
which required countries to submit budgets to the Commission for approval 
prior to implementation at the national level, allowed exceptions to debt and 
deficit requirements under specific conditions. For example, as was the case 
with France in 2013, deficit targets can be relaxed in exchange for competi-
tiveness reforms. However, conditionality imposed by demands from the EU 
has allowed national governments to obviate responsibility for unpopular 
reforms by blaming Brussels. In doing so, the governments portray the cur-
rency union as a cost to national sovereignty and, therefore, may undermine 
support for additional economic and political integration. 
In the end, all member states signed on to the new reforms except the 
United Kingdom and newcomer Croatia, but not without some unease. The 
Czech Republic was the last to sign in 2014, because its previous centre-right 
government refused to as long as it was in power. France supported the move 
with reservations. French Socialist, Elisabeth Guigou, head of parliament’s 
foreign affairs committee, explained, “We don’t like this pact, it is a Sarkozy 
legacy. Merkel insisted on it because France has been breaking stability pact 
rules since 2003.”220 To make the pact more palatable to those in his party, 
Hollande negotiated a package of European growth measures to be enacted at 
the same time. Nevertheless, with the UK veto, the treaty must be an extra-
EU treaty, that is signed outside the auspices of the EU. 
In the end, the post-crisis ‘fiscal union’ is not so much a fiscal union as 
an attempt to strengthen the origami of fiscal rules so that they hold more 
rigorously than they had earlier with the original Stability and Growth Pact. 
Cynically, one could say that these reforms are “same old, same old”: more 
rules to control what some countries do. While these rules could stabilize the 
currency somewhat, they are also one-sided regulations coming down on the 
austerity side of the austerity versus stimulus debate. With reference to Ro-
drik, without political reform, such policies may further alienate some peo-
ple. After all, should not the people of Europe decide the austerity/stimulus 
balance? If the general European public wanted greater debt to stimulate the 
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economies, such a choice could alternatively be accommodated in a stable 
currency union if joint liability and transfers were allowed, alongside national 
market reforms. These fiscal reforms are ultimately a straitjacket, but not 
necessarily a golden one. 
Rodrik’s trilemma suggests a complete fiscal union must also include a 
political one that allows voter representation at the supra-national level. A 
fiscal union would not only allow greater coordination of fiscal policies 
across member countries, but it would also allow the European electorate the 
ability to influence these policies and create EU accountability to the entire 
union, and not only to the domestic electorates each leader now serves. 
Conclusions: Economically, the EU Needs Political Union; 
Politically, EU leaders annot fford t. 
The depth and duration of Europe’s crisis has primarily occurred for two 
reasons. One is that the scale of the problem was very large. It has involved 
the entire financial system of an area defined by seventeen countries whose 
collective GDP is larger than that of the United States.221 Second, the policy 
response has often appeared uncoordinated and slow owing to the signifi-
cantly more complicated and restricted political and legislative environment 
of the eurozone, where consensus rules the day. Moreover, policy actions 
have required coordination of three separate entities, the European Commis-
sion, IMF, and ECB, or the “Troika”, causing delays due to the multilateral 
bargaining necessary before a policy could be enacted. 
In addition, the governance of the EU is constrained by the demand that 
the sovereignty of each state be respected. In essence, all important matters 
must be decided by unanimity. Chief executives, who define eurozone policy 
through their decisions on the European Council, were elected to represent 
their countries’ own national interests, not those of Europe. They have recog-
nized and acted with this limitation in mind. Moreover, recognizing the deli-
cate politics that exist within each member state, leaders typically refrain 
from putting other elected leaders in such a position openly. Therefore, the 
problem of slow policy implementation and limited reform can be traced to 
the incentives posed by currency union members’ narrow self-interest within 
the EU system of governance, to wit, the lack of a strong Europe-wide federal 
system. 
If domestic concerns dominate the decisions of the European Council, 
Germany’s and France’s domestic concerns have dominated it the most. In 
the EU, not all countries are created equal. Given that the crisis has required 
                                                          
221  When the crisis began in 2009, there were only sixteen countries. Estonia joined the cur-
rency union in 2011. 
C A I
201 
significant commitments of resources to support bailouts and credit guaran-
tees, policies have especially required the consent of those who would be the 
primary paymasters – the largest economies in the monetary union. For this 
reason, France and Germany, representing almost half of the total funding 
guarantees to the EFSF and ESM, the two main funds used to administer the 
crisis bailouts, have dominated the negotiation of all agreements. Combined 
with incentives to follow national self-interests, this constraint implies that 
the domestic interests of Germany and France have overall played the great-
est role in determining eurozone policy. The failed eurobond proposals are a 
good example.222 These proposals, which found backing in several other 
countries in the eurozone, faced vehement resistance in Germany because the 
electorate there saw such proposals as violating the prohibition of joint 
liability and potentially very costly to their own country. For this reason, 
eurobonds have never been considered seriously as a policy option. It is diffi-
cult to imagine that similar concerns in Luxembourg, for example, would 
have had the same effect on eurobond proposals, had France and Germany 
been on board. 
Figure 6-11 illustrates the reason for France and Germany’s significant 
influence in policymaking during the eurozone crisis. Throughout the negoti-
ations, three blocs often formed. Germany and the northern countries (Aus-
tria, The Netherlands, and Finland) formed the first bloc controlling over 
forty percent of the collective commitment to Europe’s bailout funds and 
financial firewall. Germany alone represented over twenty-seven percent of 
the commitment. These countries have typically called for the greatest fiscal 
responsibility in aided countries, resisting joint liability proposals and usually 
in favour of smaller, less costly aid packages. France and other countries 
(Belgium, Luxembourg, Cyprus, Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Estonia) 
composed a second bloc accounting for another 27.7 percent share of com-
mitments, with France by far the largest contributor.223 This set of countries 
has often acted as the balance of power between calls for more conservative 
policymaking and calls for greater action. SPIGI economies represented a 
third bloc. While, in theory, SPIGI countries have a significant contribution 
to make to the financial facilities, in practice, they have been the primary 
recipients of aid, thus their potential contributions have mattered less and 
their negotiating position weakened. Effectively, it is the credit of the French 
and German blocs in figure 6-11 that guarantee the financing of both the 
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EFSF and the ESM, and within these blocs, France and Germany’s concerns 
matter most. The European financial crisis has demonstrated that the EU’s 
monetary union is not one of equals. 
Overall, policy response in the eurozone crisis has depended on the speed 
with which countries were willing to commit to specific actions and, in par-
ticular, on the interests of the two countries with the greatest means, i.e., 
France and Germany. Their willingness, in turn, has depended on their lead-
ers’ willingness to act. That readiness has not necessarily been determined by 
the perception of a threat to Europe’s best interests, but instead to threats to 
the best interests of their own countries. This conflict of interests has slowed 
the adoption of policies to address sovereign debt market instability and aid 
programs for troubled nations and often resulted in the scope of policies 
adopted being compromised once chosen actions are agreed to. Power in the 
eurozone comes from the pocketbook, and the pocketbook also grants the 
power to dictate the speed circumstances will be reacted to. 
 
Figure 6-11: The share of EFSF/ESM commitments across the, at the time, seventeen 
countries in the eurozone at the start of the crisis. Northern countries led by Germany 
were responsible for over forty percent of the funds guaranteed if future bailouts were 
needed, with Germany representing twenty seven percent of the total. SPIGI countries 
that had not received a bailout in 2012 (Spain and Italy) accounted for thirty-two 
percent of resources, and the remaining countries including France accounted for 27.7 
percent. Germany and France alone accounted for over forty-seven percent of the 
liability, thus it is understandable how Merkel and Sarkozy – Merkozy – emerged as 
the two leading policymakers during the crisis. Source Data: European Union, ESM 
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treaty, Annex 1 adjusted assuming Ireland, Greece and Portugal had responsibilities 
suspended due to their bailouts. 
The influence of national self-interest and the need for compromise have also 
almost certainly contributed to policy mistakes. The northern European 
countries strongly supported the implementation of costly austerity pro-
grammes, in part, to reduce the contributions they faced in supporting bailout 
programs. As discussed previously, austerity has likely undermined economic 
recovery in aided countries and worsened the economic circumstances 
bailouts were supposed to improve. Similarly, the original lack of EU support 
to include private sector losses in the first Greek bailout almost certainly 
stemmed from the fact that French and German banks would have incurred 
the largest losses in resulting private write-downs and bond haircuts. In hind-
sight, this unwillingness to allow private sector losses only increased the 
eventual total cost of the Greek bailouts.224 Overall, national self-interests 
have resulted in aid programs that have proven too small, too slow, too 
costly, or too harsh in their implementation, creating the conditions under 
which aid has been less effective than it could have been. Further, the po-
tential for policy mistakes and the difficulty in predicting policy outcomes 
due to the EU’s need to achieve political consensus has contributed to greater 
uncertainty in financial markets during the crisis, which, in turn, has raised 
bond rates and made finance more difficult in troubled countries. 
The clear solution to the eurozone crisis is political union. European 
Commission president Barosso declared: “Let’s not be afraid of the words: 
we will need to move towards a federation of nation states. This is what we 
need. This is our political horizon.”225 A currency union is fundamentally as 
much a political undertaking as it is an economic one, especially if it to be 
maintained. There are only two ways to achieve political union. One is 
through convergence. In other words, all member state economies and poli-
ties become similar enough in appearance and behavior that they can very 
easily follow the same policy paths. In this case, political union comes from 
member states reading from the same page to speak together with a common 
voice. This process is cumbersome and can lead to cacophony. The second is 
through explicit federation whereby one entity that represents the whole 
speaks with a single voice. 
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Federalists are often impatient and unhappy with piecemeal unification. 
They prefer furious negotiation to hammer out differences in order to produce 
a constitution, but what happens if the people reject the attempt? The Con-
stitutional Convention was called in 2002 “to reinvent the system, and pro-
pose a New Europe.”226 Although its goal was a constitutional treaty rather 
than a constitution per se, the treaty was to address the shortcomings of the 
Amsterdam and Nice intergovernmental conferences, recognize that the EU 
had gone beyond the Treaty of Rome with the introduction of foreign and 
security policy as well as justice and home affairs, and to establish clear rules 
before enlargement in 2004, when, with ten new members, the process would 
become ten times more difficult. As Valery Giscard d’Estaing, Convention 
Chairman, explained in his speech to the College of Europe in Bruges: 
The founding fathers knew that their system, which remains the basis for 
integration, would have to evolve and transform itself once European 
construction moved beyond economic integration to address political 
matters. In his memoirs, Jean Monnet, who was in this sense as much a 
visionary as a pragmatist, points out that: “The purpose of the Commu-
nity was confined to the areas of solidarity enshrined in the Treaties, and 
while we always believed that those areas of solidarity would call forth 
others, and would gradually result in the broadest integration of human 
activities, I knew that their progress would halt at the boundaries where 
political power begins. At that point, it would be necessary to rein-
vent.”227 
After much fanfare and myriad references to George Washington and Phila-
delphia, two founding members of the EU, France and The Netherlands, 
rejected the treaty in 2005 in popular referenda. In 2007, the European Coun-
cil announced, “The constitutional concept, which consisted in repealing all 
existing Treaties and replacing them by a single text called “Constitution”, is 
abandoned.”228 The political support for federation was insufficient. 
Where is the boundary between economic integration and political 
power? Perhaps, there is none. Margaret Thatcher recognized the link and 
refused to cross the line: “this Government has no intention of agreeing to the 
imposition of a single currency. That would be entering a federal Europe 
through the back-Delors. Any such proposal involves a loss of sovereignty 
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which Parliament would not accept.”229 This position was, in fact, an echo of 
Winston Churchill’s 1946 speech calling for a United States of Europe, one 
that he had no intention of seeing Britain join for exactly the same reason. 
Elsewhere in Europe, Denmark also rejected the euro, for similar reasons. 
The Annual Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank also recognized the link 
between currency and national sovereignty, but rather than opposing the euro, 
embraced it: “As a monetary union represents a lasting commitment to inte-
gration which encroaches on the core area of national sovereignty, the EMU 
participants must also be prepared to take further steps towards a more com-
prehensive political union.”230 
Without political backing for federation, the only other option for politi-
cal union is to limp along, working towards convergence until the public 
support can be found. That said, Thatcher was correct in saying a common 
currency would lead to federalism. The euro is arguably a more successful 
political tool than economic tool. In public opinion polls, all countries that 
use the euro report feeling more ‘European’ and are more supportive of 
‘Europe’ than non-participanting populations. Federalist/intergovernmentalist 
tensions will remain until European citizens feel ‘less tense’ about federation. 
Time may be on the federalists’ side. Opinion polls demonstrate that the 
more educated an individual and the more he or she interacts with the EU, the 
more supportive he/she will be of integration. European history is character-
ized by fits and starts. Just as the eurozone crisis spawned a banking and 
fiscal union heretofore unimaginable, a limping European Union can still 
move forward. 
At the same time, perhaps that conclusion is too optimistic. The Econo-
mist cover from 25 October 2014 depicted a dead parrot representing Eu-
rope’s economy. Alluding to the famous Monty Python skit, The Parrot 
Sketch, Angela Merkel responds “It’s only resting”.231 Limping along may 
not be enough to deal with the continuing economic crisis. After the deploy-
ment of Draghi’s Big Bazooka, the pressure of the immediate financial crisis 
in Europe seemed to subside. The eurozone economy improved, and Europe 
continued with its bitter medicine of austerity measures. Not surprisingly, the 
austerity measures in aid-recipient countries reduced demand in those coun-
tries for goods from the north, especially from Germany. Growth and growth 
forecasts for Europe have generally been anemic since 2012 despite the end 
of the financial crisis. The ensuing lack of growth has not only failed to re-
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duce unemployment significantly in most countries, it has also led to a period 
of little inflation, causing many economists and the ECB itself to recognize 
the potential threat of general economic stagnation and even deflation within 
the eurozone. Deflation is particularly worrisome as a general fall in prices 
would not only reduce incentives for increased economic activity, but such 
pressures could cause debt burdens to increase, possibly leading to the break-
up of the euro. Charlemagne writing in the Economist concludes, “Europe did 
well to hold together during the crisis years, but its failures are apparent: a 
jobless army 25 million strong; millions more underemployed. Such numbers 
do not seem to galvanise politicians the same way bond yields at 7% do.”232 
Throughout the European financial crisis, EU leaders have only been 
able to agree to policy when severe crisis conditions demanded action be 
taken. The structure of the EU has left leaders ’between a rock and a hard 
place’. If the currency union failed, blame for the outcomes would be theirs. 
At the same time, reforms to avoid such a failure are taken only at the last 
possible moment with the least resource commitment possible because sub-
ordinating national interests to European interests undermines political sup-
port at home. Under such conditions, leaders face an incentive to delay any 
decision, hoping circumstances will change in the interim. The result is weak 
leadership and actions that seem too little, too late. 
Given these incentives, it is possible that only a new crisis will spur the 
necessary reforms needed to move forward. Discomfort spurs cooperation. In 
just three years between 2009 and 2012, the financial crisis forced greater 
integration than had been achieved in the previous decade. Ironically, success 
in averting an ultimate breakup during the crisis may have allowed leaders to 
avoid finishing the process in a way that could have led to more permanent 
stability in the monetary union. The final lesson learned may be that only 
through the crucible of crisis will Churchill’s “United States of Europe” 
become reality. 
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“Frozen conflicts” 
in Europe 
Oft forgotten but simmering “fro-
zen conflicts” continuously mark 
the political map of Europe. All lo-
cated in South Eastern Europe, the 
Black Sea area and Transcaucasia, 
these conflicts run along ethnic, 
national, cultural and linguistic 
lines, separating communities.
The analytical chapters and 
comments in this volume present 
different viewpoints on the cases 
of Northern Cyprus, Transnistria, 
Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorny 
Karabakh, Kosovo, and Crimea.
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The ANTICORRP Project: 
Anticorruption Report, vol. 3
This volume is entirely based on 
objective indicators and offers 
both quantitative and qualitative 
assessments of the linkage between 
political corruption and organised 
crime using statistics on spending, 
procurement contract data and 
judicial data. The methodology 
used in the analysis of particularism 
of public resource distribution is ap-
plicable to any other country where 
procurement data can be made 
available and opens the door to a 
better understanding and control 
of both systemic corruption and 
political finance.
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Ingi Iusmen 
Helen Stalford (eds.)
The EU as a Children’s 
Rights Actor 
Law, Policy and Structural 
Dimensions
This edited collection critiques, 
from an interdisciplinary per-
spective, the growing body of EU 
children’s rights activities in the 
light of broader global political, 
economic and legal processes. 
Specifically, it interrogates whe-
ther EU intervention effectively 
responds to what are perceived 
as global violations of children’s 
rights; the extent to which EU 
efforts to uphold children’s rights 
complement and reinforce parallel 
national and international pursuits. 
